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ABSTRACT 
International accounting scandals around the world have triggered a wave of interest 
and discussion on the transparency and integrity of financial statements. Prior 
literature has stated that due to a variety of motivations and by using different 
techniques, the management of corporations might intend to influence the figures in 
financial reporting. The preferred term used in the accounting literature to describe 
this issue is 'earnings management', which is a very interesting and topical issue for 
researchers. Therefore, this research investigates the earnings management 
phenomenon in the Libyan environment. In this research, secondary data, which was 
accruals-based models, and primary data analysis, which included a questionnaire 
survey combined with semi-structured interviews, were used to achieve the objectives 
of this research, that are: to determine the existence and the direction of earnings 
management in the Libyan context; the motivations and techniques behind that; and 
the earnings management constraints, which include internal accounting standards, 
corporate governance mechanism and audit quality. 
The analysis of secondary data examined the existence and the direction of earnings 
management in Libyan companies. Accruals-based models were applied on a sample 
of state-owned and private companies. The results indicated that the majority of the 
companies that engaged in earnings management by using income-increasing policies 
accruals were state-owned companies. However, the majority of the companies that 
engaged in earnings management by using income-decreasing policies accruals were 
private companies. The above results indicated that there are linkages between the 
direction of earnings management and the nature of company ownership in the Libyan 
environment. Further, as regards the relationship between the direction of earnings 
management and company size, the results of the state-owned companies group 
indicated that company size was positively and significantly associated with 
discretionary total accruals. On the other hand, the results of the private companies 
group indicated that company size was negatively and significantly linked to 
discretionary total accruals. 
iv 
The primary data analysis was used to investigate three main issues: the motivations 
behind the practice of earnings management; the most frequently used techniques to 
practice earnings management; and the earnings management constraints, which 
include accounting standards, internal corporate governance mechanism and audit 
quality. These subjects were investigated by using a questionnaire survey 
administered to external auditors, financial managers and senior accountants, internal 
auditors, lenders, tax officers and accounting academics. Also, a series of semi-
structured interviews was combined with the questionnaire survey, which was 
conducted with selected respondents to the survey. Results indicated that the main 
incentives for practising earnings management in Libyan state-owned companies 
were: to mitigate the threat of displacement (i.e. safeguard job position) and/or 
enhance management reputation, to report profits, to increase the value of 
management compensation, and to meet regulatory objectives. On the other hand, the 
main incentives for the private companies were to decrease the amount of taxes and to 
enhance the chance of obtaining bank loans. 
Further, the results showed that manipulation of the value of inventory, improper 
assets revaluation, incorrect capitalising rather than expensing of expenditures, 
manipulation of accrual estimation, incorrect use of expenses on asset acquisition, and 
related-party transactions were the most frequently used techniques to practice 
earnings management in Libya. Finally, the results showed a consensus among 
respondents on the importance of accounting standard. internal corporate governance 
mechanisms, audit quality as policies to constraint earnings management in the Libya 
environment. 
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1.1 Introduction 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of financial reports is to provide infonnation about the organisation's 
financial perfonnance, and the financial position of the organisation, to internal and 
external users to enable them to evaluate the perfonnance of the organisation and 
make reasonable decisions. The quality of financial reports is important to parties who 
are using the infonnation included in them, because it affects their decisions. 
Financial reports of low quality provide infonnation that leads to problems in the 
allocation of resources (Schipper & Vincent, 2003). 
According to Schipper (1989, p. 92), earnings management is a "purposeful 
intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining 
some private gain, as opposed to say, merely facilitating the neutral operation of the 
process". Moreover, Healy and Whalen (1999, p. 368) define earnings management 
as "when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions 
to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying 
economic perfonnance of the company, or to influence contractual outcomes that 
depend on reported accounting numbers". 
According to Leuza et al. (2003), financial reports with extensive earnmgs 
management inaccurately reflect corporations' perfonnance, and thus weaken users' 
ability to assess the corporation perfonnance. Therefore, practicing earnings 
management may cause misrepresentation or may reduce the transparency of financial 
reports, which will affect the decisions of users of financial reports, who rely on their 
accuracy. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 1.2 presents background 
infonnation related to earnings management research. Section 1.3 discusses the 
motivations for carrying out this study. Section 1.4 presents the study objectives and 
questions. The methodology that was adopted in this study is described in Section 1.5, 
while Section 1.6 provides the structure of this research. 
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1.2 Background Information 
In the literature review, attempts have been made to investigate the extent to which 
financial statements are manipulated through different techniques to reach different 
goals. Research into earnings management has been quite diverse, and has looked into 
different areas and used different approaches. According to Ronen and Yaari (2007), 
earnings management research can be classified into: theoretical researchand 
empirical research. Firstly, examples of theoretical research include the study of 
Lambert (1984), who examines real smoothing strategy whereby management uses its 
flexibility in making investment and production decisions to reduce the variability of 
the firm's value. Dye (1988) rationalises the external and internal demand for 
cosmetic earnings management. The external demand follows from the capital 
market's need to price the firm, and the internal demand follows from the principal-
agent relationship between owners and management. Also, Ronen el at., (2003) 
examined the effect of earnings management on voluntary disclosure and the demand 
for additional information. 
Secondly, empirical research and accounting literature have provided a number of 
approaches that have varying characteristics. McNichols (2000) provides three 
approaches that are typically employed to estimate the discretionary element, which 
are the aggregate accruals, specific accrual and distributional approaches. The 
aggregate accruals approach utilises the change in total accruals as a measure of 
discretionary accruals. The accruals-based approach is commonly utilised as signals 
for earnings management activity (Healy, 1985; Jones, 1991; Dechow et aI., 1995). 
The aggregate accruals approach was used by Healy (1985), who studied managerial 
accounting decisions and assumed that managers managed earnings to increase their 
compensation. Healy (1985) examines earnings management by comparing the mean 
of total accruals across the sample corporations separated into three groups, 
conditional on the earnings management direction. DeAnglo (1986) specifies total 
accruals as the aggregate of discretionary and non-discretionary accruals. Dechow and 
Slona (1991) developed the industry model to detect earnings management. Jones 
(1991) studies earnings management in U. S corporations during import relief 
investigations by the U.S International Trade Commission (ITC). Moreover, Jones 
separates discretionary accruals from non-discretionary accruals; this approach has 
been used by several studies such as Dechow et ai. (1995), Becker et al. (1998), Teoh 
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et al. (1998a, b), Guidry et al. (1999), Bartov et al. (2001), Larcker and Richardson 
(2004), Peasnell et al. (2005), Kothari et al. (2005). Moreover, Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) present a model that facades on the quality of working capital accruals and 
earnings. 
Instead of measuring earnings management by using aggregate accruals, the specific 
accruals approach focuses on a set of specific accrual or the influence of managers' 
discretion on specific accrual to test earnings management (McNichols, 2000; 
Marquardt & Wiedman, 2004). The previous studies of specific accrual in the 
literature can be classified into two categories: single accrual studies, such as 
McNichols and Wilson (1988) and Petroni (1992); and set of accruals studies, such as 
Beneish (1997) and Marquardt and Wiedman (2004). 
The distributional approach tests expected frequencies of earnings, and assumes that 
management has motivations to meet certain earnings benchmarks, such as sustaining 
recent profit performance or reporting positive profits. According to Goncharov 
(2005), the distribution approach tests the existence of earnings management by using 
a distribution of scaled performance measures (i.e. earnings and changes in earnings). 
Moreover, it focuses on the statistical properties of earnings to determine behaviour 
that affects earnings, and it is based on the distribution of earnings after management 
(McNichols, 2000). 
Recent years have shown an increaseed attention to earnmgs management 
phenomenon. A growing body of empirical studies has investigated earnings 
management in the developed countries generally and in the US especially. These 
studies investigate the existence of earnings management and why earnings 
management takes place, and how it is achieved. Examples of studies that investigate 
why earnings management takes place are: Healy (1985), Watts and Zimmerman 
(1986), Jones (1991), Gaver et al. (1995), Guidry et al. (1999), DuCharme et al. 
(2004) and Burgstahler (2006) , Noronha et al. (2008), Ball and Shivakumarb (2008), 
and Chen and Tsai (2010). Studies that investigate how earnings management is 
achieved are Dechow and Skinner (2000), Mulford and Comiskey (2002), Nelson et 
al. (2002), Schitlit (2002), Nelson et al. (2003), Ortega and Grant (2003), McKee 
(2005) and Ronen and Yaari (2007, and Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2011). 
3 
1.3 Research Motivations 
This study was greatly motivated to investigate the earnmgs management 
phenomenon because of the growing body of research that has been examining 
earnings management in developed countries. However, research is still lacking in 
developing countries generally and in Libya specifically, where more studies need to 
be done. Moreover, the results of studies on developed countries are not always 
applicable to developing countries. This is due to the fact that companies located in 
developing countries have received little attention in the literature and have a different 
environment to companies located in developed countries such as poor management 
performance, not many listed companies, weak corporate governance structure, 
unsophisticated users, weak accounting profession and family-controlled firms 
(Baralexis, 2004). 
Consequently, the first motivation of this research is to understand the earnings 
management phenomenon in the Libyan environment, where, to the best of the 
researcher's knowledge, this study is the first of its kind in the Libyan context. The 
Libyan environment is different from developed countries because of several reasons, 
such as: firstly, the extensive presence of state-owned and family-owned companies, 
and a small number of listed companies because of the fact that Libyan capital market 
was established in 2007. Therefore, this study examines the earnings management in 
the unlisted companies of state-owned and private companies. Secondly, the different 
economic system, cultural and legal environment from that in developed countries. 
Thirdly, corporate governance is in an early stage in Libya. 
The second motivation of this study arises from the accounting environment in Libya 
is still not developed and there are many steps that need to be taken over a period of 
time to facilitate its development. Such as, the Libyan Accounting Standards has not 
been issuaned yet. As a result, companies that are working in the Libyan environment 
are uncertain as to which accounting standards should be applied. This uncertainty has 
caused some defects that led to some misstatements occurring from fraud and/or 
errors. 
The third motivation of this study occurs from the need for light to be shed on 
corporate governance and the important role of external auditors in overseeing the 
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integrity of financial statements, to pay more attention to the importance of these 
factors, which may be useful to both regulators and professional bodies in their efforts 
to enhance the quality of financial statements. 
The fourth motivation of this study arises from the fact that that Libyan economy has 
witnessed several changes from the beginning of 2004. This is due to the fact that the 
financial sanctions on Libya were lifted on September 2003, after more than 10 years, 
which results with Libya being back on the world stage. However, Libya still faces 
the challenge of modernising its government structures and expanding its 
infrastructure. This study is a comprehensive study of earnings management 
phenomenon in Libya because it investigates the existence of earnings management, 
why earnings management take place, how it is achieved, and how it can be 
constrained. Therefore, this study is important because it is useful to have better 
understanding of earnings management phenomenon, accounting standards, corporate 
governance and audit quality as mechanisms to restrict earnings management in 
Libya. Moreover, it is expected to help in economic development in Libya by 
indicating the steps which should be considered to enhance the quality of financial 
statements in order to help policy makers and regulatory bodies in Libya to identify 
problems and possible implications of monitoring mechanisms, and to devise 
appropriate policies and regulations to enhance corporate control. This will benefit the 
country in different ways, such as decreasing earnings management levels, which may 
increase the confidence in the economy as financial information may become more 
transparent and credible. As a result, it will attract more local and foreign investments 
which, in turn, will assist to develop Libyan's economic. 
1.4 Research Objectives 
Based on the motivations for this study detailed above, the objectives of this study are 
as follows: 
1- To examine the existence and direction of earnings management in the Libyan 
context. 
2- To identify the motivations behind the practice of earnings management in 
Libyan corporations. 
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3- To found out the techniques used to practice earnings management in Libyan 
corporations. 
4- To determine the procedures that should be taken to constrain earnings 
management and improve the quality of financial reporting in Libyan 
corporations. 
1.5 Research Questions 
Taking into account the findings of the literature review, and in the line with the 
motivations and objectives presented above, the main research questions formulated 
to achieve the research objectives of this study are as follows: 
1- To what extent is earnings management practiced in Libyan corporations? 
2- What are the motives that encourage the practice of earnings management in 
Libyan corporations? 
3- What are the most frequent techniques used to practice earnings management 
in Libyan corporations? 
4- What are the procedures that should be taken to constrain earnings 
management and Improve the quality of financial reporting in Libyan 
corporations? 
1.6 Research Methodology 
This study is conducted in two stages: firstly, analysis of secondary data to investigate 
whether Libyan companies are practising earnings management and to overview the 
direction of earnings management in Libyan companies. This study follows the 
common technique that is used to detect accruals manipulation as described in the 
earnings management literature by adoption of the aggregate accruals approach, 
which uses discretionary accruals as a proxy to measure earnings management in the 
Libyan companies. Total accruals (TA ) divided into discretionary accruals (DA) and 
nondiscretionary accruals ( NDA) components. Discretionary accruals are the 
difference between actual accruals and expected nondiscretionary accruals. Four 
different versions derived from The Modified Jones Model were used in this study. 
This model was applied because it is the most common technique used to detect 
earnings management, and the data required for using this model are available in the 
Libyan environment. The sample size was 87 companies over four years. The sample 
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size was 87 financial statements of Libyan unlisted companies that are 45 state-owned 
and 42 private companies, which includes data over three years from 2007 to 2009. 
Applying this sample leads to a total number of observations of 261 company-years. 
Secondly, to collect data concerning the practice of earnings management in Libyan 
companies, six groups were asked to participate in this research through two-stages: 
firstly, completing a questionnaire survey, 500 questionnaires were distributed and the 
overall response rate was 60.4%. Secondly, the questionnaire was combined with 
semi-structured interviews with 18 interviewees, all of them answered the 
questionnaire to supplement and amplify the data obtained from the questionnaire and 
to reduce the potential for errors. The six groups consisted of external auditors, 
financial managers, senior accountants, internal auditors, lenders, tax officers and 
accounting academics. The main reason for choosing these groups of respondents is 
that all these groups should have expertise and knowledge from their daily work about 
earnings management and accounting manipulation issues. Further information on the 
research methodology is provided in Chapter 3. 
1. 7 Summary of Findings 
The analysis of secondary data examined the existence and the direction of earnings 
management in Libyan companies. Accruals-based models were applied on a sample 
of state-owned and private companies. The results indicated that the majority of the 
companies that engaged in earnings management by using income-increasing policies 
accruals were state-owned companies. However, the majority of the companies that 
engaged in earnings management by using income-decreasing policies accruals were 
private companies. The above results indicated that there are linkages between the 
direction of earnings management and the nature of company ownership in the Libyan 
environment. Further, as regards the relationship between the direction of earnings 
management and company size, the results of the state-owned companies group 
indicated that company size was positively and significantly associated with 
discretionary total accruals. On the other hand, the results of the private companies 
group indicated that company size was negatively and significantly linked to 
discretionary total accruals. 
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The primary data analysis was used to investigate three main issues: the motivations 
behind the practice of earnings management; the most frequently used techniques to 
practice earnings management; and the earnings management constraints, which 
include accounting standards, internal corporate governance mechanism and audit 
quality. These subjects were investigated by using a questionnaire survey 
administered to external auditors, financial managers and senior accountants, internal 
auditors, lenders, tax officers and accounting academics. Moreover, a series of semi-
structured interviews was combined with the questionnaire survey, which was 
conducted with selected respondents to the survey. Results indicated that the main 
incentives for practising earnings management in Libyan state-owned companies 
were: to mitigate the threat of displacement (Le. safeguard job position) and/or 
enhance management reputation, to report profits, to increase the value of 
management compensation, and to meet regulatory objectives. On the other hand, the 
main incentives for the private companies were to decrease the amount of taxes and to 
enhance the chance of obtaining bank loans. 
Further, the results showed that manipulation of the value of inventory, improper 
assets revaluation, incorrect capitalising rather than expensing of expenditures, 
manipulation of accrual estimation, incorrect use of expenses on asset acquisition, and 
related-party transactions were the most frequently used techniques to practice 
earnings management in Libya. Finally, the results showed a consensus among 
respondents on the importance of accounting standard, internal corporate governance 
mechanisms, audit quality as policies to constraint earnings management in the Libya 
environment. 
1.8 Libya Background 
This section aims to provide a background to, and characteristics of Libya's economy. 
The aim of including this part is to draw a complete picture of the Libyan 
environment. Libya is a developing country, which is an Arabic state and Islam is the 
State religion. Therefore, the Islamic religion and the Arabic language are two 
elements that characterize Libyan culture. 
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1.8.1 Libyan Economic Growth Progress 
Libya witnessed an intense shift in its economy in a comparatively short period. In 
this shift, Libyan economy accelerated its development and had become one of the 
developing countries (CIB, 2005). Libya was poor before and during the Libyan 
independence on 24 December, 1951. The economy was on its first steps and was 
constantly behind other countries. It was depended on primitive agriculture of field 
crops, raising livestock, or agricultural raw materials. Lack of subsidies and water 
shortages were the main factors in the inability to expand cultivable earth. Its industry 
involved trivial manufacturing and the processing of local products into flour, textiles, 
tobacco, footwear and clothing. This humble industry alongside foreign aid is what 
economy depended on and, yet, was hindered by the lack of local raw materials, the 
necessary experienced labour force or the capital investment. Abdussalam (1979) 
indicates that the remainder of the population lived on handicraft activities that were 
promoted by the Italian occupation in order to process domestic products 
On top of all the above, there was a lack of expertise in the technical and management 
section as well as the organisational skills, not to mention the spread of illiteracy. All 
of these factors made Libya depend upon foreign and international agencies, such as 
the UN and US in order to compensate for the difference between the country's needs 
and its resources. It was predicted that Libya needed years of foreign and international 
financial support before it adjusted itself to be able to live within its own domestic 
insufficient resources (Edwik, 2007). 
Economy in Libya is not like any other economy of its peers in the North African 
region such as Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco and others. The latter countries have 
established industrial bases and a considerable agricultural industry unlike the former. 
However when it comes to natural energy resources, chiefly the light low-sulphur 
unfinished oil and natural gas, Libya has a vast reserve in that area. After discovering 
and producing petrol and natural gas, Libya started moving forward and turned from 
one of the poorest countries in the world to one that is similar in its physical and 
human infrastructure to its neighbours (Bribsh, 2006). 
The oil discovery marked the first phase of a three-stage growth process of the Libyan 
economy, which has played a significant role in the great changes of development in 
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the Libyan economy. The second phase started 1, September, 1969. In this phase, 
Libya changed from a Western-oriented capitalist state into an anti-Western socialist 
country. The government's intervention in the country's economy grew in this phase, 
an economy that was supported financially by the ever-growing petrol revenues in the 
1970s. The government's returns decreased radically during the first two phases 
which resulted in severe deterioration in the economic activity (Bribsh, 2006). The 
third phase witnessed a long and overdue economic transformation which started in 
the mid-1990s after the central economic development and business and property 
control attempts to improve economy had been unsuccessful. According to Bribsh 
(2006) Libya has one of the less expanded economies not only amongst the Maghreb 
Arab countries but also amongst its oil-producing peers despite its significant natural 
energy resources and its economy relies heavily on the returns from those natural 
resources. Recently, as Mashat (2005) points out, non-oil activities have witnessed a 
growth that exceeded the manufacture-process of agricultural goods, as previously 
revenues from this sector were growing sluggishly, and worked its way into the fields 
of petro-chemical production, steel, iron, and aluminium. There are other major 
opportunities in the fields of civil aviation, telecommunications, water, waste 
management, fishing, and architecture, as part of the longer term aim of building up a 
stronger productive base when oil revenues become less. 
Libya, further, enjoys a strategic location in that it is situated in vicinity to global 
markets, not to mention the extensive hydrocarbon reserve. The ever-rising price of 
oil has positively influenced the economic growth as well as the country's current 
account. In order to reform and develop the economy, Libya set new measures and 
procedures and to achieve this goal. It started to reduce legislation to regulate 
information systems together with reporting accounting information to enable 
assembling national accounting, measuring the economy's growth, development 
design and routine assessment (Bribsh, 2006). The basic aim for Libya, and any other 
country for that matter, is to maintain either a stable or an increasing rate of economic 
development. The regulatory agenda of financial reporting should provide an outline 
of the necessary infonnation to meet international standards in order to achieve this 
goal despite several other factors that affect fulfilling this aim. 
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1.8.2 The Development of Accounting Practices and Auditing 
There are two types of ownership in the corporate ownership structures. The first is 
dispersed ownership structure. The second type is the concentrated ownership 
structure (CIPE, 2002). In the fonner, a larger number of owners hold a small number 
of shares from a given corporation. In the latter, it is quite the opposite, i.e. a small 
number of owners whether it were families, banks, companies or even individuals 
hold the largest percentage of shares of a corporation. Zheka (2005) adds another 
category, i.e. the state ownership. In Libya, it is the unlisted corporates, whether 
government or family-owned, and a few listed companies detennine the ownership 
structure. This is due to the fact that the capital market was only recently founded in 
2007 and the majority, if not all, are either banks or financial finns. 
The first recognised body to govern accountancy in Libya dates back to 1952 after 
Libya gained its independence from the Italian occupation. The corporation was 
named the State Accounting Bureau (henceforth SAB). In 1955, SAB was established 
by law No.31 and the Ministry of Treasury was responsible for it. Later, it became 
under the direct responsibility of the entire Ministries Council of Libya under the 
Audit Bureau of Law in 1966. The law was revised to ensure the dependence of the 
SAB. 
In 1988, a new body called the Institution for People's Control and Follow-Up in, 
1996 renamed as the Institution of People's Control and Follow-Up (lPCFU). The 
main objectives of this body were to provide the auditing and administration services 
and control to all state agencies, organisations, and departments that are financially 
supported or receive loans from either the government or a company that the 
government holds 25 per cent or more of the shares. In addition, there is large number 
of auditing service offices that provide auditing service and non-auditing service. 
Four important sources influence accounting practice in Libya; government laws and 
regulations in accordance with the business in Libya; accounting technology and 
knowledge from countries such as the UK and US, and experience of qualified 
personnel and companies; religion; accounting education and the publications and 
participation of practitioners and academics in the field. Mashat (2005) asserts that 
banks and other financial establishments have also had an impact on accounting 
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practice. According to their credit and loan policy, they require financial data about 
the business institutions that seek funds from them. It is the applicants' role to provide 
authentic and satisfactory information to encourage banks and financial 
establishments about their financial backgrounds and status. 
According to Article 3 of the Accounting Profession Law No.116 that was issued in 
1973 (previously known as the Accounting and Auditing Profession Law which is 
managed by the Libyan Union of Accountants and Auditors), the Libyan Union of 
Accountants and Auditors was founded to improve the professional and educational 
effectiveness of accountants and auditors and to organise and contribute to national 
and international seminars and conferences to stay up-to-date with international 
advances in the practice. The Libyan Charter Accountants and Auditors Union is 
criticised, because it has done little work for issuing or adopting accounting standards 
in Libya. As a result, the accounting standards and principles applied by Libyan 
companies differed from company to company, which depend on attributed the 
differences to differences in the accountants' professional and educational 
backgrounds. Therefore, the accounting environment in Libya is still not developed 
and there are many steps and studies that need to be taken over a period of time to 
facilitate its development. 
In the case of Libya, prior to 2007, there were no national standard governance 
mechanisms amongst corporations. After the Libyan stock market was founded in 
2007, Libyan corporate governance was formally announced. The government 
realized that there was a necessity to systematize and standardize corporate 
governance procedures in Libya due to the application of the 'Privatization' policy 
and foreign investments becoming part of the domestic economy. It has subsequently 
delegated this mission to the Libyan stock market which named these procedures 
'rules of corporate governance'. Nevertheless, the standardization process is still 
immature and in order to develop these rules, further studies and stages are required to 
enable its progress of improvement. 
Education and regional characteristics have a vital impact on accounting practice. 
Education is also considered a vital component in the socioeconomic and political 
development. Accounting education, in particular, in Libya functions in two stages; 
12 
commercial preparatory and secondary schools and the university. Students are 
granted the so-called 'Intennediate Diploma' on completion of their education at 
commercial schools just as their peers in UK colleges. Intermediate Diploma holders 
are capable to work either in the public and/or private sector as clerks or bookkeepers. 
Universities in Libya have had a chief impact on accounting practices in that they 
assisted in the development and construction of these practices alongside the 
publications and contributions of academics in the accounting field. 
1.9 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is organised into seven chapters and Figure 1.1 outlines the contents of the 
thesis in its entirety. 
Chapter One presented the background for this study, the motivations for carrying out 
the study, the study'S objectives and questions, outlines the methodology used, Libyan 
background, and the structure of the thesis. 
Chapter Two presents a reVIew and discussion of the definition of earnings 
management, perspectives of earnings management discussed in the earnings 
management literature, the accrual process and patterns of earnings management. 
Chapter Two moreover critically discusses earnings management techniques, the 
motivations behind the practicing of earnings management and the factors affecting 
motivation preferences. In addition, this chapter provides a review and discussion of 
the literature relevant to earnings management constraints and the factors that affect 
earnings management in practice. These factors include political forces, culture, 
accounting standards, internal corporate governance mechanisms and the impact of 
ownership structure on corporate governance, and external audit quality. 
Chapter Three presents details and justifications of the research methodology that was 
adopted in order to achieve the objectives of this research. This stage was adopted to 
collect data concerning the practice of earnings management in Libyan companies. 
Chapter Four describes the adoption of an accruals-based approach to investigate the 
existence and the direction of earnings management in Libyan companies. Statistical 
techniques, such as descriptive statistics and multiple regressions, were used to 
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analyse the secondary data to achieve the above aims. Four different versions of the 
Modified Jones Model were used as a proxy to measure earnings management in the 
Libyan companies. 
Chapters Five and Six present the overall findings derived from both the questionnaire 
and semi-structured interviews. The analysis and discussion of the findings on the 
earnings management phenomenon in the Libyan environment are presented on a 
section-by-section basis as appeared in the rationale to the questionnaire. 
Chapter Seven concludes with an overview of the study, summarises conclusions 
drawn from the study findings, and also points out the study's limitations and 
contributions. The chapter concludes by making some suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE LITERATURE REVIEW OF EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND THE 
FACTORS THAT CONSTRICT EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
2.1 Overview of Earnings Management 
According to International Accounting Standard 1 (lAS 1), the purpose of accounting 
is to provide information about the entity's financial performance, and the financial 
position of the entity, to assist decision makers to make economic assessments. 
However, managers are permitted some degree of latitude in selecting methods of 
reporting the corporation's performance (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). In other words, 
managers decide which estimates and methods will be used to report the corporation's 
performance (DeAngleo, 1986). Therefore, corporations' managers can use their 
knowledge of accounting rules to manipulate the figures reported, which will affect 
the decision of users of financial reports, who rely on their accuracy. 
Levitt, the former SEC Chairman, described the problem of the manipulating of 
accounts as "Accounting hocus-pocus" where managers try to exploit the flexibility in 
financial reporting to reach earning expectations. Moreover, he said: "This process 
has evolved over the years into what can best be characterised as a game among 
market participants. A game that, if not addressed soon, will have adverse 
consequences for America's financial reporting system" (Levitt, 1998, p.2). This 
subject has attracted considerable academic attention, and popular interest in the issue 
has been high after accounting frauds at Enron, Worldcom and Quest were uncovered. 
In addition, in the literature review, accounts manipulation is known under different 
names: earnings management, income smoothing, big bath, creative accounting and 
window-dressing (Stlowy & Breton, 2004). In addition, earnings management can be 
defined in different ways by the researchers, depending on the method of 
manipulation, the aims and the timing of managing earnings (Goncharov, 2005, p. 
20). 
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2.1.1 Definition of Earnings Management 
A number of definitions have been used to describe earnings management but 
Schipper (1989) and Healy and Whalen (1999) have proposed definitions that are 
widely accepted by other researchers. However, both definitions are difficult to 
operationalise directly using attributes of reported accounting numbers, because they 
focus on managerial intent, which is behind managing the earnings and cannot be 
observed (Dechow & Skinner, 2000). 
According to Schipper (1989, p. 92), earnmgs management is a "purposeful 
intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining 
some private gain, as opposed to say, merely facilitating the neutral operation of the 
process". According to Bissessur (2008, pp. 54-55), this definition shows that 
earnings management can exist in elements of the external disclosure process, and can 
take different forms. In addition, earnings management is approached from an 
informational perspective, which shows earnings as one of many signals that may be 
used to make certain decisions and judgments. According to Mintz and Morris (2008, 
p. 228), Schipper's definition emphasises an act by managers with a specific purpose 
of pursuing their own interests as could be the case when earnings are managed to get 
the stock price increased before the exercise date of stock. 
Healy and Whalen (1999, p. 368) define earnings management as "when managers 
use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial 
reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of the company, or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on 
reported accounting numbers". This definition gives a negative value to earnings 
management as a tool to mislead and shows there are many ways to practice judgment 
(Bissessur, 2008). 
According to Mintz and Morris (2008), Healy and Whalen's definition focuses on a 
manager's intent to mislead the shareholders by using accounting devices to affect 
earnings reports positively. However, the definition has two weaknesses: first, it does 
not clearly distinguish between earnings management and normal activities whose 
output is earnings; second, not all earnings management is misleading (Ronen & 
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Yaari, 2007). In addition, Healy and Whalen's definition moves away from the 
informational perspective (Bissessur, 2008). 
As noted above, the earnings management literature has different definitions of 
earnings management that have been employed by researchers, which reflect the 
researcher's objective. 
Ronen and Yaari (2007, p.27) present another definition for earnings management: 
"Earnings management is a collection of managerial decisions that result in not 
reporting the true short-term, value-maximising earnings as known to management. 
Earnings management can be 
Beneficial: it signals long-term value; 
Pernicious: it conceals short- or long-term value; 
Neutral: it reveals the short-term true performance. 
The managed earnings result from taking production/investment actions before 
earnings are realised, or making accounting choices that affect the earnings numbers 
and their interpretation after the true earnings are realised". 
2.1.2 Perspectives of Earnings Management 
According to Beneish (2001, p.5), earnings management has two perspectives: the 
opportunistic perspective, where managers set out to mislead investors about the 
company's economic performance and to achieve personal gain; and the informative 
perspective, which " ... .is a means for managers to reveal to investors their private 
expectations about the firm's future cash flows" and it is illustrated When managers 
seek to increase the information value. Moreover, Jiraporn et a1. (2008) affirm the 
view that earnings management can be opportunistic or beneficial. Assessing whether 
earnings management is opportunistic or beneficial hinges on the nature of the way 
earnings are managed and the aim of the earnings management. Therefore, views 
about earnings management range from good to no effect or bad (Parfet, 2000, p. 
485). 
According to Parfet (2000, p. 485) bad earnings management " ... .is intervening to 
hide real operating performance by creating artificial accounting entries or stretching 
estimates beyond a point of reasonableness". Covering the operating trends of a 
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company by the use of false and other hidden accounting offsets is bad earnings 
management. These kinds of offsets are illegal and they depict a bad picture of the 
company. This earning management led to inappropriate revenue recognition, creation 
of unknown reserves and overly conservative or overly aggressive accounting 
judgments. All these actions are inappropriate and unproductive as they generate no 
real value. As a result, they are likely to spoil the company's reputation as they are 
considered akin to fraud. However, good earnings management constitutes 
"reasonable and proper practices that are part of operating a well-managed business 
and delivering value to shareholders". "Good" earnings management, sometimes 
referred to as "operational" earnings management is a situation where managers take 
actions that are helpful in creating steady financial performance by the use of 
acceptable and voluntary business decisions and practices. 
2.1.3 The Accrual Process 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) require managers to make 
judgments and estimates to raise the quality of earnings and to make financial reports 
more informative about the performance of the corporation by using accounting 
accrual shift, and/or by adjusting recognition of cash flows over time (Dechow, 1994). 
On the other hand, accounting literature discusses whether accruals are actually used 
to improve the quality of financial reports and make them more informative, or in 
reality are used for earnings management, which can happen informatively, or are 
used for earnings management, which can happen from the discretion available to 
management reporting under GAAP and accrual accounting, a principle which 
consists of recording all economic transactions at the time they occur instead of the 
underlying cash basis of accounting which consists of recording all economic 
transactions when cash is received (Healy, 1985; Jones, 1991; Dechow et aI., 1995 
Healy & Whalen, 1999; Dechow & Skinner, 2000; Krishnan, 2003; Baralexis, 2004). 
The crucial issue is how managers utilise accruals, in order to get earnings that are of 
high quality. Empirical evidence confirms that the accruals basis provides better 
results about economic performance to investors than cash flows (Dechow, 1994). 
However, the discretion can be used as a purposeful intervention in the external 
financial reporting process (Schipper, 1989). 
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There are several methods by which managers can practice judgment in their financial 
reports. For instance, judgment is demanded to estimate a number of future economic 
events, such as predicted life cycles and the depreciation of values of long-term assets 
and losses from bad debts and asset impairments. In addition, managers should choose 
acceptable accounting methods for reporting the same economic transactions, for 
example, choose methods of inventory valuation (such as LIFO, FIFO, weighted-
average or accelerated depreciation methods). Moreover, managers should practice 
judgment in working capital management that influences cost allocations and net 
revenues (for example inventory levels, and the timing of inventory shipments or 
purchases). Managers should also decide how to set up firms' transactions. For 
instance, lease contracts can be designed which can be included or not included in the 
balance sheet, and equity investments can be structured to avoid or require 
consolidation (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). 
Accounting judgment can be utilised by management to make financial reports more 
informative, which can arise if some accounting choices or estimates are recognised 
to be credible signals of a corporation's financial performance (Healy & Whalen, 
1999). With this situation, management communicates its private information related 
to the corporation's performance by means of financial reporting (Beaver & Ryan, 
2005; Guay, 2006). 
On the other hand, management can also utilise its judgment in financial reporting and 
in setting transactions to change financial reports, either to mislead stakeholders 
related to the corporation's economic performance, or to influence contractual 
outcome that depends on reported accounting numbers (Healy & Whalen, 1999; 
Dechow & Skinner, 2000). With this situation, management uses its private 
information to distort signals related to the corporation's performance through 
financial reporting. In addition, earnings management can be practiced with or 
without violating or exploiting GAAP. In other words, there are two types of earnings 
management: legitimate and illegitimate (Healy & Wahlen, 1999; Baralexis, 2004). 
According to The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) (1978), the 
objective of financial reports is to communicate accounting information to outside 
users. Earnings or net income is the principal result in financial reports that reflects 
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the corporation's perfonnance, which is produced under the accrual basis of 
accounting. Accruals allow earnings to provide more meaningful infonnation related 
to a corporation's economic perfonnance, and they are better to predict the 
corporation's future perfonnance than cash flows, but what is important is the extent 
to which managers can use accruals to improve the quality of financial reports and 
when this action becomes earnings management (Bissessur, 2008, p.9). 
Accrual accounting has been used for reporting the corporation perfonnance to avoid 
problems with measuring the perfonnance when operations are continuous. In other 
words, accrual accounting matches appropriately and allocates revenues and 
expenses, gains and losses, within the period in which they are incurred or earned. 
Furthennore, accrual accounting becomes important since it has been used as a 
summary measure of corporation perfonnance by a wide range of users, for example 
reflect cash flow forecasts and have a higher correlation with value than current cash 
flow (Dechow et aI., 2004). According to The F ASB, Accrual accounting is an: 
"attempt to record the financial effects on an entity of transactions and other events 
and circumstances that have cash consequences for the entity in the periods in which 
those transactions, events, and circumstances occur rather than only in the periods in 
which cash is received or paid by the entity" [FASB, 1985, SFAC No.6. 139]. 
In addition, "accrual accounting uses accrual, deferral, and allocation procedures 
whose goal is to relate revenues, expenses, gains, and losses to periods to reflect an 
entity's perfonnance during a period instead of merely listing its cash receipts and 
outlays. Thus, recognition of revenues, expenses, gains, and losses and the related 
increments or decrements in assets and liabilities - including matching of cost and 
revenues, allocation, and amortisation is the essence of using accrual accounting to 
measure perfonnance of entities" [F ASB, 1985, SF AC No.6. 145]. 
By utilising accruals to change the timing of cash flows recognised in earnings, 
GAAP was developed to reinforce perfonnance measurement. Two important 
accounting principles which are derived from the production of earnings are the 
revenue recognition principle and the matching principle. Through having those 
principles, the accrual process is suggested to alleviate timing and matching problems 
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related to cash flows, so that earnings reflect more closely a corporation's 
performance (Dechow, 1994). 
Although accrual accounting presents information which is useful for financial reports 
users, it may decrease the credibility of accounting information because of the 
judgment and accounting choices used by managers to manipulate the accounting 
numbers. Accruals-based measures are widely accepted as indicators of earnings 
management activity (Healy, 1985; Jones, 1991; Dechow et aI., 1995; Krishnan, 
2003). Total accrual can be classified into two parts; the first is discretionary accruals, 
which reflect manipulated accounting for accrual items and are caused by 
conservative or aggressive accounting policy choices, and the second is non-
discretionary accruals, which reflect non-manipulated accounting accrual items, and 
are the normal element of earnings, which result from the neutral application of 
accounting rules (Xie, 2001; Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Goncharov, 2005, plO; 
Aljifri, 2007). 
The researchers on earnings management literature endeavour to differentiate between 
accruals resulting from normal accruals: "Non-discretionary accruals are accruals that 
arise from transactions made in the current period that are normal for the firm given 
its performance level and business strategy, industry conventions, macro-economic 
events, and other economic factors" and managed earnings: "Discretionary accruals 
are accruals that arise from transactions made or accounting treatments chosen in 
order to manage earnings" (Ronen & Yaari, 2007, p. 372). 
The accounting literature focuses on discretionary accruals to examine earnings 
quality, and earnings management by using the accruals models (Peasnell et aI., 2000; 
Goncharov, 2005, p.1 0). However, it is difficult to differentiate between discretionary 
accruals and non-discretionary accruals because the latter are linked with the level of 
corporation activity (Schipper, 1989; Dechow, 1994; Scott, 2003; Aljifri, 2007). As a 
result, researchers have used methods to estimate the discretionary accruals from total 
accruals (Aljifri, 2007) due to the fact that discretionary accruals are determined by 
managers, and it could be either harmful or beneficial to financial reports users 
depending on the managers' motivation. 
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2.1.4 Patterns of Earnings Management 
According to Stlowy and Breton (2004, p.3), accounts manipulation is "the use of 
management's discretion to make accounting choices or to design transactions so as to 
affect the possibilities of wealth transfer between the company and society (political 
costs), fund providers (cost of capital) or managers (compensation plans)". Moreover, 
the authors presented a framework of accounts manipulation, which is represented in 
various types: earnings management, income smoothing, big bath accounting, creative 
accounting and window dressing. 
Furthennore, Stlowy and Breton classify accounts manipulation in two ways: firstly, 
accounts manipUlation is related to earnings per share (EPS), which can be 
manipulated in two ways, either by removing or by adding certain expenses or 
revenues, or by exhibiting items before or after utilising the net income to calculate 
the earnings per share. Secondly, accounts manipulation is related to the debt/equity 
ratio, which can be manipUlated by artificially overstating net income or by 
concealing certain financing through off-balance sheet-financing items. Figure 2.1 
shows the different types of accounts manipulation. 
Furthennore, Scott (2003) classifies the patterns of earnings management into four 
categories which are interpreted in the following subsections. 
2.1.4.1 Big bath 
'Take a bath' can take place when a corporation is going through a bad period of 
earnings, and is unable to recover profitability. The management may decide to 
exaggerate losses in an effort to purify the financial report and create a buffer that can 
be used to improve the earnings in the follOwing year. 
Big bath accounting is manifested in income decreasing discretionary accruals and 
sizeable asset write-offs. In other words, managers decide to select accounting 
methods to report large losses in a period when they have a loss or low earnings in 
order to report high earnings in the period after (Jordan & Clark, 2004). 
According to Healy (1985) and Scott (2003), managers use discretion within 
accounting choices to take a bath to increase the probability of future reported profits. 
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Healy (1985) points out that managers whose bonuses will decrease because oflosses 
or low net income or annual earnings already reaching the bonus level may plan to 
take a bath; such action will not affect the bonus in the current year but will enhance 
the probability of future bonuses. McNichols and Wilson (1988) also found that when 
profit is too low, firms' managers will choose to record future expenses (take a big 
bath) to decrease their profit in the current year. 
Figure (2.1) the different types of accounts manipulation (Stlowy and Breton, 2004) 
Potential wealth transfer 
.. 
ACCOUNTS 
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2.1.4.2 Income Minimisation 
According to Scott (2003), income minimisation is comparable to taking a bath but 
less extreme, and it may be chosen by managers during periods of high profitability. 
Mangers practice income minimisation by using policies which include rapid write-
offs of capital assets and intangibles, recording advertising, research and development 
expenditures, oil and gas expenditure. Income taxation provides another set of 
motivations for this pattern, as does enhancement of arguments for relief from foreign 
competition. Holthausen et al. (1995) and Gaver et al. (1995) provide evidence that 
managers decrease current reported earnings to increase their future compensation. 
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2.1.4.3 Income Maximisation 
Income maximisation happens when managers practice earnings management 
techniques to increase a corporation's earnings. According to Carslaw (1988) and 
Thomas (1989), managers practice discretion to raise earnings when the level of 
earnings or earnings per share is a little lower than the target number. 
In addition, Healy (1985) mentions that managers may engage in a pattern of earnings 
maximisation to increase their compensation. Moreover, there is also evidence that 
managers try to keep positive earnings, in order to keep 'consistent profitability', usual 
in annual reports. In other words, managers try to avoid reporting losses and earnings 
decreases (Hayn, 1995; DeAngelo et al., 1996). Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) 
provide evidence that managers managed their earnings to avoid earning decreases 
and losses by using cash flow from operations and changes in working capital, and to 
avoid reporting earnings that are lower than analysts' consensus forecasts. 
Degeorge et al. (1999) and Roychowdhury (2006) developed empirical methods to 
detect real activities manipulation in large samples, and point out that managers 
manipulate real activities to avoid reporting losses in the annual reports. In addition, 
they achieve that by offering price discounts to temporarily increase sales, 
overproduction to lower the cost of goods sold, and reduce discretionary expenditures 
to improve reported margins. Jacob and Jorgensen (2007) confirmed the findings of 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) that earnings management is used to avoid earnings 
decreases and losses. In addition, Teoh et al. (1998) and Yoon and Miller (2002) 
found that managers increase earnings before equity offers. 
2.1.4.4 Income Smoothing 
Income smoothing happens when managers increase low earnings or decrease high 
earnings to avoid the deviation of reporting from analysts' expected earnings by using 
accounting discretion. According to Copeland (1968), smoothing moderates year-to-
year fluctuations in income by shifting earnings from peak years to less successful 
periods. Moreover, the objective of income smoothing is to decrease the variation in 
periodic earnings with the passage of time by using accounting discretion (Ronen and 
Sadan, 1981). In other words, when companies report stable earnings that makes the 
financial reports users feel more confident. 
25 
In addition, Tucker and Zarowin (2006) depict income smoothing as having dual roles 
in determining the quality of earnings, which can lead to garbling or efficient 
communication of private information. Managers can use the flexibility of accounting 
policies to adjust the financial reports to produce income smooth stream. According to 
Barnea et al. (1976, p.lll), "the deliberate damping of fluctuations about some level 
of earnings is considered to be nonnal for the finn". 
Many studies have proved that there is significant evidence of income smoothing and 
managers' motivations to smooth earnings (Ronen & Sadan, 1981; Hand, 1989; Tseng 
& Lai, 2007). According to Ronen and Yaari (2007, pp.317-318), Soothing is the 
dampening of fluctuation in the series of reported earnings. They point out types of 
smoothing: real and artificial smoothing. "Real smoothing involves making 
production and investment decisions that reduce the variability of earnings. Artificial 
or cosmetic smoothing is achieved through accounting choices". The difference 
between real smoothing and artificial smoothing is the former includes decisions that 
decrease the volatility of economic earnings, and the later includes both 
understatements (low earnings) and overstatements (high earnings). 
2.1.5 Earnings Management Techniques 
The methods that managers use to manage earnings have been detailed in the earnings 
management literature. Managers can manage earnings by two main techniques: 
accounting choices and operating decisions. According to McKee (2005, p.4), 
"earnings management is primarily achieved by management actions that make it 
easier to achieve desired earnings levels through accounting choices from among 
GAAP, and operating decisions". 
McKee (2005, p.4) gIves examples about usmg operating decisions to manage 
earnings, which would be whether or not to implement special discounts or incentive 
programmes to increase sales toward the end of the accounting period when revenue 
targets are not being met. Another example he pointed out is that operating decisions 
would be whether to invest in new equipment, which may reduce the number of 
employees, or hire additional workers. These types of decisions have to be made 
continuously to promote positive earning management. Earnings management through 
operating decisions is also called economic earnings management, because it tries to 
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manage the cash inflow and outflow as well, thus the revenues and expenses 
associated with the day to day operations. Figure 2.2 shows the effects of operating 
versus accounting choices. 
Figure (2.2) Effects of Operating versus Accounting Choices (McKee. 2005. P. 5) 
Management Management 
operating accounting 
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Business Transaction or Generally Recorded in Net income 
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The most common class of earnings management technique involves simply using the 
flexibility that exists in GAAP (Pliancy in GAAP) (Mulford & Comiskey, 2002, 
P.62). Furthermore, Scott (1997) explains that because managers can have a choice of 
choosing accounting policies from a set of GAAP, it is normal to expect that they will 
choose policies which aim at maximising their own utility and/or the market value of 
the firm. Moreover, managers may have incentives and rewards to skew the 
interpretation of GAAP to achieve target earnings. However, academics and 
regulators seem to agree on the view that when earnings management can be 
exercised within the limits of GAAP accounting, fraudulent reporting represents an 
act of overt violation of GAAP. 
Dechow and Skinner (2000, p.239) show many ways managers can make judgments 
over financial reports. Moreover, the authors try to distinguish between earnings 
management and financial fraud by the presented figure (2-3), which presents obvious 
differences between judgments that fall within the GAAP which include managing 
earnings depending on the managerial intent. Nevertheless, the authors point out that 
still in the case of aggressive accounting choices, it is difficult to distinguish between 
the legitimate practice of accounting discretion without determining the managers 
aims of managing earnings. 
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According to Mulford and Comiskey (2002, p.62) there are no authoritative listings of 
actions that could be considered in earnings management. Rather, those suggested are 
usually identified simply by considering areas of flexibility within GAAP and 
anecdotes based on experience. No presumption is made at this point that the 
employment of any of these techniques or activities would be outside the bounds of 
the flexibility inherent in GAAP. 
Figure (2-3) Management discretion over accounting choices Dechow and Skinner, 
" Conservative" 
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Accounting 
"Fraudulent" 
Accounting 
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Accounting Choices 
Within GAAP 
-Overly aggressive recognition of 
provisions or reserves. 
-Overvaluation of acquired in process 
R&D in purchase acquisitions. 
-Overstatement of restructuring 
charges and asset write-offs. 
-Earnings that result from a neutral 
operation of the process. 
-Understatement of the provision for 
bad debts. 
-Drawing down provisions or reserves 
in an overly aggressive manner. 
Violates GAAP 
-Recording sales before they are 
"realizable' , 
-Recording fictitious sales. 
-Backdating sales invoices. 
-Overstating inventory by recording 
fictitious inventory. 
"Real" Cash Flow Choices 
-Delaying sales 
-Accelerating R&D or 
advertising expenditures 
-Postponing R&D or 
advertising expenditures 
- Accelerating sales 
Moreover, Mulford and Comiskey (2002, p.65) suggested a sample of possible 
techniques or accounting activities that might be used for managing earnings 
purposes, and stated that no presumption was made that the employment of any of 
these techniques or activities would be outside the limits of the flexibility inherent in 
GAAP. Table 2-2 presents earnings management techniques and activities. 
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Table (2-2) Potential Earnings Management Techniques and Activities (Mulford and 
Comiskey, 2002, P65) 
Potential Earnings Management Techniques and Activities 
1. Changing depreciation methods, (accelerated to straight-line). 
2. Changing the useful lives used for depreciation purposes. 
3. Changing estimates of salvage value used for depreciation purposes. 
4. Determining the allowance required for uncollectible accounts or loans 
receivable. 
5. Determining the allowance required for warranty obligations. 
6. Deciding on the valuation allowance required for deferred tax assets. 
7. Determining the presence of impaired assets and any necessary loss accrual. 
8. Estimating the stage of completion of percentage-of completion contracts. 
9. Estimating the likelihood of realization of contract claims. 
10. Estimating write-downs required for certain investments. 
11. Estimating the amount of a restructuring accrual. 
12. Judging the need for and amount of inventory write-downs. 
13. Estimating environmental obligation accruals. 
14. Making or changing pension actuarial assumptions. 
15. Determining the portion of the price of purchase transaction to be assigned to 
acquired in-process research and development. 
16. Determining or changing the amortization periods for intangibles. 
17. Deciding the extent to which various cost such as landfill development, direct-
response advertising, and software development should be capitalized. 
18. Deciding on the proper hedge-classification of a financial derivative. 
19. Determining whether an investment permits the exercise of significant 
influence over the investor company. 
20. Deciding whether a decline in the market value of an investment is other than 
temporary. 
Nelson et aI. (2002) studied the factors that affect how managers try to practice 
earnings management, the actions of auditors to discover that, and the characteristics 
of accounting standards which promote management to practice earnings 
management, by using a questionnaire that was distributed to audit partners and 
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managers to obtain the data. The authors found that it is more likely for managers to 
attempt earnings management whereas auditors were less likely to adjust these 
attempts, which are either structured to comply with precise standards or unstructured 
with respect to imprecise standards. 
Moreover, their results indicate that earnings management attempts occur in several 
accounting areas such as business combinations, revenue recognition, fixed assets, 
intangible assets, accounting changes and prior period adjustments, transfers of 
receivables, consolidations and equity/cost method, and investments and leases. 
Auditors adjusted 44 percent ofthe attempts, and 66 percent were not adjusted for the 
following reasons: in 21 percent of the cases, auditors believed the client 
demonstrated compliance with GAAP. On the other hand, the auditors had no opinion 
about 17 percent of the respondents, because they did not have convincing evidence 
whether the client's position was incorrect, and the remaining 18 percent because of 
some other reason (usually, immateriality). 
Schitlit (2002) presented the most common techniques to practice earnmgs 
management, which are as follows: 
1- Recording revenue too soon or that is of questionable quality. There are many 
opportunities that occur to achieve the aim, including recording revenue 
before the earnings process has completed or before an unconditional 
exchange has occurred, such as: recording revenue when future services 
remain to be provided, recording revenue before shipment or before the 
customers' unconditional acceptance, and recording revenue even though the 
customer is not obligated to pay. 
2- Recording bogus revenue. Managers use this technique to increase revenue. 
These technique examples include recording sales that lack economic 
substance, recording as revenue supplier rebates tied to future required 
purchases, and releasing revenue that was improperly held back before a 
merger. 
3- Boosting income with one-time gains. Such as: boosting profits by selling 
undervalued assets, including investment income or gains as part of revenue, 
and including investment income or gains as a reduction in operating 
expenses. 
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4- Shifting current expenses to a later or earlier period. This case happens by 
capitalising a cost in the current period and expensing it over a period of time, 
such as changing accounting policies and shifting current expenses to an 
earlier period, failing to write-off impaired assets, and reducing asset reserves. 
5- Failing to record or improperly reducing liabilities. There are some examples: 
failing to record expenses and related liabilities when future obligations 
remain, releasing questionable reserves into income, and recording revenue 
when cash is received even though future obligations remain. 
6- Shifting current revenue to a later period. Managers practice this technique by 
delaying recording revenue when it is relatively high in a given year. There are 
some common examples: deliberately overstating the allowance for 
uncollectibles and adjusting it downward in future years, and deliberately 
overstating the estimated sales returns account and adjusting it downward in 
future years. 
7- Shifting future expenses to the current period as a special charge. Managers 
could practice this technique by accelerating discretionary expenses into the 
current period if the current year's revenue is relatively high in relation to 
expected future revenue or future expenses are expected to be relatively high. 
For example: inflating a special charge amount, writing off R&D costs from 
an acquisition, and accelerating discretionary expenses. 
Nelson et al. (2003) provide evidence about the approaches managers use to attempt 
earnings management by categorising managers' attempts to manage earnings into 
four primary approaches: expense recognition, revenue recognition, issues unique to 
business combinations, and other issues. Then, within each of those broad categories, 
Nelson et al. sub-classify them into different approaches based on the methods used in 
an attempt to manage earnings. Moreover, the authors identify the particularly 
important approaches managers used to practice earnings management from an 
auditor's point of view, and describe every approach individually (expenses and other 
losses, revenue and other gains, business combinations, and other approaches). 
Ortega and Grant (2003) have classified earnings management techniques that have 
been used by managers in America into four categories: 
1- Revenue recognition. 
31 
2- Operating expense timing. 
3- Unrealistic assumptions to estimate liabilities for example using aggressive 
assumptions when accruing liabilities. 
4- Real or operating actions such as making voluntary business decisions in the 
ordinary course of running a business. 
Ronen and Yaari (2007, p.31) mention the techniques that can be used to manage 
earnings, which are as follows: 
- choosing from a menu of treatments that are accepted under GAAP, such as from the 
methods to assess the inventory. 
- making a decision on the timing of the adoption of a new standard. 
- making a judgment call when GAAP requires estimates, for example depreciation, 
the allowance for bad debt, assets valuation and asset write-off. 
- classifying of items as above or below the line of operating earnings or earnings 
from continuing operations, in order to separate persistent earnings from transitory 
earnings. 
- Structuring transactions to achieve desired accounting outcomes, such as conducting 
transactions with related parties, and designing mergers to qualify for the pooling 
method. 
- Timing the recognition of revenues and expenses through, as examples, timing the 
sales of assets in order to smooth earnings, and deciding to capitalise expenses. 
- Making real production and investment decisions, such as reducing research and 
development expenditures, and affecting selling and administrative expenses. 
- Managing the transparency of the presentation, for example: choice between 
presenting special items in a separate line in the income statement and presenting 
them in a footnote. 
- Managing the informativeness of earnings through various means, such as reporting 
comprehensive income on the statement of equity rather than on the performance 
statement. 
Noronha et al. (2008) presented a list of techniques that may be employed in Chinese 
companies: 
1- Adjusting accounts receivables or bad debt allowance (e.g. increase or decrease 
allowance expense). 
32 
2- Gains or losses from disposals (e.g. extend or shorten the disposal period). 
3- Construction in progress (postponing or advancing the time of completion). 
4- Changing the depreciation method (e.g. straight-line to declining-balance). 
5- Adjust other revenues and gains (e.g. rental, sale of property). 
6- Adjusting investment operations (e.g. expense method to equity method). 
7- Related party transactions (e.g. purchase and sales, transference). 
8- Operating revenue (e.g. buy back, postponing or advancing the time of 
recognition). 
9- Revenue from government subsidies. 
10- Adjusting administrative expenses (entertainment expense, officers' salaries). 
11- Adjust promotional expenses and advertising expenses. 
2.1.6 Earnings Management Motivations 
Significant empirical studies examined motivations that are behind earnmgs 
management in the accounting literature (Healy & Wahlen, 1999; Barth et aI., 1999; 
Revsine et aI., 2002; Baralexis, 2004; and Noronha et al., 2008), their results showed 
that managers managed earnings for several motivations, which depend on aims that 
need to be reached. The main motivations behind earnings management are: 
2.1.6.1 Capital Market Motivations 
Financial reports provide important information about a corporation's performance, 
which is used as input for valuation decisions by market participants such as investors 
and analysts. Therefore, managers try to influence the short term stock price 
performance via managed earnings numbers to achieve their own benefit (Healy & 
Wahlen, 1999). Barth et al. (1999) found evidence that firms with patterns of 
increasing earnings have significantly larger earnings multiples than other firms, and 
that the incremental earnings multiple is reduced significantly when a pattern of 
increasing earnings is broken. The capital market may influence managers to manage 
earnings to increase corporations' share prices (Schipper, 1989; Revsine et aI., 2002). 
The rising importance of capital market motivations in earnings management IS 
associated with the growth of managers-share price movements' sensitivity. 
Recently, empirical study documents support the argument that stock prices are 
sensitive to earnings benchmarks (Goncharov, 2005, p.78). Barth et ai. (1999) 
33 
documented that a corporation's shares which report resulting earnings increases are 
priced with price-earnings multiples. However, price-earnings multiples decline 
significantly when earnings decrease after a previous pattern of increasing earnings. 
Skinner and Sloan (2002) show that stock price reactions to negative earnings 
surprises are disproportionately large for growth stocks. Such stock reactions illustrate 
the importance of meeting or beating the expectations of stock market participants and 
provide incentives for earnings management. 
Other significant empirical studies have investigated whether or not managers 
managed earnings because of capital market incentives. Dechow and Skinner (2000) 
stated that managing earnings to effect short-term stock prices has been recognised as 
the most important reason for managers to manipulate earnings. Moreover, capital 
market incentives for earnings management may come from specific events. 
Studies show that stock price declines are associated with even small negative 
earnings surprises. As a result, managers may be motivated to manage earnings to 
meet stock market participants' expectations. According to Ronen and Sadan (1981), 
management manage earnings to reach analysts' consensus forecasts. Burgstahler and 
Dichev (1997) stated that managers manage earnings to avoid earnings decreases and 
losses, while (Degeorge et al., 1999) give a reason as avoiding report earnings which 
is lower than analysts consensus forecasts. Kasznik and McNichols (2002) present 
evidence of positive market responses to meeting or beating analyst earnings 
forecasts. Payne and Robb (2000) findings suggest that managers increase income to 
achieve forecasted earnings levels, and their desire to increase income is negatively 
correlated with analysts' forecast dispersion. In 2006, Burgstahler, in a study with 
Eames, supported the findings of previous studies that managers manage earnings to 
avoid reporting earnings lower than analysts' forecasts. Moreover, they provide 
evidence that to meet or slightly beat analysts' forecasts, earnings are managed 
upward and forecasts are managed downward. 
Furthermore, empirical research shows that managers managed earnings before initial 
public offerings (lPO). According to DuCharme et al. (2004), abnormal accounting 
accruals are unusually high around stock offers. In addition, their results support the 
view that some firms opportunistically manipulate earnings upward before stock 
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Issues. Teoh et a1. (l998b) provide evidence on income-increasing earnings 
management during the year of IPOs, and document that discretionary accruals during 
the IPOs explain poor earnings and stock performance in subsequent years. Friedlan 
(1994) shows that IPO firms make income-increasing accruals the most current 
statements included in the prospectus. DuCharme et a1. (2001) show that abnormal 
accruals around IPOs are negatively related to post-offer returns and positively related 
to initial firm value. Roosenbooma (2003) finds that managers manage their 
company's earnings in the first year as a public company but not in the years before 
the IPOs. Ball and Shivakumarb (2008) studied earnings management around the time 
of IPO in the UK, and they found that managers opportunistically inflate earnings to 
influence IPO pricing. 
Moreover, there is evidence that managers manage earnings prior to a stock merger. 
Erickson and Wang (1999) found that acquiring firms manage earnings upward in the 
periods prior to the merger agreement; also, their results indicate that the degree of 
income increasing earnings management is positively related to the relative size of the 
merger. DeAngelo (1988) stated that managing earnings is important for valuations in 
management buyouts and provide little evidence that earnings were managed by 
buyout corporations from a study of accruals changing. 
2.1.6.2 External Contract Motivations 
External contracts such as debt contracts can lead managers to practice earnings 
management to meet the contract requirements. The main aim for debt contracts is to 
limit managers' ability that benefits a corporation's stockholders at the expense of its 
creditors, and this affects the choices of accounting policies (Watts & Zimmerman, 
1986). Significant studies have investigated whether corporations are close to lending 
covenants managing their earnings. Duke and Hunt (1990) suggested that managers' 
motivations influence accounting policy choice to manage earnings by violating debt 
covenant restrictions. Defond and liambalvo (1994) examined earnings management 
in corporations which reported debt covenant violations in annual financial reports. It 
has been found that debt covenant restrictions affect accounting choices in the 
previous year and the year of violation and corporations accelerate earnings in the 
year before the covenant violation. 
35 
Sweeney (1994) examined the association between adoption of income· increasing 
accounting changes and debt covenant violations, and points out that managers take 
action by using income· increasing methods when corporations are facing technical 
default. Jaggi and Lee (2002) provided results that support the expectation that the 
severity of financial distress affects the choice of income-decreasing or income-
increasing discretionary accruals. Their results confirmed that managers of 
corporations with financial distress used income-decreasing discretionary accruals if 
debts are renegotiated or restructuring takes place because waivers are denied, and 
used income-increasing discretionary accruals when they could achieve waivers for 
debt covenant violations. 
2.1.6.3 Regulatory Motivations 
Significant studies have observed the potential impact of regulatory motivations 
requirements on earnings management, and provide evidence that regulatory 
considerations induce managers to manage earnings. 
2.1.6.3.1 Tax Motivation 
Tax motivation occurs because corporations can decrease the value of tax payment by 
timing transactions (Beatty et al., 1995). Baralexis (2004) studied the motives 
underlying earnings management in Greece, and found that small corporations 
managed their earnings to decrease income taxes whereas large corporations engaged 
with earnings management to demand external financing. Noronha et al. (2008) 
examined the underlying factors that motivate managers to practice earnings 
management in China, and they showed that private ownership corporations engaged 
with earnings management for tax expense savings, while public ownership 
corporations had stronger motivations to manage earnings for management 
compensation. 
2.1.6.3.2 Political Motivation 
Many corporations are quite visible politically, such as large corporations, strategic 
industries and monopolistic or near monopolistic corporations, because their activities 
touch most people. These corporations may want to manage their earnings to reduce 
their visibility, for example decreasing the income in periods with high income, 
otherwise public pressure may occur for the government to step in with increased 
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regulation or other means to lower profitability (Scott, 2003). The earnmgs 
management literature provides evidence that corporations take steps to decrease 
income when they are targeted by political procedures with unfavourable 
consequences (Cahan et aI., 1997). Jones (1991) found that managers used the 
income-decreasing accruals method to manage earnings during import relief 
investigations by the United States International Trade Commission (ITC). Cahan 
(1992) stated that corporations being investigated for monopolistic practices by the 
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission in the USA during 1970-
1983 utilised more income-decreasing accruals during the investigation time 
compared to other time in the sample period. Key (1997) tested the political costs 
theory in the cable television industry during periods of congressional scrutiny and the 
results of the study are consistent with previous studies about political costs, in which 
income-decreasing accruals are used to reduce earnings. Han and Wang (1998) 
examined oil corporations that expect increases in earnings and where affected by 
sudden product price increases their results confirmed that corporations utilised 
income-decreasing accruals in their reported quarterly earnings. 
2.1.6.4 Management Compensation Contract Motivation 
Management compensation contracts evaluate managers' performance through 
accounting information. Several studies have examined the association between 
earnings management and managers' compensation. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) 
argue that managers with bonus plans have motivations to reallocate the earnings 
from the future years to the current year. 
Healy (1985) studied managerial accounting decisions and postulated that managers 
manage earnings to increase their compensation; whereas Healy hypothesises that 
managers choose discretionary accruals to increase their short-term bonuses. Healy 
notes that many firms have bonus plans in which funds are allocated to a bonus pool 
based on actual performance relative to target performance. No funds are allocated to 
the bonus pool when actual performance is below some minimum threshold (lower 
bound). As performance exceeds the minimum, funds are added linearly in relation to 
performance, up to a ceiling (upper bound), at which point the bonus pool is capped. 
Healy assumes that each manager observes income before discretionary accruals and 
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makes either income-increasing or decreasing discretionary accruals based on hislher 
incentives. 
The result of this study found that managers utilised accrual policies to affect their 
bonus contracts, and utilised changes in accounting procedures to influence their 
bonus plan. In addition, Healy (1985) stated that managers may plan to take a big bath 
when they have already reached the bonus or their bonus will decrease because of 
losses or low net income; such actions will not affect the bonus in the current year, 
but will enhance the probability of future bonuses. 
Guidry et al. (1999) examined the bonus-maximisation hypothesis that managers 
utilise earnings management to increase their short-term bonuses. The results of this 
study yield strong evidence supporting Healy (1985). Gaver et al. (1995) examined 
the relationship between bonus plans bounds and discretionary accruals for the period 
1980 to 1990 for 102 firms. They found that managers use income-increasing 
methods when earnings before discretionary accruals fall less than the level of the 
lower bonus; however, when earnings are more than the level of the upper bonus, 
managers utilise income-decreasing methods to manage earnings. Holthausen et a1. 
(1995) examined the extent to which managers manage earnings to increase their 
bonus plan. They provide evidence that managers decrease earnings when the bonuses 
are at their maximum. However, they found no evidence that managers utilise 
income-decreasing methods when earnings are less than the minimum level to receive 
a bonus. 
2.1.6.5 Behavioural Motivations 
According to Goncharov (2005), earnings management literature addresses two kinds 
of behavioural motivations: firstly, to show a better performance than a former Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO); secondly, through job anxiety. 
2.1.6.5.1 Motivation during CEO Changes 
Several studies examined earnings management during CEO changes. The results on 
earnings management surrounding CEO changes give evidence that earnings were 
managed downwards. Strong and Meyer (1987) mention that corporations utilised an 
asset write-off policy during changes in senior management, especially When the new 
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chief executive officer came from outside the corporation. Elliott and Shaw (1988) 
studied the management behaviour of corporations that reported discretionary write-
offs during the years 1982-1985. The results of this study are consistent with Strong 
and Meyer (1987), that corporations changed the CEO, president and/or chief 
financial officer during the year of the write-off. The purpose of this step is new 
management seeking to blame prior management for problems. By consciously 
overstating losses attributable to their predecessors, management improves 
expectations about the future and lowers the benchmark against which its 
performance will be measured. 
Furthermore, Pourciau (1993) examined the relationship between earnings 
management and non-routine executive changes. The author found evidence 
consistent with the hypothesis that a new CEO decreases earnings in the period of 
executive change to increase earnings in the following period. Wells (2002) 
investigated the extent of managing earnings in the years surrounding CEO changes 
by Australian corporations. The author provided evidence that earnings have been 
managed to decrease income in the period of CEO change through abnormal and 
extraordinary items. This result is consistent with the view that management is 
engaging in earnings management particularly for non-routine CEO changes, where 
the opportunities to manage earnings are greatest. 
2.1.6.5.2 Job Anxiety 
Fudenberg and Tirol (1995) argued that concerns about job security (keeping position 
or avoiding interference) drove managers to practice earnings management during a 
bad or good period. During a good period, managers may hoard income for future 
periods to lengthen their tenure. However, during a bad period, managers are expected 
to increase earnings to reduce the likelihood of dismissal. Moreover, Defond and Park 
(1997) provide evidence supporting Fudenberg and Tirol that shows that concerns 
about job security create motivations for managers to manage earnings in both the 
current and future relative period. Their evidence suggested that when earnings in the 
current year are good and the expectation of future earnings are poor, management 
saves current earnings for possible utilisation in the future; however, when earnings in 
the current year are poor and the expectation of future earnings are good, management 
use earnings from the future for the current period. 
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2.1.6.6 Communicating Information Motivations 
Evaluating whether earnings management is harmful or beneficial depends on the 
nature of the approach to manage earnings and the goal behind earnings management. 
There are studies that argue that earnings management can be utilised to communicate 
information to the users and increases the value of the information that will be useful 
to them (Subramanyam, 1996; Arya et aI., 2003; Scott, 2003). According to Beneish 
(2001. p.5), the informative perspective of earnings management is illustrated when 
managers seek to increase the information value. Form this perspective, earnings 
management may be utilised to make certain judgment and decisions. Scott (2003) 
mentions that the outside information users are looking through the corporation's 
accounting policy choices when they are evaluating and comparing earnings 
performance. The market deficiency is defined relative to publicly available 
information. Therefore, when earnings management can reveal inside information to 
outside users, this can improve the informativeness of financial reporting. 
2.1. 7 Factors affecting motivations preferences 
Motivations presented above can be considered the main causes for exercising 
earnings management. The extent of earnings management is affected by the 
environment where and in which a corporation operates. The environment may create 
conditions for practicing earnings management. However, the environment may 
positively affect the motivations to provide high quality financial information and 
thus constrain income manipUlation (Goncharov, 2005). 
According to Noronha et al. (2008), the issue which should be considered is how 
managers consider the importance of the motivations. Corporations are working in 
different environments with different variables. As a result, managers will have 
different priorities or motivations. There are two factors that influence motivation 
preference, which are corporation size and the corporation ownership structure. 
With reference to corporation size, Moses (1987) provided evidence that earnings 
management is associated with a corporation's size. Baralexis (2004), in his study of 
Greek corporations, found that large corporations in Greece have different 
motivations to small corporations. Reducing income tax considerations are very 
important for small corporations. However, large corporations managed earnings to 
demand external financing. Zhu and Su (2002) found that Chinese medium and small 
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corporations have motivations to practice earnings management for tax expense and 
managers compensation. 
The corporation ownership structure has an important influence on the reported 
earnings and information value. The monitoring mechanism that a corporation uses is 
influenced by ownership structure, including the monitoring earnings management 
activity (Siregar & Utama, 2008). Hao (1999) mentioned that the non-tradable 
characteristic of state-owned enterprise shares is the basic reason for the low quality 
of earnings data. Noronha et al. (2008) state that because managers in state-owned 
corporations are government officials, corporate earnings attainment is one of their 
promotion criteria. Therefore, managers may have the motivation to increase 
earnings. However, Siregar and Utama (2008) examined the relationship between 
earnings management and ownership structure and firm size, and they provided 
evidence that family ownership has effect on selection of a particular kind of earnings 
management. 
The previous studies in the earnings management literature investigated earnmgs 
management techniques and motivations in the listed companies. This study 
investigates the earnings management techniques and motivations in the Libyan 
environment, which is different from the previous studies because the ownership 
structures of corporations in Libya are largely determined by unlisted companies due 
to the fact that Libyan capital market was established in 2007. Hence, the majority of 
Libyan companies are unlisted, which are state- and family-owned companies. 
Therefore, the objective of this study is examining the earnings management in the 
unlisted companies of state-owned and private companies, where, to the best of the 
researcher's knowledge this study is the first of its kind that investigates earnings 
management techniques and motivations in the unlisted companies. 
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2.2 The Factors that Affect In Earnings Management Practicing 
Financial reports of low quality provide information that leads to problems in the 
allocation of resources (Schipper & Vincent, 2003). According to Leuz et al. (2003), 
financial reports with extensive earnings management inaccurately reflect corporation 
performance, and thus weaken users' ability to assess the corporation's performance. 
Furthermore, financial reporting quality is not only determined by accounting 
standards (Ball et aI., 2000), it is also affected by the environment, such as where the 
corporation is working. Baralexis (2004) illustrates the difference between the 
developing and developed environment, and presents factors that influence the 
practising of earnings management and the quality of financial reports, such as poor 
management performance, weak corporate governance structure, weak accounting 
profession, limited extent of external auditing and unsophisticated users. Goncharov 
(2005) argues that accounting practices are a function of the interaction between the 
corporations' political, legal, social, cultural and economic environment. These 
factors shape reporting practices and determine greatly the extent of earnings 
management. Therefore, the corporation's environment is important as an earnings 
management constraint, and may positively influence earnings management 
motivations to provide high quality financial reports through requiring high quality 
information. On the other hand, the environment may create conditions for practicing 
earnings management, such as with weak corporate governance and weak audit 
quality. In other words, earnings management has a negative relationship with the 
quality of financial reports, when managers use earnmgs management 
opportunistically. Therefore, constraining earnings management will positively 
influence the quality of financial reports. 
The literature of earnings management presents factors that influence earnings 
management practice and improve the quality of financial reports. Levitt (1998) called 
for an action plan to improve the quality of financial reports by constraining earnings 
management. The action plan includes improving the accounting framework, 
enhancing outside auditing in the financial reporting process, strengthening the audit 
committee process and pursuing cultural change on the part of corporate management. 
Goncharov (2005) presents additional factors that constrict earnings management, 
which are as follows: political forces, culture, corporate governance, auditing and 
accounting standards. 
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2.2.1 Political Forces 
Financial reports receive attention by politicians to create or resolve crises. The 
political process theories suggest hypotheses about the use of accounting numbers in 
the political process. Politicians and bureaucrats seek to propose solutions to financial 
problems, thereby improving their political position. Moreover, they are alleged to 
have motivations to seek wealth transfers via the political process, because it provides 
opportunities for politicians and bureaucrats to generate laws and regulations that 
transfer control of resources to the government and wealth to themselves (Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1986). Empirical studies argue the influence of political forces on 
financial reporting practice. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) mention that the political 
process commonly is averse to corporations reporting big losses. Ball et al. (2003) 
argue that the incentives of those preparing financial reports depend on the extent of 
politics relative to market influences on their practices. Goncharov (2005) argues that 
political forces influence reporting practices either directly through the laws on 
accounting, taxes, investor protection and their enforcement, or indirectly through the 
interplay with market forces. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) suggest that financial 
reports affect and are affected by the actions of political processes. 
2.2.2 Culture 
Theoretical frameworks have shown and several empirical studies have discussed the 
influence of culture on accounting. Previous studies have shown different patterns of 
accounting structure and practice in different parts of the world, and the influence of 
cultural factors on the development of national accounting systems (Salter and 
Niswander, 1995). Gray (1988) argues that culture affects accounting practices, and 
he developed a theory that linked cultural constructs to accounting values and systems 
(including measurement and disclosure that decide the practices of financial 
reporting). Salter and Niswander (1995) test the theory developed by Gray on data 
from 29 countries, and they find that cultural base is useful to explain financial 
reporting practices, while it is less useful to explain regulatory and professional 
structures. Chanchani and Willett (2004) test Gray's model on a sample of preparers 
and users of financial reports in New Zealand and India, and they provide results 
which give some support to it. 
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According to Goncharov (2005), cultural values play an important role in explaining 
cross-country variations in the extent of earnings management practices. Secord and 
Su (1994) examine the relationship between accounting models and culture in Asian 
countries, and their results show there is much similarity in the accounting practices 
between Asian countries that have similar common cultural origins, but also provide 
evidence that the diversity of the Asian culture may contribute to differences in 
accounting practices. Kinnunen and Koskela (2003) examine earnings management in. 
18 countries in the period 1995-1999. Their results suggest that there are systematic 
differences in the type of earnings management across countries. The differences exist 
because of discretion-allowed principles, the role of auditing and other factors beyond 
the regulator's control, such as cultural values and management's incentive structures. 
2.2.3 Accounting Standards 
Academics and practitioners often perceive earnmgs management as a result of 
latitude in accounting standards. Accounting standards give managers different 
accounting choices, which managers can select from to prepare financial reports. As a 
result, financial reports may provide earnings with different quality. Earnings 
management is expected to be more extensive under flexible systems that leave a 
sufficient gap for making judgments (Goncharov, 2005). 
Yu (2005) examined the relationship between earnings management and accounting 
standards and his results show that international accounting standards, accrual-based 
accounting standards, separating tax and financial reporting and accounting standards 
with increased disclosure requirements all constrain earnings management. Also, his 
results argue that accounting standard policy is an important institutional factor which 
influences a country's financial reports quality. Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) 
examined whether tighter accounting standards decrease earnings management and 
lead to the provision of financial reports that include more relevant information to the 
capital market. They provide results that confirm that tighter accounting standards 
strictly increase earnings quality, as measured by the variability of reported earnings 
and the association between reported earnings and the market price reaction. 
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Ball et aL (2003) argue the relationship between the quality of financial reports and 
accounting standards. The study results show that it is impossible for countries with 
low quality accounting standards to have high quality financial reports. On the other 
hand, high quality accounting standards do not guarantee financial reports with high 
quality. Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008) support this view by citing the importance of 
other factors that also influence the quality of financial reports, such as management 
incentives and national institutional factors. 
2.2.4 Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance is a set of mechanisms designed to mitigate agency problems 
that arise from the separation of ownership and control in a company, which might 
protect the interests of owners, improve company performance, and ensure that 
investors get an adequate return on their investment (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; La 
Porta et aI., 2002). Moreover, since the mid-I 990s there has been considerable interest 
in the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms, based on data from 
developed market economies such as the UK, the US and Japan (Dnes, 2005). Also, it 
is now of interest to most developing countries, including Libya. 
Corporate governance can be defined as follows: 
" ... The relationship among various participants in determining the direction 
and performance of corporations. The primary participants are 1) the 
shareholders, 2) the management (led by the chief executive officer), and 3) 
the board of directors ... Other participants include the employees, customers, 
suppliers, creditors, and the community". Monks and Minow (2001, p. I). 
Du Plessis et al. (2005, pp. 6-7) refer to corporate governance as: 
"the process of controlling management and of balancing the interests of all 
internal stakeholders and other parties who can be affected by the corporations 
conduct in order to ensure responsible behaviour by corporations and to 
achieve the maximum level of efficiency and profitability for a corporation" 
Solomon and Solomon (2003, p. 14) defined corporate governance as: 
" ... the system of checks and balance, both internal and external to companies, 
which ensure that companies discharge their accountability to all their 
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stakeholders and act in a socially responsible way in all areas of their business 
activity" 
The four most common important components of these definitions are that 
corporation governance is, firstly, a process of controlling management; secondly, it 
takes into consideration the interests of internal stakeholders and other parties who 
can be affected by the corporation's conduct; thirdly, it aims at ensuring responsible 
behaviour by corporations; and finally, it has the ultimate goal of achieving the 
maximum level of efficiency and profitability for a corporation. In other words, the 
core of corporate governance lies in two related questions: who is controlling the 
corporation, and for what purposes? 
This section discusses the influence of corporate governance on the occurrence of 
earnings management. Earnings management gives managers opportunities to manage 
a corporation's performance in a way that depends on their motivations. Corporations 
with good corporate governance mechanisms may restrict the possibility of managers 
to manage financial reports (Rezaee, 2002). Academic researchers have found a 
relationship between weaknesses in corporate governance and poor financial reporting 
quality, and weaker internal controls, financial statement fraud and earnings 
manipulation (e.g. Beasley, 1996; Dechow et aI., 1996). As a result, there is a 
negative relationship between the strength of internal corporate governance 
mechanisms and the practice of earnings management. In other words, good corporate 
governance structure can prevent a corporation's management from employing 
procedures that infringe the interests of the corporation's owners and other parties 
who can be affected by the corporation's conduct, and can constrain such 
opportunistic earnings management. 
Internal corporate governance structure includes an independent and competent board 
of directors, an effective audit committee, an effective internal audit function, and 
legal protection. The following section also includes a review of the previous 
literature on the role of a corporation's internal governance structure in constraining 
earnings management. It is widely accepted that there are distinct corporate 
governance differences between countries. The basic differences are orientation, 
ownership concentration and time horizon of economic relationships (Shleifer & 
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Vishny, 1997). Also, it should be noted that the Libyan case is different from 
developed countries because the ownership structures of corporations in Libya are 
largely determined by unlisted companies, which are state- and family-owned. 
Therefore, the objective of this section is to introduce some elements of internal 
corporate governance mechanisms to the Libyan environment that could help to 
restrict earnings management and improve the quality of financial reporting, and 
facilitate improvements in corporations' performance. 
2.2.4.1 Agency Theory 
According to the agency theory perspective, because of the separation of the 
ownership and control, there exist conflicts of interests between the agent and the 
principal. Agency theory identifies the agency relationship where one party, the 
principal, delegates work to another party, the agent (Mallin, 2007). The agency 
theory argues when there is an agency problem, managers of a corporation (agents) 
may act against the interests of the corporation's owners (principals). Agency 
problems arise from the difference of interest between a corporation's management 
and owners. Therefore, effective control and monitoring mechanisms are needed to 
reduce agency conflicts in firms. 
Agency theory is explains the relationship between principals and agent, in this 
relationship one party (the principal) delegates work to another (the agent), who 
performs that work. Agency theory is concerned with resolving two problems that can 
arise in agency relationships. Firstly, is the agency problem that arises when the 
desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict, and it is difficult or expensive for 
the principle to verify what the agent is actually doing. The problem here is that the 
principal cannot verify that the agent has behaved appropriately. Secondly, is the 
problem of risk sharing that arises when the principal and agent have different 
attitudes towards risk. The problem here is that the principle and the agent may prefer 
different actions because of the different risk preferences (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
2.2.4.2 The Impact or Ownership Structure on Corporate Governance 
There is evidence that the corporation's ownership structure might significantly 
influence the corporation's financial performance. This effect might happen via the 
structure's impact on incentives, decision-making and the monitoring of performance 
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(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). In addition, ownership structure affects the monitoring 
mechanism that the corporation uses, which includes earnings management 
monitoring activity (Siregar & Utama, 2008). Corporate ownership structures might 
be divided into two kinds of ownership: concentrated and dispersed (CIPE, 2002). In 
the concentrated ownership structure, a small number of individuals, families, banks 
and holding companies hold the highest proportions of the corporations' shares. 
Zheka (2005) also includes state ownership within this structure. In the dispersed 
ownership structure, a large number of owners hold a small number of a corporation's 
shares. Balsam et al. (2002) mention that institutional investors (sophisticated 
investors) have more access to the corporation's information than non-institutional 
investors. Therefore, they have more ability to detect earnings management. 
Moreover, institutional investors have a large monitoring function if the ownership 
structure of the corporation is widely dispersed. 
A widespread ownership structure is mostly extant in countries such as the United 
Kingdom and the United States, where the agency problem arises from the conflict of 
interests between a corporation's management and outside shareholders (Ding et aI., 
2007). On the other hand, in other developed and developing countries, a 
corporation's ownership structure is controlled by families or one owner who 
haslhave effective control of the corporation, where the agency problems (which arise 
from the conflicts of interest between controlling shareholders and the minority 
shareholders) are not as serious as those in corporations with public ownership 
structure or without controlling shareholders. The type of ownership that is dominant 
in market-based economies is private ownership. Active and deliberate liberalisation 
and privatisation policies have led to a considerable decrease in the number of state-
owned companies in most countries. Nevertheless, cases of state-owned companies 
are easy to find in some economies, such as Scandinavian welfare economies, where 
the presence of state-owned companies in regular markets is particularly strong 
(Goldeng et at, 2008). In addition, state-ownership companies' structure (where the 
states represent the principals and the management of the company represents agents) 
can be found in economies that are not market-based, such as Libya. However, in all 
of the previous cases, the essential consequence is similar, where inside parties 
through their control of the corporation want to increase their private benefit at the 
cost of external parties. 
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As mentioned above, widespread ownership may be dominant in the United Kingdom 
and the United States, but corporate ownership in many other countries around the 
world is controlled by the state and family, and is characterised by concentrated 
ownership (LaPorta et aI., 1999). In the 1990s, researchers started to address the 
problems of corporate governance that related to concentrated ownership (Morek, 
2000). Researchers are starting to realise that concentrated ownership, along with 
poor institutional protection of outside shareholders, is associated with certain types 
of corporate governance weakness; these weaknesses include relatively fewer public 
firms, lower firm valuations, lower payout of firm earnings as dividends, less 
information contained in stock prices, inefficient strategy and capital allocation 
decisions, and expropriation of minority shareholders. Moreover, Young et al. (2001) 
identified the factors in the emerging economies that are associated with principal-
agent problems which are: concentrated ownership structures (state and family 
owned), strategy and competitiveness, and poor legal protection of minority 
shareholder rights. 
There have been a few studies on corporate governance in developing countries. Most 
developing countries face wide gaps in corporate governance research compared to 
their industrialised counterparts. Moreover, most developing countries' economic and 
industrial organisations are characterised by the fact that the majority of businesses 
and corporations in these countries are family-owned corporations which are small-
and medium-sized, and state-owned corporations, which dominate production, 
consumption and labour markets in many economies. 
In relation to family-owned corporations, Schulze et al. (2001) argued that the 
relationship between principals (family owners) and agents (family-member 
managers) are probably based on emotions, sentiments and informalities, which result 
in less effective monitoring of family managers. This means that family owners and 
family-member managers not only reduce the effectiveness of internal and external 
control mechanisms, but also expose firms to a self-control problem which harms 
themselves as well as those around them. As for state-owned corporations, Chen 
(2004) pointed out that the agency problems with Chinese state-owned corporations 
are more serious because of several factors, such as soft budget constraints, personal 
connections, seniority, political loyalty, insiders' control, managerial inefficiency and 
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lack of competent managers. Factors other than management ability were often the 
criteria used for the promotion of state-owned corporate managers. Chen also 
describes three factors that may motivate managers, workers, and public officials to 
take more from the corporation than they gave: contends that, lack of owners and of 
managers with authority, lack of incentives to monitor the input of key factors of 
production, and a lack of adequate reward systems. Ng (2005) stated that 
corporations with high ownership concentration should pay even more attention to 
improving corporate governance practices in order to enhance their performance. This 
attention should be paid in such areas as improving the effectiveness and quality of 
the board and the audit committee. If the effectiveness of these corporate governance 
variables can be improved, it is envisaged that firm performance can be further 
enhanced, even in high ownership concentration companies. 
Significant studies have attempted to link earnings management and the ownership 
structure of corporations. These studies' results provide evidence that the extent and 
direction of earnings management are associated with ownership structure (Dempsey 
et aI., 1993; Wang, 2006; AI-Fayoumi et aI., 2010). Siregar and Utama (2008) 
investigated whether Indonesian public corporations that are listed on the Jakarta 
Stock Exchange conduct efficient or opportunistic earnings management, and 
examined the effect of ownership structure on the type of earnings management 
selected (efficient earnings management and opportunistic earnings management). 
The study results suggest that family ownership has a significant effect on the type of 
earnings management which is practiced by Indonesian listed corporations. 
Corporations with non-business groups and a high proportion of family ownership are 
more likely to practice efficient earnings management than other types of 
corporations. 
2.2.4.3 The Impact of an Effective Board of Directors on the Restraint of 
Earnings Management 
A corporate governance mechanism should control management and balance the 
interests of owners' rights and all other parties who can be affected by the 
corporation's conduct in order to ensure responsible behaviour by corporations and to 
reach the maximum level of efficiency and profitability for a corporation. The board 
of directors is an important element of the internal corporate governance mechanism 
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and is charged with monitoring the corporation's management to protect its owners' 
interests and restraint earnings management. Fama and Jensen (1983) pointed out that 
the board of directors is the most important mechanism in internal corporate 
governance because it fonns the summit of the internal corporate government 
structure in the corporation. Even though most decisions by the board of directors are 
related to management issues including top management, the board also has to ensure 
the validity of the accounting choices made by top management and the financial 
implications of such decisions (NYSE, 2002). In an attempt to improve the 
effectiveness of the board of directors, a number of recent empirical studies and 
various recommendations made by the international bodies of corporate governance 
suggest that some characteristics of the board of directors should be achieved, and 
these characteristics are expected to have a great influence on the quality of financial 
reporting as measured by the level of earnings management. This section discusses 
prior literature on types of board, independent directors and other characteristics. 
2.2.4.3.1 Board Independence 
Fama and Jensen (1983) stated that the composition of a board of directors is an 
important factor in establishing a board that is an effective monitor of management 
actions. The board of directors usually includes two kinds of directors, which are 
inside directors who are employed by corporations in an executive or operational 
capacity, and outside directors who should be independent and have no relationship 
with the corporation other than being board directors. 
According to Fama and Jensen (1983), effective boards separate the problems of 
decision management from decision control, and outside directors are widely believed 
to playa larger role in monitoring management than inside board members. Also, the 
effectiveness of a board is enhanced by including independent directors because they 
have incentives to increase their reputations as experts in decision control. Monks and 
Minow (2001) claim that non-executive directors generally face a lower conflict of 
interest since their future career success does not depend on chief executive officers. 
It is argued that a larger outside directors' presence will bring stronger supervision of 
managerial actions. Consistent with this argument, Kaplan and Reishus (1990) find 
that directors of poorly perfonning finns, who therefore may be perceived to have 
done a poor job overseeing management, are less likely to become directors at other 
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firms. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) also argue that outside directors are important 
because a director's willingness to monitor the chief executive officer increases with 
his or her independence from the chief executive officer. In contrast, in situation 
associated directors where there are outside directors and they have some relationship 
with non-board members such as being consultants to the corporation, being relatives 
of management, retirees of the corporation, being lawyers receiving a fee income, and 
being involved in other related party transactions, this relationship might influence the 
independence of the outside board directors (Vicknair et aI., 1993; Beasley, 1996; 
Carcello & Neal, 2000). 
The international bodies of corporate governance, such as the Cad bury Committee 
Report (CCR) in the UK (1992) and the Blue Ribbon Committee Report and 
Recommendations (BRC) in the US (1999), provided various recommendations that a 
majority of outside or independent directors can make a positive contribution to the 
board's monitoring responsibilities. Moreover, significant empirical studies have 
investigated the impact of independent board directors on the effectiveness of the 
board. Beasley (1996) indicated that a larger proportion of independent members on 
the board significantly decreases the probability of a company practicing earnings 
management, because they are properly independent from the corporation's 
management, which makes them able to monitor the management effectively. 
Peasnell et al. (2005) investigated the effect of board composition on the occurrence 
of earnings management utilising a sample of UK corporations. The authors stated 
that corporations with a lower proportion of independent board directors are more 
likely to practice earnings management upward than corporations with a higher 
proportion of independent board directors. In other words, there is a negative 
relationship between the proportion of independent directors in the board and 
abnormal income increasing. 
Furthermore, Klein (2002) exammes whether audit committee and board 
characteristics are related to earnings management by the corporation. A negative 
relation was found between abnormal accruals and board directors' independence. 
Consistent with this, Xie et al. (2003) examined the role of the relation between 
earnings management and the structure, background and composition of a company's 
board of directors. Their study is particularly interested in the role played by outside 
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directors; their background in corporations, finance, or law; and their membership on 
two key board committees, the audit and executive committees. The results of their 
study were consistent with the Blue Ribbon Panel recommendation, and indicated that 
a lower level of earnings management is associated with greater independent outside 
representation on the board, the monitoring that outside directors provide may 
improve when they are financially sophisticated. Board and audit committee members 
with corporate or financial backgrounds are associated with companies that have 
smaller discretionary current accruals. Board and audit committee meeting frequency 
is also associated with reduced levels of discretionary current accruals. It can be 
concluded that board and audit committee activity and their members' financial 
sophistication may be important factors in constraining the propensity of managers to 
engage in earnings management. 
Moreover, Davidson et al. (2005) investigated the role of a corporation's internal 
governance mechanisms (which include the board of directors [separation of the chief 
executive and board chair roles], the audit committee, the internal audit function and 
the choice of external auditor) in constraining earnings management utilising a sample 
of Australian corporations. The results of the study indicated that a lower level of 
earnings management is associated with the presence of non-executive directors on 
the board. On the other hand, Park and Shin (2004) investigated the effect of board 
composition on the practice of earnings management in Canada. The results of the 
study indicated that outside directors, as a whole, do not reduce abnonnal accruals 
earnings management. Also, Hennalin and Weisbach (1991) found no relation 
between corporation perfonnance and a small number of outside directors on the 
board. 
2.2.4.3.2 Other Board Characteristics 
There are other related characteristics that may improve the effectiveness of the 
board. Xie et al. (2003) examined the role of the relation between earnings 
management and the structure, background and composition of a company's board of 
directors. The study provides empirical evidence that the monitoring that outside 
directors provide may improve when they are financially sophisticated. A member of 
the board of directors with a corporate or financial background might be more 
familiar with earnings management Issues and might better understand the 
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implications of earnings manipulation. Furthermore, Park and Shin (2004) explained 
why outside directors were not effective in curbing earnings management in Canada. 
The authors stated that outside directors, as a whole, may lack financial 
sophistication. In addition, another important characteristic that may influence the 
effectiveness of the board of directors is the separation between the role of chairman 
and the chief executive officer. The chairman's position and the chief executive 
officer should be separated for an effective monitoring system, since the chairman is 
the head of the board of directors which monitors management, while the chief 
executive officer is mainly responsible for corporate management. 
Recent literature (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Strickland et aI., 1996; and Dechow'et aI., 
1996) and corporate governance guidelines (e.g. CCR, 1992; Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASX) 2003) discourages the dual position of chief executive officers 
because this concentrated power may lead to possible conflicts of interest, resulting in 
a reduction in the level of monitoring, and executive directors, who in most cases 
involve a majority of the board, are monitors of their own performance. The CCR 
produced two major recommendations, which are that boards of directors should 
include at least three non-executive directors, two of whom should be independent of 
management, and the positions of the chairman and the chief executive officer should 
not be held by the same individual. In addition, the chief executive officer should 
have limited power to appoint new directors and set board agendas, and rigorous chief 
executive officer performance reviews should take place regularly. 
2.2.4.4 Impact of an Effective Audit Committee on the Restraint of Earnings 
Management 
The importance of the audit committee has been highlighted in the recommendations 
of corporate governance guidelines. Therefore, audit committees have been widely 
established following these recommendations. According to Spira (2002, p. 5), "An 
audit committee is a committee of directors who are charged not with the running of 
the business but with overseeing how the business is controlled, reported on and 
conducted". The existence of the audit committee should increase the board of 
directors' ability to act as a management control by presenting more detailed 
knowledge of financial statements and other financial information issued by the 
corporation (Pincus et al.. 1989). The audit committee is expected to encourage 
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external auditors' independence because it is responsible for monitoring management 
and auditors for the benefit of all owners. Also, an audit committee with independent 
directors is expected to enhance the quality of monitoring because it is not related 
with the management of the corporation, either as officers or employees (Braiotta, 
1999; Walker, 2004). Moreover, an audit committee that is composed of independent 
and qualified directors is better able to increase auditors' independence (DeZoort & 
Salterio, 2001; and Raghunandan et aI., 2001). The CCR (1992) stressed that 
establishing audit committees is an important action to increase corporate governance 
standards. An active audit committee would indicate the level of effort that has been 
made to ensure good financial reporting. The external auditor should discuss the 
quality of financial reporting with the audit committee. 
Five key recommendations were made regarding the establishment of audit 
committees by the BRC (1999) in the USA. Firstly, audit committees should have a 
written charter setting out their duties and responsibilities; secondly, the members of 
an audit committee should be independent non-executive directors; thirdly, at least 
three members of the audit committee should be financially literate; fourthly, the 
committee has the ultimate authority and responsibility to appoint, evaluate and, when 
necessary, replace the external auditor. Finally, the audit committee should discuss 
with external auditors how they have maintained their independence. The following 
sections present the previous literature on the audit committee related to functions, 
qualifications and communications with external auditors. 
2.2.4.4.1 Responsibilities of Audit Committee 
Audit committees are established to provide an oversight of good financial reporting 
and auditing practices. According to CCR (1992), Verschoor (1993), BRC (1999) and 
Spira (2002), responsibilities of the audit committee include assisting the board of 
directors in oversight responsibilities and being charged with matters relating to 
financial reporting and auditing. Delegating part of the responsibilities to the audit 
committee has two advantages for the board, which are improving the independence 
of the oversight body and improving board efficiency in monitoring corporate 
managers from earnings management. 
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The audit committee's responsibilities can be classified into four main areas. Firstly, 
there is oversight of the financial statement, which includes considering both 
significant accounting policies and any changes to them, and any significant estimates 
and judgments, assisting directors in discharging their statutory responsibilities as 
regards financial reporting, reviewing financial statements with management and the 
external auditors, and disclosure of financial and non-financial transactions and 
related information presented with the financial statements. Secondly, the audit 
committee should evaluate and review the corporation's internal control procedures, 
and monitor and review the effectiveness of the internal audit function to prevent or 
detect fraudulent activities or irregularities, and improve communication between the 
board and external auditors. Thirdly, it should review the qualifications, independence 
and performance of the external auditor, review and discuss with management and the 
external auditor the annual audited financial statements and other financial 
information, to develop and implement policy on the engagement of the external 
auditor to supply non-audit services, and coordinate the work of internal and external 
auditors, and improve communication between the board and external auditors. 
Finally, the audit committee should report findings to the board of directors, and 
strengthen the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors. 
3.2.4.4.2 Independence and Qualifications of Audit Committee 
According to CCR (1992), the members of an audit committee should be independent 
non-executive directors and at least three members of the audit committee financially 
literate. In support, the BRC (1999) reported that there is a positive relation between 
an audit committee and greater oversight and lower engaging in earnings 
management. McMullen and Raghunandan (1996) examine the relation between audit 
committee characteristics and financial misconducts by comparing corporations 
without financial reporting problems and other corporations with financial reporting 
problems. The authors find a negative relation between audit committee independence 
and financial misconducts. 
Carcello and Neal (2000) examine the relation between the composition of financially 
distressed corporations' audit committees and the likelihood of receiving going-
concern reports. The results of the study reported a negative relation between the 
percentage of affiliated directors on the audit committee and the likelihood of 
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receiving a going-concern report. Also, it showed that more independent and expert 
audit committees are more effective in protecting auditors from dismissal, with the 
result that external auditors are able to issue a going-concern report without any 
pressure from the corporation management. 
In support, Klein (2002) examines whether audit committee and board characteristics 
are related to earnings management by the corporation. A negative relation was found 
between earnings management and board directors' and audit committees' 
independence. Also, the relation was more pronounced for corporations with audit 
committees comprised of less than a majority of independent directors. Agrawal and 
Chadha (2005) could not find a significant relation between several key corporate 
governance characteristics and financial reporting problems. These include the 
independence of boards and audit committees and the provision of non-audit services 
by outside auditors. 
A significant amount of literature suggests that audit committee members should be 
financially literate (DeZoort, 1997; McDaniel et aI., 2002; and DeZoort et aI., 2002). 
The international bodies of corporate government, such as the BRC Report and 
Recommendations in the US (1999) and National Association of Corporate Directors 
NACD (2000) provided various recommendations that members of audit committee 
should have primary types of knowledge, which are an understanding of how business 
activities are presented in financial statements and the ability to analyse these 
statements, and an understanding of the nature and purposes of the financial statement 
audit. They also stressed that at least one member should have accounting or related 
financial management expertise. McDaniel et aI. (2002) suggested that including a 
financial expert in the audit committee would change the focus of the committee and 
therefore affect financial reporting quality. Moreover, Bedard et al. (2004) provide 
empirical evidence that a financial audit committee with expertise members is 
positively associated with reducing income-decreasing earnings management. 
2.2.4.5 Impact of an Effective Internal Auditor on the Restraint of Earnings 
Management 
The internal auditors' function evolves from a traditional oversight function to a wider 
function that includes a wider spectrum of activities that add value to their 
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organisations (Ahlawat & Lowe, 2004). The internal auditors' function is also 
expected to identify and monitor a corporation's risks, to evaluate whether internal 
controls are efficient and effective, and to improve corporate governance. Gramling et 
al. (2004) believe that there is growing importance placed on expanded roles for the 
internal auditors in ensuring quality corporate governance. Institute of Internal 
Auditors Research Foundation (IIARF) (1999) defined internal auditing as: 
... an independent, objective assurance and consulting activity designed to add 
value and improve an organisation's operations. It helps an organisation 
accomplish its objectives by bringing a systematic disciplined approach to 
evaluate and improve the effectiveness of the risk management, control, and 
governance processes (Institute of Internal Auditors, Research Foundation 
1999). 
This definition highlights the independence and objectivity of internal auditing 
regarding assurance services and consulting. The functions of internal auditors 
include: reviewing and evaluating the adequacy and effectiveness of the system of 
internal control and the quality of performance in carrying out assigned 
responsibilities, reviewing and evaluating the reliability and effectiveness and how 
well the responsibilities assigned to managers are being carried out in practice. Spira 
and Page (2003) argued that internal auditors play an important role in embracing the 
opportunity to participate in achieving the corporate goals through their contribution 
to risk management. Internal auditors are an integral part of the corporate governance 
mechanism. Graham (2004) pointed out that the internal auditor should be perceived 
as a valuable strategic partner and an integral part of corporate governance. Moreover, 
Richard and Deborah (2000) mention that internal auditors have the opportunity to be 
recognised as delivering value at the highest levels of their corporations by enhancing 
corporate governance. 
The importance of internal audit functions has received attention from many 
researchers. Goodwin and Seow (2002) examine the views of external auditors and 
directors concerning the impact of certain governance mechanisms on the prevention 
and detection of control weaknesses, financial statement errors and fraud (earnings 
management) in Singapore. The study results indicated that auditors and directors 
58 
perceive that the existence of an internal audit function and strict enforcement of a 
corporate code of conduct have a significant impact on the company's ability to 
strengthen controls, prevent and detect earinings management from fraud and/or 
errors, and enhance audit effectiveness. Walker et al. (2003) stated that the role of the 
internal auditor is to help their corporations in identifying and evaluating risks. 
In addition, Gallegos (2004) stated that, in the effective corporate governance 
mechanism, internal and external auditors have essential roles to play. Both of them 
must provide assurance to directors and management regarding the integrity of 
financial statements and the adequacy of internal controls. Graham (2004) stressed 
that good corporate governance increasingly requires achieving a balance among all 
of its components. The board of directors is responsible for setting corporate strategy, 
whilst the design of the internal systems and control processes to implement that 
strategy should be the responsibility of the management. Internal auditors are charged 
with assessing and ensuring that these wide-ranging processes function effectively. 
Bishop et al. (2000) pointed out that the interactions between internal auditors and the 
audit committee are an important element of corporate governance mechanism. 
Extending and expanding the interaction between audit committee and internal 
auditors can enhance the quality of corporate governance and strengthen the 
corporation's infrastructure. An effective audit committee can strengthen the position 
of the internal auditors' function by acting as an independent forum, while internal 
auditors provide assistance to the audit committee in its oversight of reporting and 
risk management and control (Braiotta, 1999; Bishop et aI., 2000; and Goodwin & 
Yeo, 2001). In this connection, DeZoort et al. (2000) point out that internal auditor 
directors believed that structured communications programmes between an audit 
committee and internal auditors could enhance the corporate governance quality. 
The relationship between internal and external auditors is one that influences the work 
of both, and communication difficulties between both parties can have a significant 
influence on the efficiency of an audit (Brody et aI., 1998). Therefore, significant 
studies increasingly advocate that coordination of the internal and external auditors 
could provide total audit coverage more effectively and efficiently. Edge and Farley 
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(1991) mention two major benefits to the external auditor of utilising the work of the 
internal auditor, which are (1) reducing the time taken for the audit and the cost of the 
external audit, and (2) improving the quality of the external audit function because the 
internal auditor examines in more depth the internal control system and has a better 
knowledge of the client accounting system. Braiotta and Marsh (1992) explained that 
internal auditors are responsible for reviewing, assessing and monitoring the internal 
control structure, policies and procedures. An effective internal aUditing function will 
provide the external auditor with the necessary information about the design and the 
effectiveness of the entity's internal control policies and procedures and help them to 
assess the control risk and the extent of their substantive procedures. 
In addition, the BRC on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees 
(1999) pointed out that the internal auditor plays a significant role in working with 
management, the audit committee and the external auditor in ensuring the 
effectiveness of internal controls and in bringing any weaknesses to the attention of 
the appropriate parties. Krislmamoorthy (2002) indicated that external auditors 
usually check and evaluate the internal control structure and the internal audit 
function. Therefore, good communication and coordination of the internal and 
external auditors could improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the auditing 
process. 
Significant empirical studies show that internal auditing plays an important role in 
external financial reporting and restricting earnings management, and it is part of the 
solution to the perceived control, reporting and ethical problems in the corporate 
sector (Coram et aI., 2008). Eighme and Cashell (2002) mention that internal auditors 
can assist in decreasing earnings management via performing two functions, which 
are (1) evaluating the effectiveness of relevant internal controls and risk management 
processes, and (2) supporting the audit committee and management in evaluating 
earnings management risks. 
In addition, Douglas et al. (2009) examined whether a high-quality internal auditor's 
function is associated with lower levels of earnings management. Their study's results 
find a significant negative relation between overall internal auditors' function quality 
and absolute abnormal accruals. Coram et al. (2008) examined the association 
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between both the existence and the type of internal audit function and the propensity 
to detect and self-report fraud. The authors find that corporations with an internal 
audit function are more likely than others without such a function to detect and self-
report fraud. The findings of their study suggested that internal audit adds value 
through improving the control and monitoring the environment within organisations 
to detect and self-report fraud. Moreover, the study suggested that keeping the internal 
audit function within the corporation was more effective than completely outsourcing 
that function. 
On the other hand, Davidson et al. (2005) investigated the role of a firm's corporate 
governance structure, including the board of directors, the audit committee, the 
internal audit function and the choice of external auditor, in constraining earnings 
management in Australia (to discover if the practice of earnings management is 
systematically related to the strength of internal corporate governance mechanisms). 
The results of the study find a significant association between non-executive directors 
on the board and on the audit committee and a lower likelihood of earnings 
management. However, the results show that the voluntary establishment of an 
internal audit function and the choice of auditor were not significantly related to a 
reduction in the level of discretionary accruals. 
2.2.5 External Audit Quality 
External audit plays an important role in the monitoring of financial statements 
because it reports any observed breaches of restrictive covenants to the users of 
financial statements (DeAngelo, 1981 a). Auditing is the accumulation and evaluation 
of evidence about information to determine and report on the degree of 
correspondence between the information and established criteria. Also, auditing 
should be done by a competent, independent person (Arens et aI., 2008). The 
objective of an external audit is the expression of an opinion on the fairness of 
financial statements regarding all material respects, financial position, results of 
operations and cash flows in conformity with an applicable financial reporting 
framework (International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB), 2004a). 
External auditors need to obtain sufficient evidence that makes them able to provide 
that opinion about the fairness of financial statements and to issue an appropriate 
audit report. In other words, a financial statement audit is conducted to determine 
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whether the financial statements are stated in accordance with specified criteria and to 
gather evidence to determine whether the statements contain material errors or other 
misstatements. According to the IAASB: 
- An auditor conducting an audit obtains reasonable assurance that the 
financial statements taken as a whole are free from material misstatement, 
whether caused by fraud or error (2004b, p.9). 
-Misstatements in the financial statements can occur from error or fraud. The 
distinguishing factor between error and fraud is whether the underlying action 
that results in the misstatement of the financial statements is intentional or 
unintentional (2004b). 
-The term error refers to an unintentional misstatement in financial statements, 
including the omission of an amount or a disclosure (2004b, pA). 
-The term fraud refers to an intentional act by one or more individuals among 
management, those charged with governance, employees, or third parties, 
involving the use of deception to obtain an unjust or illegal advantage (2004b 
p.5). 
The fraudulence of financial statements might be due to the attempts of management 
to manage earnings so as to mislead the users of financial statement by influencing 
their perceptions about the performance and profitability of the corporation. 
Practicing of earnings management might start with small actions or inappropriate 
adjustment of assumptions and changes in jUdgments by management. Motivations 
and pressures might lead these actions to increase to the extent that they result in 
fraudulent financial reporting. Many users of financial statements are particularly 
concerned about an actual or potential conflict of interest between themselves and the 
management of the corporation. This apprehension extends to the fear that the 
financial statements and accompanying data being provided by management may be 
intentionally biased in management's favour. Conflicts of interest may exist also 
among the different classes of users of financial statements. Thus, users seek 
assurance from independent auditors that the information is both free from 
management bias and neutral with respect to the various user groups. In other words, 
they seek an assurance that the information is not presented in a way that favours one 
group over another (Cosserat & Rodda, 2009). 
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As mentioned before, an external audit plays an important role in the monitoring of 
financial statements. Therefore, external auditors are expected to detect opportunistic 
earnings management and, in that case, they are considered high-quality auditors. The 
quality of an audit is a function of both auditor competence (which is the auditor's 
ability to detect material omissions or misstatements in the financial statements) and 
auditor independence (which is the auditor's propensity to correct and reveal material 
errors) (DeAngelo, 1981a). In other words, audit quality is the probability that the 
external auditor detects earnings management in financial statements and then reports 
that to the external users. According to Hayes et ai. (2005), external auditors are 
evaluated based on technical audit quality and functional audit quality elements. 
Technical audit quality is related to the detection and reporting of errors and the 
detecting of fraud in financial statements. Functional audit quality is related to the 
process of carrying out the audit and communication with interested parties, and 
represents the audit process itself, not the outcome of it. Several studies have 
investigated the influence of audit quality on earnings management (Dechow et aI., 
1996; Petroni & Beasley, 1996; Francis et aI., 1999; Gaver & Paterson, 2001; 
Krishnan, 2003; and Chen et aI., 2005). These studies argued that high quality audits 
serve as a constraint on earnings management. Consequently, they enhance the 
credibility of corporate financial statements and assist financial statement users to 
make rational decisions. George (2009) argues that an audit's effectiveness to increase 
the quality of financial reporting depends partly on the auditor's ability to detect 
material misstatements and partly on the auditor's behaviour subsequent to the 
detection of such misstatements. However, the utility of the auditing function depends 
on the quality of audits, which is determined by several factors. The following section 
includes a review of the previous literature on the influence of a number of factors, 
such as length of tenure, non-auditing services and lawsuits on audit quality. 
2.2.5.1 Length of Tenure and Audit Quality 
The length of tenure is a key factor that may affect audit quality. Hayes el at. (2005) 
believe that mostly the first year of auditing is perceived as less thorough, since it 
takes some time to identify all potential audit risks for a new client. Moreover, since 
the better identification and understanding of a client's business and risk is useful in 
detecting material misstatements in the financial statements, the auditor learning 
argument suggests that audit quality and the integrity of the accounting reports is 
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lower during the early years of tenure, and improves as audit tenure increases. On the 
other hand, Johnson et al. (2002) and Boon et al. (2008) believe that the auditor might 
lose his professional scepticism if the length of tenure is for a long period, where after 
long length of tenure the auditor may become less sceptical of the client's accounting 
practices and judgments based on a "learned confidence" in the client. In other 
words, the audit quality could be enhanced with long length of tenure because it 
provides better identification of client's risk, better understanding of client's business 
and industry and knowledge about the corporation's operations, which are essential 
for an adequate audit to assess the risk of misstatement of the financial statements 
whether due to error or fraud, and to design the nature and extent of further audit 
procedures. However, it may decrease the auditor independence and objectivity due to 
the cosiness of the auditor-client relationship developed over an extended period. 
Johnson et al. (2002) examined whether the length of the relationship between a 
corporation and an audit firm is associated with financial reporting quality. The study 
found that relative to short audit-firm tenures of two to three years, medium audit-firm 
tenures of four to eight years were associated with lower quality financial reports. 
However, there was no evidence that longer audit-firm tenures of nine or more years 
were associated with reduced financial reporting quality. 
With particular reference to earnings management, several researchers have studied 
the relationship between length of tenure and audit quality, and they have produced 
different results. On the one hand, researchers have shown that there is a positive 
relationship. Myers et al. (2003) pointed out that the longer auditor tenure improves 
the quality of reported earnings (as proxied by earnings management) and concluded 
that with long length of tenure, auditors are better able to impose reporting discipline 
on their clients. Carcello and Nagy (2004) also examine the relationship between 
audit firm tenure and fraudulent financial reporting. The authors find that fraudulent 
financial reporting is more likely to happen in the first three years of the auditor-client 
relationship. The authors could not find any evidence that fraudulent financial 
reporting is more likely given long auditor tenure and their results were consistent 
with the argument that mandatory audit firm rotation could have adverse effects on 
audit quality. 
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Furthennore, Chen et al. (2008) argue that although a limit on the number of years 
that an audit finn may audit the same company may improve auditor independence 
and audit quality, auditors gain more experience and better knowledge from longer 
tenure to detennine the quality of a client's financial reporting. The authors 
investigated the relationship between audit finn tenure and earnings quality using a 
sample of Taiwanese companies, and the results of the study find that absolute 
discretionary accruals decrease significantly with audit finn tenure. Also, Jackson et 
al. (2008) find that audit quality increases with length of audit finn tenure. George 
(2009) examines the relationship between the probability of financial statement fraud 
and audit finn tenure (expressed in tenns of number of years' continuous audit 
engagement for a client). The result suggests that with an increase in the length of 
auditor client relationship, the probability of financial statement fraud reduces. 
On the other hand, Fairchild (2008) examines the effect of auditor tenure on the level 
of managerial fraud and the extent of auditor qualification of reports. The author 
pointed out that although the auditor's ability to detect fraud enhances with tenure. 
Later in the tenure, the auditor becomes sympathetic towards the management, and 
may 'turn a blind eye' to fraudulent behaviour. As a result, this leads to a decrease in 
fraud-detecting efforts, decrease in audit qualification, and an increase in managerial 
fraud. Davis et al. (2005) examine the association between audit tenure and practicing 
earnings management to meet earnings forecasts. The results of the study suggested 
that, by the use of discretionary accruals to meet earnings forecasts, management was 
able to take advantage of the auditor's inexperience in the early years of the 
relationship, and the auditor's ability to constrain management's reporting choices 
declines over time. Dao et al. (2008) investigate the relationship between length of 
tenure and audit quality by using shareholder votes on auditor ratification as a proxy 
for investor perceptions about audit quality. The results of the study indicated that 
shareholders were more likely to vote against, or abstain from, auditor ratification 
when the auditor has long tenure with the client. In other words, shareholders view 
long auditor tenure as adversely affecting audit quality. 
Other researchers have found no relationship between length of tenure and audit 
quality, Kealey et al. (2007) did not find evidence of a negative association between 
financial reporting quality and length of tenure. In addition, Knechel and Vanstraelen 
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(2007) examined the effect of auditor tenure on audit quality for private companies in 
Belgium. The study indicated that audit tenure did not affect either the independent of 
the auditors over time nor provide them with a better ability to predict bankruptcy. 
2.2.5.2 Non-Audit Services and Audit Quality 
Previous studies have focused on whether there is a relationship between audit quality 
and non-audit fees paid to audit firms. The joint supply of audit and non-audit 
services to the same client could be an incentive that makes auditors compromise their 
independence due to the fact that audit firms might not be willing to criticise the work 
carried out by their consultancy division, and it might not wish to lose lucrative 
consultancy services (Lennox, 1999). Several studies document that the joint 
provision of both services can cause a reduction of qualified audit reports and might 
compromise the independence of auditors (Frankel et aI., 2002; Gul et aI., 2006; 
Basioudis et aI., 2008; Quick & Warming-Rasmussen, 2009). Frankel et al. examined 
the association between earnings management and a proxy for economic bonding (the 
purchase of non-audit services) by using a sample of US companies. 
The study'S results find a significant positive association between earnmgs 
management and the purchase of non-audit services, which means that the 
independence of auditors might be compromised by increasing the acquisition of non-
audit services. In their study Basioudis et al. (2008) examined the association between 
the audit firm's final decision regarding the type of opinion provided to a financially 
stressed client and audit service fees and non-audit service fees in the UK. The 
authors find that financially stressed corporations with high audit fees were more 
likely to receive a going-concern modified audit opinion, while corporations with high 
non-audit fees were less likely to receive a going-concern modified audit opinion. 
Consistent with this, Quick and Warming-Rasmussen investigated the impact of non-
audit services on investors' perceptions of auditor independence in Germany. The 
authors find that shareholders generally perceive a negative effect on auditor's 
independence if non-audit services were provided and for most of them a negative 
effect was found, even if these services are not explicitly prohibited in Germany. 
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On the other hand, other studies conclude that non-audit services might help auditors 
to get more experience and a better understanding of a client's business (Antle et aI., 
2006; Lim & Tan, 2008; Patel et al., 2009). Antle et al. found that non-audit services 
fees decrease abnormal accruals. Consistent with this, Lim provided evidence that 
non-audit services positiVely affect audit quality. Patel et al. investigated the reasons 
for providing non-audit services by the incumbent external auditors in New Zealand 
listed companies. The results of the study indicated that the simultaneous provision of 
audit and non-audit services were for efficiency motivations rather than increasing the 
revenue for auditors. Therefore, the regulations in place to restrict the number of non-
audit services that an auditor can provide the client might result in inefficiencies or 
incurrence of unnecessary costs for the client and auditor. 
Finally, other studies document that there is no relationship between non-audit 
services and audit quality. De Fond et al. (2002) found no significant relationship 
between non-audit service fees and impaired auditor independence. Antle et al. (2006) 
did not find any support for the assertion that fees for non-audit services increase 
abnormal accruals. In the same context, Cahan et al. (2008) examined whether 
earnings management is related to the amount that a client spends on non-audit 
services, and the growth and length of the non-audit services relationship between the 
client and its auditor. Their results did not provide any support for a relationship 
between non-audit fee growth rates or the length of time of the non-audit fee and 
earnings management. DeFuentes and Pucheta-Martinez (2009) examined the joint 
provision of audit and non-audit services by the same audit firm and the fact that it 
may risk the independence of the auditor when issuing the audit report. The authors 
found that even in countries of low audit litigation risk where auditors are hardly ever 
charged for misconduct and negligence, auditors are likely to give a qualified audit 
report when providing audit and non-audit services. Consequently, the study's results 
are supportive of the reputation theory, where the economic losses associated with the 
reputation damage and the loss of clients are external deterrents for an auditor's 
misapplication of the audit standards. 
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2.2.5.3 Audit Firm Size and Audit Quality 
The size of an audit a firm is considered as one of factors that affect audit quality and 
it has been used as a proxy to measure it. Prior studies examine whether larger 
auditing firms provide higher quality audits than smaller auditing firms. These studies 
assumed that large audit firms due to their greater resources are more likely to provide 
more precise information and higher quality audit services than small audit firms 
(Davidson & Neu, 1993). Moreover, large audit firms have a greater motivation to 
protect their reputation (Lys & Watts, 1994; DeFond et aI., 2002). Also, Pearson 
(1980) argues that large firms are less likely to be economically dependent on a few 
clients. Therefore, it could enhance auditors' independence because large firms do not 
rely on revenue from a single client. However, large audit firms might have more 
resources to pay for lawsuits by creditors or investors. 
Several studies have suggested that audit firm is size positively related to audit 
quality. DeAngelo (1981 b) suggests that larger firms provide higher quality audits due 
to the fact that larger audit firms have fewer motivations to compromise their 
standards to ensure retention of clients in comparison with smaller firms. Moore and 
Scott (1989) also pointed out that audit firm size and the extent of audit work 
undertaken are positively related. Consistent with previous results, Davidson and Neu 
(1993) indicated that larger auditing firms are associated with higher-quality audits. 
Chan et al. (2005) investigated the relationship between audit quality (as measured by 
auditor size and industry specialisation) and earnings management (as measured by 
the modified Jones model) for 367 newly listed Taiwanese IPO firms between 1999 
and 2002. The study assumed that Taiwanese firms with higher quality auditors 
engage less in earnings management in the IPO process, and it found that the big five 
auditors engaged less in earnings management in the IPO year in Taiwan. This shows 
that high quality auditors constrain earnings management and provide more precise 
information. 
Furthermore, Geiger and Rama (2006) investigated the relation between audit firm 
size and the quality of audit reporting decisions by examining whether the Big four 
audit firms exhibit higher quality reporting by having fewer "audit-reporting errors" 
in the context of issuing going-concern modified reports. The results of this study 
indicate that error rates for the big four audit firms are significantly lower compared 
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to the non-big four firms. Further, Jong-Hag et al. (2010) studied whether and how the 
size of a local practice office within an audit firm is a significant, engagement-specific 
factor determining audit quality and audit fees over and beyond audit finn size at the 
national level, and auditor industry leadership at the city or office level. Their results 
reveal that in the US audit market, both audit quality and audit fees were positively 
associated with office size. 
On the other hand, there is other evidence to suggest that there is no relationship 
between audit firm size and quality. Jeong and Rho (2004) investigated the 
relationship in Korea between earnings management and the big six and non-big six 
audit firms, and whether results changed when auditors changed. The authors did not 
find a statistically significant difference between the discretionary accruals of 
corporations with big six and non-big six auditors, or of firms that change from one to 
the other. This result is inconsistent with the findings of pre,,:ious studies. Khurana 
and Raman (2004) examined whether big four auditors provided higher quality audits 
relative to non-big four auditors in Asian countries during the period 1990-1996. To 
neutralise the potential confounding effects of cross-border differences, the authors 
investigated the relative quality of big four vs. non-big four auditors within each 
country separately so that each country serves as its own control. The results of the 
study suggests that the big four were not providing higher quality audits in Asian 
countries even prior to the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Finally, Krishnan (2005) 
argues that audit quality can vary within an audit firm, depending on location, and it is 
unfair to evaluate audit quality based on the size of audit firm. 
2.2.5.4 Impact of Audit Fees and Competition on Audit Quality 
Corporations evaluate likely audit quality and their willingness to pay additional fees 
during auditor selection. Hence, the combination of improved information regarding 
pricing and the ability to evaluate audit quality may justify corporations' paying of 
higher fees for high-quality services (Jensen & Payne, 2005a). Several empirical 
studies have addressed the issue of increasing competitiveness in the market for audit 
services and its impact on audit fees and audit quality. Some pointed out that high 
audit quality might cost higher audit fees (Zeithaml, 1988; Lichtenstein et aI., 1993). 
Other studies suggest that audit fees should decrease as the level of competitiveness in 
the audit market increases (Jensen & Payne, 2005b). In addition, Pearson and 
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Trompeter (1994) argue that lower levels of competition could harm clients through 
higher fees and lower levels of service. Also, Chaney et al. (2003) argue that greater 
competition among audit firms results in lower fees and improved service quality. 
However, it may lead to reduced pricing with possibly detrimental quality effects. 
Similarly, Behn (2009) mentions that prior research has demonstrated that price 
competition leads to discounting, which can result in unrealistically low audit fees and 
poor audit quality. 
Jensen and Payne (2005a) also believe that price competition affects audit quality. 
Therefore, audit firms are likely to re-evaluate their positions in the marketplace. 
Also, audit firms with relatively high production costs will provide services if the 
competitive environment allows them to charge fees commensurate with those costs. 
In other words, strong competition may lead to higher audit quality services. 
However, it may lead to lower audit fees, which affects audit firms due to the fact that 
they might accept lower audit fees, or exit the market. Also, some audit firms 
(possibly audit firms with a lack of experience) may use fees competition as an 
opportunity to exploit their competitive advantage by using audit fees to gain market 
share. Jensen and Payne provide evidence that price competition leads to lower audit 
fees and changes in market share for audit firms and leads to a reduction in the market 
share of big audit firms. 
Copley and Doucet (1993) argue that increased competition and the resulting pressure 
to minimise audit fees have led to poor quality audits, despite the fact that economic 
theory generality predicts a positive relationship between competition and quality. 
The authors examine the impact of this apparent conflict on audit quality. The study 
finds that increased competition results in increased audit quality. 
2.2.5.5 Lawsuit and Audit Quality 
Auditing firms suffer indirect costs as a result of increasing lawsuits (Stice, 1991). 
Lys and Watts (1994) provide information on lawsuits alleging audit failures and 
examine variables derived from a qualitative analysis of both the legal conditions and 
the economic incentives to bring a lawsuit. The authors provide three factors that are 
necessary for a disclosure lawsuit. First, existence of cause, which includes practicing 
earnings management; the probability that the auditor could not discover the financial 
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statements misleading, or discover it and failed to report that; and the existence of a 
loss by a plaintiff. Secondly, plaintiffs discover the cause. Finally, plaintiffs may have 
net benefits from the suit. The authors find that lawsuits naming auditors as 
defendants are more likely to be filed when client firms experience financial 
difficulties and poor stock price performance and receive qualified audit reports, when 
client firms are larger, when the client represents a relatively larger proportion of the 
auditor's revenues, and when the auditor employs unstructured audit technology. 
Palrnrose (1988) suggests that increasing frequency of lawsuits against an auditing 
firm is viewed as a negative signal about the quality of auditing services provided by 
the firms and impairs its reputation. 
2.2.5.6 Other Factors that Affect Audit Quality 
The concept of survival in the business world is linked to the achieved performance or 
organisation goals particularly in the long-term. Sudsomboon and Ussahawanitchakit 
(2009) argue that the importance of professional audit competencies has been brought 
to attention due to the fact that the reliability and quality of financial reporting is the 
first element for survival in an audit market. Also, the competencies help to predict 
performance outcomes and provide an explanation for discrepancies in performance. 
Furthermore, audit knowledge refers to the understanding of the relevance of 
accounting and auditing standards, the audit process, audit technique and client 
evaluation, which have an influence on audit achievement. Audit knowledge needs a 
high level of education and training in audit and related subjects. Auditing is also an 
essential part of the developing systems of responsibilities and accountability within 
firms in particular and society worldwide in general. Knowledge content of audit 
professional is composed of audit of historical financial information, financial 
accounting and reporting information technology, which have an influence on audit 
achievement. 
Auditors should obtain knowledge about an audit client's business that is sufficient to 
enable them to identify and understand the events, transactions and practices that may 
have a significant effect on the financial statements or on the audit report. Auditors 
could obtain their information about an audit client from their experience with the 
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client, publicly available information, and from the client themselves. In addition, the 
main reasons for obtaining this understanding are to evaluate the engagement risks 
associated with accepting the specific engagement and to help the auditors in 
determining whether all professional and ethical requirements regarding this client 
can be met (Hayes et al., 2005). 
According to Navaratnam (1994), a quality audit depends on who is carrying out the 
audit and the location of the auditee. Auditing needs knowledge, skills and 
experience. These should be developed by a formal auditor training course, 
observations of audits, work experience in audits, and conducing audits. Also, 
auditors should possess a balanced knowledge of the system and its processes, people, 
procedures and outcomes. They must be able to understand different perspectives 
without any personal bias. Moreover, Catanach and Walker (1999) mention that audit 
quality is deemed to be a function of performance. Specifically, the auditor's ability, 
which includes knowledge, experience, technical competence, industry specialisation, 
technological proficiency and professional conduct, affects performance. 
Several prior studies focus on auditing standard compliance in many countries. There 
are many types of auditing standard, such as the International Accounting Standard 
(lAS), International Standards on Auditing (IS As) and any applicable international, 
national or local equivalents. These auditing standards require standards to ensure 
audit performance. Sudsomboon and Ussahawanitchakit (2009) argue that the 
credibility and reliability of financial statements are important. Therefore, 
independent external auditors are expected by the users to enhance the credibility and 
reliability of financial statements. Also, independent auditors are required to have 
competence about accounting standard compliance, which is established from 
knowledge, learning and experience. Prior studies suggest that audit quality is 
positively affected by the ability of external auditors. Moreover, the performance of 
external auditors influences their reputation and image. In conclusion, the ability of 
external auditors in accounting standard compliance has an effect on audit image or 
reputation. 
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In the early 1990s, the business environment went through a series of substantial 
changes, such as electronic data interchanging, electronic file transferring, electronic 
money transferring and e-business. These factors led to shifts, such as paperless 
accounting systems, all of which affected the traditional audit trail. Several studies 
have investigated the impact of these changes in the technology (which might include 
various tools and techniques that can be used by auditors, such as software packages 
or auditor-designed routines) on audit performance (Bierstaker et aI., 2001; Rezaee et 
aI., 2001; Flowerday et. aI., 2006; Robson et aI., 2007; Sudsomboon & 
Ussahawanitchakit, 2009). To meet the requirements of an audit, it is necessary to 
verify the accuracy of transactions to reveal fraud or error, which requires auditors to 
have the necessary technology knowledge. 
Sudsomboon and Ussahawanitchakit (2009) investigated the influenced five 
dimensions of professional audit competencies (audit standard compliance, expertise 
judgment commitment, ethical and value awareness, client linkage efficiency and 
audit technique implementation effectiveness) on audit success, audit quality and 
audit reputation. Their study assumed that audit knowledge, self-experience and 
individual learning have an influence on professional audit competencies; moreover, 
that professional regulation, stakeholder force and professional competition are the 
moderators of the relationship. The study results indicated that professional audit 
competencies have a positive impact on audit quality and audit reputation, which 
affects audit success. Moreover, attributes of auditors, such as audit knowledge, self-
experience and individual learning have positive associations with professional audit 
competencies. 
It may be difficult to evaluate auditors attributes thus the researchers can apply 
alternative surrogates to evaluate audit quality, for example length of tenure, non-
auditing services, finn size and competition to study the ability of auditors to detect 
earnings management. This research will study the influence of these alternative 
surrogates and attributes of auditors on audit quality. 
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2.3 Summary 
This chapter has presented an introduction and general background on earnmgs 
management phenomenon. It began by broadly examining the theme of earnings 
management phenomenon, included earnings management definition, perspectives of 
earnings management, the accrual process and patterns of earnings management. The 
chapter also reviewed literature on the techniques of earnings management that may 
be used to practice earnings management. In addition, it reviews and discussions of 
the literature on earnings management motivations, which might be behind the 
practice of earnmgs management. These motivations include capital market 
motivations, external contract motivations, regulatory motivations, management 
compensation contract motivation, behavioural motivations, and communicating 
information motivations. Also, this chapter has reviewed the factors that affect 
motivation preferences. Finally, Low quality financial statements provide information 
that leads to problems in the allocation of resources. Furthermore, financial statements 
with extensive opportunistic earnings management inaccurately reflect corporation 
performance, and thus weaken users' ability to assess the corporation performance. 
Opportunistic earnings management has a negative relationship with the quality of 
financial reports. Therefore, constraining earnings management will positively 
influence the quality of financial reports. The literature of earnings management 
presents factors which influence earnings management practice and improve the 
quality of financial reports. Therefore, chapter discussed factors that constrict the 
practice of earnings management and the quality of financial reports. These factors 
are political forces, culture, accounting standards, internal corporate governance 
mechanisms and audit quality. 
The majority of previous studies in the earnings management literature investigated 
earnings management phenomenon in developed countries. However, research is still 
lacking in developing countries generally and in Libya specifically, where more 
studies need to be done. This is due to the fact that companies located in developing 
countries have received little attention in the literature and have a different 
environment to companies located in developed countries such as poor management 
performance, not many listed companies, weak corporate governance structure, 
unsophisticated users, weak accounting profession and family-controlled firms. 
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Moreover, the previous studies in the earnings management literature investigated 
earnings management techniques and motivations in the listed companies. 
This study investigates the earnings management techniques and motivations in the 
Libyan environment, which is different from the previous studies because of several 
reasons, such as the different economic system, cultural and legal environment from 
that in developed countries, corporate governance is in an early stage in Libya, and 
the ownership structures of corporations in Libya are largely determined by unlisted 
companies due to the fact that Libyan capital market was established in 2007. Hence, 
the majority of Libyan companies are unlisted, which are state- and family-owned 
companies. Therefore, the objective of this study is examining the earnings 
management in the unlisted companies of state-owned and private companies, where, 
to the best of the researcher's knowledge this study is the first of its kind that 
investigates earnings management techniques and motivations in the unlisted 
companies. Furthermore, this study is a comprehensive study of earnings management 
phenomenon in Libya because it investigates the existence of earnings management, 
why earnings management take place, how it is achieved, and how it can be 
constrained. The next chapter details the research methodology to achieve the 
research aims. 
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3.1 Introduction 
CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The previous chapter provided a summary of the literature of the earnings 
management phenomenon; its definition and perspectives, examples of motivations 
and techniques that might lead to managing earnings and the actions that might 
constrict earnings management. The aim of this chapter is to explain the research 
methodology that was employed in undertaking the empirical study and the statistical 
methods used to analyse the data in order to achieve the objectives of this research. 
This study adopted a two-stage approach; the first stage, to investigate whether 
Libyan companies are practicing earnings management and to overview the direction 
of earnings management in Libyan companies. A secondary data analysis was used to 
achieve the above aims. Different versions of the Modified Jones model were used as 
a proxy to measure earnings management in Libyan companies. The sample size was 
87 companies over three years. 
The second stage of this study was to distribute a questionnaire to a number of 
external auditors, financial managers and senior accountants, internal auditors, 
lenders, tax officers and accounting academics. Moreover, the questionnaire survey 
was combined with semi-structured interviews with 18 interviewees, all of whom also 
answered the questionnaire. There were three main aims for this. The first aim was to 
supplement and amplify the data obtained from the questionnaire survey. The second 
objective was to gain a better understanding and to compare the different aspects of 
the responses that were received from the questionnaire about the earnings 
management phenomenon in Libya. Finally, the third aim was to investigate how the 
quality of the financial reports in Libya can be improved and mitigates the potential 
adverse consequences of manipulating the reported earnings. This complementary 
approach, which employed quantitative and qualitative techniques, was adopted to 
reduce the potential for errors and provide more insights into the different aspects of 
earnings management in Libya. 
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The chapter is organised as follows: Section Two provides the research objectives. 
Section Three presents the research questions. Section Four provides the theoretical 
approach underlying the research methodology, beginning with identifying the 
meaning of ontology, epistemology and methodology and the assumptions and 
paradigms under them. Section Five describes data collection methods which include 
the secondary data analysis, discusses the questionnaire survey used and the semi-
structured interview conducted in the study. Section Six presents a summary of the 
chapter's contents. Figure 3.1 presents contents of this chapter. 
3.2 Research Objectives 
The objectives of this research are as follows: 
5- To examine the existence and direction of earnings management in the Libyan 
context. 
6- To identify the motivations behind the practice of earnings management in 
Libyan corporations. 
7 - To found out the techniques used to practice of earnings management in 
Libyan corporations. 
8- To determine the procedures that should be taken to constrain earnings 
management and improve the quality of financial reporting in Libyan 
corporations. 
3.3 Research Questions 
Taking into account the findings of the literature review and research objectives, the 
research questions investigated in this study are as follows: 
5- To what extent is earnings management practiced in Libyan corporations? 
6- What are the motives that encourage the practice of earnings management in 
Libyan corporations? 
7 - What are the most frequent techniques used to practice earnings management 
in Libyan corporations? 
8- What are the procedures that should be taken to constrain earnings 
management and improve the quality of financial reporting in Libyan 
corporations? 
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Before going further into a description of the methods employed in this study, the 
study objective and questions are presented again to illustrate the relationship between 
the methods chosen and the study questions (Table 3.1). For each study question, the 
most appropriate method was chosen as the main method. In addition, other methods 
were used to complement and supplement the main method. 
Table (3.1) the relationship between research questions, objectives, and methods. 
Study Question Objectives Methods 
To what extent is earnings To examine the existence - Main method: 
management practiced m 
and the direction of Secondary data analysis by Libyan corporations? 
earmngs management in using the Modified Jones 
the Libyan context. model. 
What are the motives that To identify the motivations - Main method: 
encourage the practice of behind the practice of Questionnaire survey 
earnings management m earnmgs management m -Support method: 
Libyan corporations? Libyan corporations. Interview survey 
What are the most frequent To found out the - Main method: 
techniques that used to techniques used to practice Questionnaire survey 
practice earnings manag- earnmgs management m - Support method: 
ement m Libyan Libyan corporations. Interview survey 
corporations? 
What are the procedures To determine the actions - Main method: 
that should be taken to that should be taken to Questionnaire survey 
constrain earnings manag- lmprove the quality of - Support method: 
ement and lmprove the financial reporting m Interview survey 
quality of financial Libyan corporations. 
reporting m Libyan 
corporations? 
3.4 Theoretical Approach 
At the beginning of this section, it is useful to identify the meaning of ontology, 
epistemology and methodology. Ontology is concerned with the theory of social 
entities and with what exists to be investigated (Walliman, 2006, p.15). Ontology 
deals with questions about the nature of being and reality: what do we know and how 
can we know this? Epistemologies deal with questions about truth: what do we accept 
as a truth and how has this been constructed? (Grbich, 2007, P.6). In simple terms, it 
is the philosophY of knowledge or how we come to know. Epistemology is intimately 
related to ontology and methodology; as ontology involves the philosophy of reality, 
epistemology addresses how we come to know that reality, whereas methodology 
identifies the particular practices used to get knowledge of it (Krauss, 2005). Figure 
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3.2 introduces the relationship between ontology, epistemology and methodology, and 
also presents the interrelationship between the building blocks of research. 
Figure 3.2: The interrelationship between the building blocks of research. (Grix, 2004, 
p.66) 
Epistemology Methodology Methods 
What is 
out there 
toknow~ 
What and 
how can w, 
know about ~ 
it? How can w.e.go 
about acqUlnn&.... __ _ 
that knowledge? ~hich precise 
procedures can 
be used m..,. ,. 
acquire it? ~Which data 
can we 
collect? 
In social science research, any research relies on three philosophical assumptions 
(Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Wass & Wells, 1994; Collis & Hussey, 2003; May10r & 
Blackmon, 2005), which are as follows: 
(i) The ontological assumption attempts to answer the question, what is the nature of 
knowable? Or what is the nature of reality? In other words, what is considered to exist 
and, just as importantly, what does not exist in the environment we are studying. The 
quantitative methods under this assumption assume that reality is objective and 
external to the researcher, while qualitative methods see reality as subjective and 
believe the researcher can understand it by examining the perceptions of human 
actors. 
(ii) The epistemological assumption attempts to answer the question what is the nature 
of the relationship between the knower (the researcher) and what is being researched 
(or knowable)? The quantitative methods under this assumption assume that the 
researcher is completely independent from the thing that is being researched, whereas 
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qualitative methods try to minimise the distance between the researcher and that 
which is being researched by involving different forms of participative enquiry. 
(iii) The methodological assumption attempts to answer the question, how should the 
researcher (inquirer) go about finding out knowledge? In other words, it is concerned 
with the process of research and determining which paradigm will be used. 
Many researchers worry about whether to use a quantitative or a qualitative method. 
Some use only one type of method, whereas others suggest that both types might 
occasionally be appropriate (Hyde, 2000; Sobh & Perry, 2006). However, choosing 
the research methodology is only one of the three components (ontology, 
epistemology and methodology) of a paradigm that would be used in the research. As 
mentioned before, any academic research relies on three assumptions: the nature of 
reality that is related to the ontological assumption, the relationship between the 
researcher and reality that is related to the epistemological assumption, the techniques 
used by the researcher to discover that reality which is related to the methodological 
assumption (Healy & Perry, 2000). The researcher's position in relation to these 
assumptions permeates the research and will determine the research philosophy, 
design and methods employed in data collection and interpretation of results. 
The term "paradigm" "refers to the progress of scientific practice based on people's 
philosophies and assumptions about the world and the nature of knowledge" (Collis & 
Hussey, 2003, P.47). According to Guba and Lincoln (1994, p. 105), a paradigm is a 
"basic belief system or worldview that guides the investigator". In this sense, beliefs 
about the nature of reality and seeking knowledge have different philosophical 
foundations for different researches according to designing the research questions and 
how they answer these questions (Morgan, 2007). There are two main extreme 
paradigms of science which are the positivist paradigm (quantitative) and the 
phenomenological paradigm (qualitative) (Collis & Hussey, 2003). Each paradigm 
has fundamentally different assumptions concerning the nature of reality, and the 
relationship between the researcher and what is being researched. 
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This section focuses on the positivist paradigm. The tenn positivist was created by 
Auguste Comte in the 19th century (Cohen et aI., 2000, p.22). This paradigm is an 
"application of the natural sciences to the study of social reality, an objective 
approach that can test theories and establish scientific laws. It aims to establish causes 
and effects" (Walliman, 2006, p.15). Also, Cassell and Symon (1994, p.2) stated that 
"the assumption behind the positivist paradigm is that there is an objective truth 
existing in the world which can be revealed through the scientific method where the 
focus is on measuring relationships between variables systematically and 
statistically". It is derived from the philosophy of science, which believes that reality 
is objective or independent of observers (Maylor & Blackmon, 2005), and founded on 
the belief that the study of human behaviour should be conducted in the same way as 
studies conducted in the natural sciences (Collis & Hussey, 2003). Therefore, this 
paradigm is characterised by the use of qualitative methods, such as a questionnaire 
and analytical statistical analysis (Stiles, 2003). In addition, it applies a deductive 
research strategy and observes theory as a tool to order, explain, predict and analyse 
testable hypotheses relating to relationships between measurable variables (Grix, 
2004), these relationships being dependent on defining these variables (Remenyi, 
1998; Collis & Hussey, 2003). Therefore, the assumptions of the positivist paradigm 
are appropriate for the natural sciences. However, it might be inappropriate for social 
science phenomenon, when it involves reflective human beings (Sobh & Perry, 2006), 
because it is difficult to separate the variables from their social environments and 
understand them without testing the perceptions they have of their own activities. 
This section focuses on the phenomenological paradigm. The phenomenological 
paradigm is concerned with understanding human behaviour from the participant's 
own frame of reference. Also, it stresses the subjective aspects of human activity by 
focusing on the meaning, rather than measurement, of social phenomena (Collis & 
Hussey, 2003). Under this paradigm, the reality is subjective (Healy & Perry, 2000) or 
dependent on researchers since they are part of what is being researched, which means 
it allows them to be part of the setting and to get more in-depth data and knowledge 
on the subject (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991; Collis & Hussey, 2003). The methods 
under this paradigm are interpretative techniques that describe, translate and look for 
the meaning (VanMaanen, 1983). Therefore, this paradigm is characterised by the use 
of qualitative methods, such as interviews and observation (Stiles, 2003). Sobh and 
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Perry (2006) argue that constructivists believe that without human interaction in the 
processes, an enquiry into the social world becomes too abstract to understand. Also, 
they insist that measurement by quantitative data is essentially fallible because human 
beings' views or ideas are subjective and highly individual-based. However, there are 
some difficulties in using phenomenology due to the great deal of time and the 
resources needed to collect data, the difficulty to analyse and interpret data, and the 
difficulties of controlling the qualitative research or its progress and even its end-point 
(Sarantakos, 1998). 
The two previous paradigms employ only a single method, which is quantitative for 
the positivist paradigm and qualitative for the phenomenological paradigm (Collis & 
Hussey, 2003). Alternatively, to obtain a better understanding of the phenomenon the 
researcher might use more than one method (both quantitative and qualitative). Mixed 
method research is an attempt to bridge the separation between both approaches 
which is considered to be a valuable research strategy, providing richer data and a 
greater understanding of the research problem (Onwuegbuzie et al., 2005; Johnson et 
al., 2007; Creswell, 2009). Healy and Perry (2000) and Stiles (2003) argue that the 
realist paradigm might reflect the middle ground between the positivist and 
phenomenological paradigms and can provide an element of unification by offering a 
philosophical bridge between them. Sobh and Perry (2006) state that mixed methods 
are appropriate within the realist paradigm. 
Under the realist paradigm the real world is out there to discover (Guba & Lincoln, 
1994; Healy & Perry, 2000; Sobh & Perry, 2006). In addition, reality is independent 
of human thought, but knowledge is always associated with the experiences of the 
researcher and human construction (Sobh & Perry, 2006), because the realists believe 
that reality varies from their particular view of it. Realists attempt to build various 
views of reality and seek to comprehend phenomena regarding to which ones are 
relative in place and time (Riege, 2003). The desire of realist research is to develop a 
"family of answers" that covers several contingent contexts and different reflective 
participants (Pawson & Tilley, 1997). The researcher seeks to adopt a contemporary 
scientific perspective, and this paradigm is characterised by the use of mixed methods 
(using quantitative methods such as structural equation modelling and qualitative 
method) (Healy & Perry, 2000; Stiles, 2003). 
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This study was greatly motivated to investigate the earnmgs management 
phenomenon because of the growing body of research that examines earnings 
management in developed countries. However, research is still lacking in developing 
countries generally and in Libya specifically. Therefore, the aim of this research is to 
understand the earnings management phenomenon in the Libyan environment. Hence, 
the research used mixed methods which are a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative approaches. According to Creswell and Clark (2007), it is advantageous to 
use both quantitative and qualitative methods for collecting data. Mixing the two 
methods can be done sequentially or simultaneously. Priorities of one method can be 
emphasised more than other method (fully mixed against partially mixed) and the 
timing of mixing may taken place at different stages (Creswell 2009; Leech et aI., 
2009). In the first stage of this research, the quantitative approach tests the existence 
of earnings management in the Libyan context by utilising secondary data analysis. 
Whereas, in the second stage, the quantitative approach (questionnaire) was combined 
with qualitative approach (semi-structured interviews) to collect primary data in order 
to achieve a better understanding of the earnings management phenomenon in Libya 
and to confirm the questionnaire findings. 
3.5 Research Mechanics 
This research, as mentioned above, used a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
approaches and secondary data and primary data, which is called mixed methods or a 
triangulation approach. According to Creswell and Clark (2007, p. 6), "Mixed 
methods research involves both collecting and analysing quantitative and qualitative 
data". Denzin, (1978, p.310) stated that triangulation means using more than one 
method or source of data in the same study of a social phenomenon". Collis and 
Hussey (2003) agree that applying different approaches, methods and techniques in 
the same research is called triangulation, which can overcome the potential bias and 
sterility of a single-method approach. Moreover, a triangulation approach draws from 
multiple theoretical perspectives and research methods and it assists the researcher to 
capture a comprehensive, holistic and contextual portrayal of events or the social 
phenomenon under research (Hoque, 2006). There are four types of triangUlation 
(Collis and Hussey, 2003): 
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o Data triangulation: using a variety of data sources within a single study, 
where data is collected at different times or from different sources in the 
study of a phenomenon. 
o Investigator triangulation: where different researchers independently 
collect data on the same phenomenon and compare the results. 
o Methodological triangulation: where both quantitative and qualitative 
methods of data collection are used. 
o Theories triangulation: where a theory is taken from one discipline and 
applied to explain a phenomenon in another discipline. 
In light of the above and to achieve the aims of this study, it was decided to apply 
both data triangulation and methodological triangulation to cancel out the method 
effect and to enhance confidence in the obtained results. Firstly, regarding data 
triangulation, the researcher collected both secondary data and primary data about the 
earnings management phenomenon in Libya. Secondly, regarding methodological 
triangulation, both quantitative and qualitative methods were used in different stages 
of the study. Moreover, this research was achieved in two stages: firstly, secondary 
data analyses, which include analysing financial information of Libyan corporations; 
secondly, distributing a questionnaire and also semi-structured interviews to 
supplement and clarify findings derived from the questionnaire. 
3.6 Data Collection and Analysis Methods 
As mentioned earlier, this study collected data about the earnings management 
phenomenon in Libya. This included secondary data from the financial reports of 
Libyan corporations, and primary data using a questionnaire and semi-structured 
interviews. This section will discuss these data collection methods: 
3.6.1 Secondary Data Analysis 
The aim of this stage is to determine the extent of earnings management in the Libyan 
context. This section contains an estimation model that is used to achieve the aim of 
this stage, and a description of the sample selection of Libyan companies. 
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3.6.1.1 Estimating Earnings Management Approaches 
According to McNichols (2000), measuring the management's discretion over 
earnings is the essential element of any test for earnings management. The accounting 
literature has provided a number of approaches that have varying characteristics. 
McNichols provides three common approaches that are typically employed to test 
earnings management, which as following: 
(1) The aggregate accruals approach: This approach utilises the change in total 
accruals as a measure of discretionary accruals. Accruals-based approach is 
commonly utilised as signals for earnings management activity (Healy, 1985; Jones, 
1991; Dechow et aI., 1995). The divisions of total accruals into two components by 
using regression analysis, which means not all accruals, reflect earnings management 
activities because accruals may also be utilised to increase the informativeness of 
financial reports. Total accruals separate into discretionary accruals, which represent 
those accruals where managers have some degree to exercise judgment, and non-
discretionary accruals, which represents those accruals that are largely determined 
exogenously, and which therefore play no part in the manipulation of earnings. 
According to Beaver (2002), the major issue of this approach is the ability to exhibit 
conditioning variables that reflect the components of the total accruals. Therefore, 
researchers have tried to estimate non-discretionary and discretionary components. 
According to McNichols and Wilson (1988), there are several issues that influence the 
models of aggregate accruals approach. They stated that the models in this approach 
require a proxy for managers' discretion over accruals. The authors started with 
dividing total accruals (TA ) into discretionary accruals (DA) and non-discretionary 
accruals ( NDA ) components: 
TA=DA+NDA 
The accounting literature provides several total accruals models based on detecting 
earnings management, such as Healy Model, DeAngelo Model, Industry Model, Jones 
Model, Modified Jones Model, Margin Model, 0&0 Model. 
(2) The specific accrual approach: Instead of measuring earnings management by 
using aggregate accruals, the specific accruals approach focuses on a set of specific 
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accrual or the influence of managers' discretion on specific accrual to test earnings 
management (McNichols, 2000; Marquardt and Wiedman, 2004). In other words, the 
Specific Accrual Approach studies the behaviour of each specific accrual to recognise 
its non-discretionary and discretionary components. 
Using the specific accrual rather than aggregate accruals can be effective because the 
researcher can recognise the accounting model and what the unmanaged expense 
ought to be. The specific accrual approach have advantages and disadvantages 
(McNichols, 2000). The advantages of the specific accrual approach are firstly, 
according to McNichols (2000, p.333), "the researcher can develop intuition for the 
key factors that influence the behaviour of the accrual, exploiting his or her 
knowledge of generally accepted accounting principles". Secondly, a specific accrual 
approach is able to be useful in industries where the work of the business generates 
the accrual in question to be a material and becomes the aim of judgment and 
discretion. A specific industry set is also able to present insight into variables to 
control and to better recognise the discretionary components of a specific accrual. 
Thirdly, researchers can estimate the relationship between explanatory factors and the 
single accruals directly, while in the aggregate approach, different components may 
relate differently to explanatory variables, which might result in estimation errors for 
parameter estimates. 
On the other hand, the disadvantages of using the specific accrual approach are: 
firstly, this approach can detect earnings management when it is clear which accruals 
management is used to manipulate earnings. However, the power of this approach will 
reduce when it is not clear which accrual is used by management to manipulate 
earnings. Moreover, when the objective of the test is to examine the existence of 
earnings management rather than examine whether a specific accrual is used to 
manage earnings, then each specific accrual requires a test to find out whether it is 
used to manage earnings. Secondly, the specific accrual approach needs more 
knowledge about the business and more data than the aggregate accruals approach. 
This factor increases the cost of using the specific accrual approach. Thirdly, the 
number of corporations that manage a specific accrual may be smaller than 
corporations with aggregate accruals. This may result in a limitation for generalisation 
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of the results of the specific accrual test. Also, it may preclude identification of 
earnings management behaviour if specific accruals are not sufficiently sensitive. 
Furthermore, Ronen and Yaari (2007) argue that if the discretionary component is 
smaller than non-discretionary accruals component of a given single account, the 
latter may drown the fonner, which results in a type (n ) error. Moreover, they state 
that it is difficult to detect earnings management by utilising a portfolio of accruals, 
and if the result of the test shows there is no earnings management in one account that 
does not imply that there is no earnings management in another. 
The previous studies that attempt to measure earnings management by utilising a 
specific accrual in the literature can be classified into two categories: firstly, single 
accrual studies, such as McNichols and Wilson (1988) studied the debts provisions; 
Petroni (1992) and Beaver et a1. (2003) Studied the claim loss reserves· of property. 
casualty insurers; and Wahlen (1994) studied the provision and allowance for loan 
losses. Secondly, set of accruals studies, such as Beneish (1997) and Marquardt and 
Wiedman (2004). 
(3) The distributional approach: in an attempt to detect earnings management, 
studies such as Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), DeGeorge et a1. (1999) and Holland 
and Ramsay (2003) investigated the statistical properties of earnings, determining 
behaviour that affects it. These attempts are based on the distribution of earnings after 
its management. This approach is different to the previous approaches, which attempt 
to detect earnings management activities through using discretionary accruals. This 
approach uses tests of expected frequencies of earnings and assumes that management 
has motivations to meet certain earnings benchmarks, such as sustaining recent profit 
performance or reporting positive profits. The distributional approach focuses on the 
statistical properties of earnings to determine behaviour that affects earnings, and is 
based on the distribution of earnings after management (McNichols, 2000). According 
to Goncharov (2005), the distribution approach tests the existence of earnings 
management by using a distribution of scaled performance measures (Le. earnings and 
changes in earnings). 
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Healy and Wahlen (1999) state that the differences between the distributional 
approach and other approaches are: firstly, the researcher does not have to estimate 
abnormal accruals (potentially noisy). Instead, the researcher checks reported earnings 
distribution for abnormal discontinuities at certain thresholds. The researcher 
indicates the attributes of the earnings distribution for a large sample of corporations, 
before asserting that these characteristics are related to earnings management. 
Secondly, the researcher is able to estimate the earnings management pervasiveness at 
thresholds. However, the weaknesses of the distribution approach are: firstly, the 
approach does not measure the magnitude of earnings management. Secondly, the 
approach does not identify the specific methods that are used to manage earnings. 
Moreover, according to Goncharov (2005), the distribution approach has several 
distinct features which are: firstly, the approach traces earnings management with 
both accruals and cash flows because it examines for irregularities in the reporting of 
aggregate earnings numbers. Secondly, the users of this approach need to use a 
hypothesis about a discontinuity (irregularity) in a certain region of the empirical 
distribution in the presence of income manipulations. Finally, the statistical 
significance of this discontinuity is evaluated by comparing the distributional 
frequencies of managed (empirical) and unmanaged (theoretical or expected) 
numbers. 
Furthermore, McNichols (2000) states that the distribution approach does not explain 
the methods that are used to manage earnings. This approach is also silent on the 
motivations that are behind practicing earnings management to reach specific 
benchmarks. Moreover, Durtschi and Easton (2005) present evidence that the shapes 
of the frequency distributions of earnings, which are used to measure the existence of 
earnings management, are influenced by, firstly, deflation (using, for example, market 
capitalisation or price). Secondly, it is influenced by the sample selection criteria 
which lead to differential inclusion/exclusion of observations to the left of zero versus 
observations to the right of zero. Thirdly, it is influenced by differences between the 
characteristics of observations to the left of zero and observations to the right of zero 
(such as market pricing and analyst optimism/pessimism). Finally, it is influenced by 
the combination of previous factors. The authors conclude that the shapes of the 
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frequency distributions of earnings cannot be used as a measurement of earnings 
management. 
Several studies apply the distribution approach to examine the existence of earnings 
management, such as Burgstaher and Dichev (1997), DeGeorge et al. (1999), Beatty 
et al. (1999) and Holland and Ramsay (2003). These studies focus on the earnings 
behaviour around a specific benchmark or thresholds, and see whether the occurrence 
of earnings below and above the benchmark are distributed smoothly or reflect 
discontinuities because of the practice of earnings management. In other words, they 
focus on the density of the earnings after management. 
As discussed above regarding approaches that have been used to examining earnings 
management. This study follows aggregate approach because it is the most common 
approach used to detect earnings management and the data required for using this 
model are available in the Libyan environment. In addition, using specific accrual 
approach will not give the required result when the objective of the test is to examine 
the existence of earnings management because it is examining whether a specific 
accrual is used to manage earnings. Moreover, the distributional approach does not 
measure the magnitude of earnings management and it is required data that is not 
available to this study. 
3.6.1.2 The Aggregate Accrual Approach Models 
3.6.1.2.1 The Healy Model (1985) 
By developing an empirical approach, Healy (1985) examines earnings management 
by comparing the mean of total accruals across the sample corporations separated into 
three groups, conditional on the earnings management direction. In addition, Healy 
(1985) predicted that systematic earnings management takes place in every period. 
The author expects that in the first group, the earnings reports will be managed to 
increase earnings. However, in the other two groups he expects that earnings reports 
will be managed downward. Deductions are then made through two comparisons of 
the mean total accruals in the first group, where earnings are forecasted to be 
managed upwards, with the mean total accruals in the other two groups, where 
earnings are predicted to decrease. The model treats in an equal way the set of 
observations for which earnings are forecasted to increase as the estimation period 
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and the set of observations for which earnings are forecasted to decrease as the event 
period. The mean total accruals from the group in which earnings are predicted to be 
managed upwards represent the proxy for non-discretionary accruals. This assumes 
the following discretionary accruals model: 
Where: 
2:TA, 
NDA = T 
, 
T 
NDA= estimated non-discretionary accruals, 
T A = total accruals scaled by lagged total assets, 
T= 1, 2, ... T is a year SUbscript for years included in the estimation period, 
and 
t= a year subscript indicating a year in the event period. 
3.6.1.2.2 The DeAngelo Model (1986) 
The DeAngelo model has seldom been used in the previous empirical studies on 
earnings management (Dechow et aI., 1985; Ronen & Yaari, 2007). DeAnglo 
specifies total accruals as the aggregate of discretionary and non-discretionary 
accruals. Total accruals are calculated by subtracting cash flow from operations, 
which is obtained via treating working capital for all shifts in all recent operating 
accounts, from net income. Also the author hypothesises that discretionary accruals 
follow a random walk process. Thus, the lagged total accrual as a proxy to estimate 
non-discretionary accruals of the current year: 
NDA,=TAI A'_l 
where: 
NDA= estimated non-discretionary accruals, 
TA I AT- 1 = total accruals scaled by lagged total assets, and 
t= a year SUbscript indicating a year in the event period. 
According to Dechow et al. (1985, p 198), "the DeAngelo model can be viewed as a 
special case of the Healy model, in which the estimation period for non-discretionary 
accruals is restricted to the previous year's observation. A common characteristic of 
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the Healy and DeAngelo models is that they both use total accruals from the 
estimation period to proxy for expected non-discretionary accruals". The discretionary 
accruals component of total accruals is calculated then as the first difference between 
the year's I total accruals and the total accruals of the year I-I. Working under the 
assumption of no earnings management, DeAngelo hypothesises that the first 
difference will be equal to zero. If there is earnings management in the current year 
then the model displays a difference which is higher or less than zero, and it is as a 
proxy for discretionary accruals. As a result, the model will detect earnings 
management only if both of the assumptions are accurate; the first assumption is non-
discretionary accruals are equal over periods "constant", and the second assumption is 
discretionary accruals have value equal to zero in the estimation period. Therefore, if 
both assumptions are not accurate, this means the model will calculate non-
discretionary accruals with error. Moreover, Dechow (1994) gives evidence that the 
random walk model is unsuitable for total accruals. However, the practical advantage 
of the model is the short estimation period. 
Friedlan (1994) stated that the random walk approach is not suitable for corporations 
that tend to be growing. The growth will influence the corporation's operations, 
including accruals. Thus, when growth is disregarded, that will lead to incorrect 
results, because the change in the total accrual in the analysis period, which is 
attributed to preparer discretion, may in fact be due to changes in non-discretionary 
accruals caused by growth. As a result, Friedlan (1994) presents the following 
modified model of the DeAngelo model. 
Total accruals, Total accrualst-\ 
Discretionary accruals, = - ------
Sales, - Sales,_t Sales, - Sales'_2 
Friedlan (1994) suggests a change in the DeAngelo model by using the change in 
sales rather than the level of sales. Friedlan (1994) contends that the change in sales 
is a more appropriate deflator than the level of sales because the change in accruals 
related to variations in operating activity is proportionate to the change in sales, not to 
the sales level. 
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Moreover, Thomas and Zhang (2000) suggest that the Healy and the DeAnglo models 
present two extremes of non-discretionary accrual behaviour: the random walk and 
the mean-reverting cases. They suggest that a model that incorporates both 
approaches with signed predicted weights may perform better. For these purposes, the 
authors first divide total accruals into two accounts: current and non-current, because 
the mean reversion process of these two components is likely to be different: 
where: 
TAIAI =CA+NCA 
TA I AI = total accruals scaled by lagged total assets, 
CA = current component of total accruals, and 
NCA= non-current component of total accruals. 
Then they design two models, where weights are predicted cross-sectionally: 
where: 
r-I 
LCAI 
1- NDCA
r 
= aCA
r
_1 + (1- a) I=r-~ 
I-I 
LNCAI 
2- NDNCA = bNCA + (1- b).:.=:I=I...,,;.-s_-
I I-I 5 
a,b = predicted values of current ( a ) and non-current ( b) weights 
respectively, 
NDCA, = non-discretionary current component of total accruals, and 
NDNCAI = non-discretionary non-current component of total accruals. 
Predictions for the current and non-current accruals are then summed to obtain the 
proxy for the non-discretionary accruals in the period t. 
3.6.1.2.3The Industry Model 
Dechow and Slona (1991) developed the industry model to detect earnings 
management. The model does not have the assumption that non-discretionary 
accruals are constant over time. The model assumes that a corporation's accruals 
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development can be clarified through accruals reported by other corporations that are 
working in the same industry. Also, the model hypothesises that the difference in the 
determinants of non-discretionary accruals are largely the same in the same industry. 
where: 
NDA t = r I + r 2 median I (TAt) 
NDA= estimated non-discretionary accruals, 
median I (TA, ) = the median value of total accruals scaled by lagged assets for 
all non-sample corporations in the same two-digit standard industrial 
classification (SIC) code, 
The corporation specific parameters r I and r 2 are estimated using Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) on the observation in the estimation period, and 
t= a year subscript indicating a year in the event period. 
According to Dechow et al. (1995), the industry model has some limitations because 
it only eliminates the difference in non-discretionary accruals which are general 
across corporations in the same industry. On the other hand, if changes in non-
discretionary accruals basically reflect responses to changes in the corporation's 
specific circumstances, then the model cannot use the discretionary accruals proxy to 
extract all non-discretionary accruals. Moreover, Goncharov (2005) states that the 
industry model hypothesises that discretionary accruals are not correlated across 
corporations in the same industry. This hypothesis is incorrect when several 
corporations attempt to manage earnings in the same direction (increase or decrease) 
over a significant period of time in the estimation and test years. According to Ronen 
and Yaari (2007), the test considers instead the difference in T A between a 
corporation with incentives to manage earnings and its colleagues that lack these 
incentives. Moreover, the model has several disadvantages; firstly, the model applies 
only to event studies in which not all corporations experience the same event. 
Secondly, even if not all corporations in the industry have the same incentives to 
manage earnings, if other corporations in the industry also manage earnings in the 
same direction, the test is biased against finding earnings management, and if other 
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corporations manage earnings in the opposite direction, the test might indicate non-
existent earnings management. 
3.6.1.2.4 The Jones Model 
Jones (1991) studied earnings management in U. S corporations during import relief 
investigations by the u.s International Trade Commission (ITC). Import relief is 
made by the ITC to protect domestic producers against competition by foreign 
corporations. The Jones Model is more powerful than all of the previous models 
(Goncharov, 2005) because the model relaxes the hypothesis that non-discretionary 
accruals are constant over time, where previous models allow the change in non-
discretionary accruals, which is related to changes in economic conditions. The model 
tries to control the corporation's economic circumstances that may lead to changes in 
non-discretionary accruals. In addition, the model relates total accruals to the change 
in revenues and the level of gross property, plant and equipment. The model 
developed a corporation-specific time-series estimation to estimate non-discretionary 
accruals in the event year, which is as follows: 
where: 
NDA = estimated non-discretionary accruals, 
MEV" = revenues in year t less revenues in year t-l 
PPEII = gross property, plant and equipment in year t 
A,_t = total assets at t-l, and 
at, PI ,P2 firm-specific parameters. 
Estimates of the corporation-specific parameters, a l , PI , and P2 are generated utilising 
the following equation in the estimation period: 
Jones utilises gross property, plant and equipment and revenue change in revenue 
control for changes in the economic circumstances of the corporation and, therefore, 
for changes in non-discretionary accruals. Revenue is utilised to control the economic 
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environment of the corporation because it is able to measure the corporations' 
operations before managing earnings, (revenues influence to some extent accounts 
receivable, accounts payable and inventory that constitute working capital accruals). 
Furthermore, gross property, plant and equipment are utilised to control the portion of 
total accruals that are related to the non-discretionary depreciation expense (gross 
property, plant and equipment controls for changes in depreciation and amortisation 
expense that is a part of total accruals) (Goncharov, 2005). 
According to Ronen and Yaari (2007), the Jones model employs two stages which 
are: the estimation stage, wherein the coefficients of the normal accruals are 
determined, and the event stage, wherein the abnormal accruals are isolated in order 
to test for earnings management. Also, total accruals are equal to nonnal accruals and 
discretionary accruals: 
-Total accruals are derived from the financial data of a corporation. 
-Normal accruals are estimated from the change in sales and property, plant and 
equipment, deflated by the beginning-of-the-period assets. 
- Discretionary accruals are equal to total accruals minus normal accruals. 
The model may not be enough to detect earnings management when the aim of 
managers practicing earnings management is income-decreasing (Jones, 1991). 
According to Dechow et a1. (1995), a hypothesis of the model is that revenues are 
non-discretionary accruals. Thus, the model will eliminate part of the managed 
earnings from the discretionary accruals proxy. 
According to Ronen and Yaari (2007), the misspecifications of the Jones model are: 
firstly, the validity of equating abnormal accruals with discretionary accruals because 
there is some variation in accruals results from changing business conditions and the 
consequent change in strategy and operating rather than from practicing earnings 
management. Secondly, applying the model with a small sample tends to weaken the 
power of the model because it generates large standard errors. Thirdly, contaminated 
data causes a problem because if accruals are measured with an error, the 
measurement of discretionary accruals may also be incorrect. To some extent, this 
issue is unavoidable, as research relies on public data that is not always complete. 
3.6.1.2.5 The Modified Jones Model 
The limitation of the Jones model is that when discretion is exercised over revenues, 
the model measures discretionary accruals with an error (Dechow et al., 1995), and 
the model is unable to utilise revenues as a proxy for earnings management 
(Goncharov, 2005). Dechow et al. (1995) criticise the hypothesis of the original Jones 
model, which assumes all revenues are non-discretionary. Therefore, the authors 
modified the Jones model to eliminate its weakness. The modified model also detects 
earnings management by using revenue recognition. The difference between the Jones 
model and the Modified Jones is the former model hypothesises that discretion is not 
exercised over revenue in either the estimation period or the event period, whereas the 
latter model hypothesises that earnings management causes all changes in credit sales 
in the event period because manipUlation of credit sales recognition may be easier 
than that of cash sales. The Modified Jones model calculates non-discretionary 
accruals as presented below: 
where: 
NDTA" / Ail-I = total accruals of corporation ( i ), 
MEC = net receivable in years t less net receivables in year t -1, 
" 
ME~I = revenues in year t less revenues in year t -1, 
P P E" = gross property plant and equipment in year t , 
Ail-I = total assets at (t -1), and 
aI' /31' f32 = firm-specific parameters. 
The change in revenues in the Modified Jones model is adjusted for the change in 
sales on credit (the change in receivables in the event period). The Modified Jones 
model assumption comes from the fact that it is easier for managers to practice 
earnings management by exercising discretion over the recognition of the part of 
revenues from sales on credit than over the part of revenues from cash sales. Thus, 
they hypothesise that all changes of sales on credit result from earnings management 
activities of the corporation. 
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Recent studies have utilised a cross-sectional Modified Jones model, such as: Becker 
et al. (1998); Guidry et al. (1999) and Peasnell et al. (2005). The cross- sectional 
Modified Jones is similar to the original model, which uses time-series data to 
estimate the parameters of the model. However, the cross-sectional Modified Jones 
uses cross-sectional data to estimate the parameters of the model. 
Teoh et al. (1998a and b) decompose total accruals into current and long-term 
components, and evaluate them separately because management has more discretion 
over the short term, which includes adjustments of short-term assets and liabilities 
that support the day-to-day operations, than over long-term accruals, which includes 
adjustments of long-term net assets that can be increased by adjusting depreciation, 
decreasing deferred taxes or realising unusual gains. 
Furthermore, Dechow et al. (1995) stated that discretionary accruals are likely to be 
misspecified for corporations with extreme levels of performance. Therefore, Larcker 
and Richardson (2004) added two independent variables to the Modified Jones model 
to reduce measurement error, which is correlated with the discretionary accruals. 
These variables are: firstly, book-to-market ratio, which controls for expected growth 
in operations; if left uncontrolled, growth will be picked up as discretionary accruals. 
Secondly, operating cash flows, which controls for current operating performance. 
The changes of Larcker and Richardson to the Modified Jones model make the model 
more powerful to detect earnings management. 
According to Jones et al. (2008), the changes of Larcker and Richardson to the 
Modified Jones model make the model more powerful to detect earnings management 
because firstly, it identifies unexpected accruals that are less persistent than other 
components of earnings. Secondly, it has far greater explanatory power. Finally, it 
identifies discretionary accruals that are associated with lower future earnings and 
lower future stock returns. The Modified Jones model with book-to-market ratio and 
cash flows can be represented as follows: 
TAil I Ail_I =al(ll AiI- t ) + f3t(MEVit - MECiI I Ail_I) + f32(PPE, I Ait_ l ) + 
f33(BM it ) + f34(CF0 it I Ait_t ) + Bit 
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where: BMit = the book value of common equity over the market value of 
common equity, 
CFOu = operating cash flows 
Other variables are the same as defined in the Modified Jones model. 
Moreover, Kothari et al. (2005) examined whether a performance-matched approach, 
which is a type of control sample approach, is powerful and specified at testing 
earnings management. Also, performance matching on return on assets controls for 
the effect of performance on measured earnings management. The authors adjust the 
Modified Jones model by adding income before extraordinary items (ROA). The 
model is designed to present a comparison of the effectiveness of performance 
matching versus including a performance measure in the accruals regression. The 
model is presented below: 
TAil 1 Ail_I =01 + /31(11 Ail_I) + /32 (MEV;, -MECi, 1 Ail_I) + /33 (PPE iI 1 Ail_I) + 
/34 (ROAil(Oril_I» + Gil 
where: ROA, = is income before extraordinary items for year (I) over (At-! ), and 
other variables are the same as defined in the Modified Jones model. 
There are several studies that compare the ability of earnings management models. 
Dechow et al. (1995) compared the performance of five models to detect earnings 
management (the Healy, DeAngelo, Jones, Modified Jones, and Industry models). 
The authors provide evidence that the Modified Jones was the most powerful in 
detecting earnings management. Likewise, by regressing earnings on non-
discretionary earnings and discretionary accruals, Guay et al. (1996) evaluated the 
earnings management (discretionary accruals) models; these include the Healy, 
DeAngelo, Industry, Jones and Modified Jones models. They find that the Jones and 
the Modified Jones are stronger than other models, because they provide discretionary 
accruals which are compatible with the opportunistic accruals and performance 
measure assumptions. 
99 
In order to detect earnings management, Bartov et al. (2001) compared the capacity of 
the cross-sectional Jones Model and the cross-sectional Modified Jones Model, with 
their time series counterparts. The authors found that the time-series versions of the 
models were less powerful than the cross-sectional versions of the models in detecting 
earnings management. This is because utilising a cross-sectional model in a large 
sample size should give results that are less subject to a survivorship bias. Also, 
Subramanyam (1996) preferred to utilise the cross-sectional Jones model than the 
time-series Jones model for several reasons. Firstly, the cross-sectional model 
generates a larger sample and a higher number of observations. Secondly, the time-
series model requires estimation over a period of up to ten years and therefore 
introduces misspecification due to non-stationarity. Finally, the time-series approach 
may lower the effectiveness of tests (i. e. Type II error) due to overlapping estimation 
and treatment periods. 
Further, there are two different methods to calculate accruals. These methods are: 
- The balance-sheet approach: under this approach total accruals are the change in 
non-cash current assets minus the change in current liabilities, excluding the current 
portion of long-term debt less depreciated. 
- The statement-of-cash flows approach: under this approach total accruals are the 
difference between income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations 
and cash flow from operations. 
3.6.1.2.6 The Kang and Sivaramakrishnan Model (KS model) 
Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) point out that the original Jones-type models, 
which try to estimate the managed component (discretionary accruals), face statistical 
difficulties, which are associated with the violations of the Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) assumptions. These difficulties that face the aggregate models are: firstly, 
errors in the variables problem; these errors might be due to some of the independent 
variables not being observed by researchers. Also the proxies for independent 
variables are likely to be affected by earnings management. This error issue causes a 
measurement error which is correlated with the regressors, and results in inconsistent 
parameter estimates, and biasing the managed accrual proxy. 
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Secondly, omitted variables problem; this is a result of ignoring the cost of goods sold 
and other expenses in the model. Liabilities (a part of aggregated accruals) are more 
likely to be driven by expenses than by revenues. The original Jones model includes 
only revenues as a control for the normal portion of total accruals. 
Thirdly, a simultaneity problem; as Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995, p.355) 
mention, "a simultaneity problem arises because both the regressors and the 
regressand are jointly determined by the constraints required by (GAAP) and double-
entry bookkeeping" that may lead to inconsistent coefficient estimates with incorrect 
standard errors. 
The above problems can lead to a decrease in the power of the statistical test and 
erroneous inferences regarding earnings management. Kang and Sivaramakrishnan 
(1995) mitigate the simultaneity problem and errors in variable problems through 
utilising an instrumental variable method, lagged values of regressors and other 
lagged income components are used as instruments because they are correlated with 
the regressors and are presumed to be not correlated with regression error. Also, the 
Kang and Sivaramakrishnan model mitigates the omitted variables problem by 
including more variables, cost of goods sold and other expenses in the model. 
Apart from the estimation procedure, the Kang and Sivaramakrishnan model has 
several key components that distinguish it from the other aggregate accrual models. 
The Kang and Sivaramakrishnan model estimates discretionary accruals with the help 
of the level (versus the change) of current assets and liabilities, as Kang (1999, p.ll) 
mentioned: "When earnings management is isolated in one period, both levels and 
changes of current assets and liabilities contain an equal amount of managed 
accruals". Also, the model excludes tax related expenses and accruals. 
Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) propose the following model for the estimation of 
the accounting accruals balance: 
AR'I REV) Ar. (APB, I DEP, I PPE) f1 AB, =;0 +;I( - I +'#'2 - EXP,)+¢J3( - I + :PART, +v, 
REV,_I EXP,_I GPPE,_I 
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where: 
AR, = balance of non-cash current assets (net of tax receivables) less current 
liabilities (net tax payables) and depreciation and amortisation expense scaled 
by total assets in year t -1 , 
AR = accounting receivable, 
REV = net sales revenues, 
EXP = operating expenses include: cost of goods sold, selling and 
administrative expenses before depreciation, 
AP B = accounts balance related to expenses, (e.g. inventory, prepaid expenses 
and accounts payable, 
DEP = depreciation and amortisation, 
GPPE = gross property, plant and equipment, and 
PART = partitioning variable that captures factors that allegedly motivate 
earnings management. 
Regression parameters are estimated usmg a generalised method of moment 
procedure. 
3.6.1.2.7The Margin Model 
Peasnell et al. (2000) suggest a different procedure for modelling the non-
discretionary component of current accruals. The authors argue that their model 
illustrates the normal accrual process and all variables have a clear economic 
substance. Depreciation is excluded from the model, as managers are not expected to 
use depreciation charges as an efficient instrument for earnings management. The 
authors' model only looks at working capital accruals, which they calculate in the 
following way: 
CCA, = (MNV, +MEC,)-llPAY, +UNIDEN, 
MNV, = PUR, -COGS, 
MEC, = REV, - CRt - BDEt 
MAY, = PUR, -Cp' 
CCA, = (REV, - COGS, - RDE,) + (CP, - CR,) + UNIDENt 
= smREV, - cmCRt + UNIDEN 
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where: 
CCA = working capital accruals, 
MNV = purchase of materials (P UR ) - cost of finished goods sold ( COGS ), 
MEC = revenue from credit sales (REV) - cash received from customers 
(CR ) - bad debt expense ( BDE ), 
AP A Y = purchase of materials (P UR ) - cash paid to suppliers ( CP ), 
UN/DEN == all non-cash current assets other than stocks and trade debtors and 
all current liabilities other than credit sales, 
sm = the gross margin on sales, and 
em = the gross cash contribution. 
The above equation can be used to determine accruals recognition before it is 
managed. Working capital accruals, which are not a product from cash collections and 
sales in the year, are classified as discretionary accruals. Working capital accruals are 
presented as a linear function of two drivers, and the authors develop an empirical 
model that should predict the normal level of working capital accruals: 
where: 
REV = total sales, 
CR = total sales - change in trade debtors, 
ao' at, a2 = regression coefficients, and 
G, = regression residual. 
In this equation at represents the mean value of the sales margin and a2 represents 
the mean value of cash margin. This sign of at is predicted to be positive and the sign 
of a2 negative. The prediction error in the event period is a proxy for earnings 
management (Goncharov, 2005). 
Peasnell et al. (2000) stated that the Margin model is a suitable method to detect 
earnings management through expenses, except bad debt expense. The model is better 
than the original Jones and Modified Jones models for identifying discretionary 
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accruals when cash flow performance is extremely low or high. However, the 
standard Jones and the Modified Jones models are more suitable if the corporation's 
management manage earnings by manipulating bad debt accounts or revenue. 
3.6.1.2.8 The Dechow and Dichev Model (measures of accruals quality) 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) present a model that facades on the quality of working 
capital accruals and earnings. The model is related to firstly, the results of previous 
studies that earnings are better than underlying cash flows as a measure of a 
corporation's performance (e.g. Dechow, 1994; Liu et aI., 2002). Secondly, several 
studies applied models of discretionary accruals to detect earnings management, 
where they focus on the opportunistic use of accruals to practice earnings 
management. These studies suggest that management's intent influences the incidence 
and magnitude of accrual estimation errors. 
The accrual process based on the timing of the economic achievements and sacrifices 
often are different with the timing of the related cash flows. Therefore, one role of the 
accruals is the accruals shift and adjusts the recognition of cash flows over time that 
results in adjusted numbers (earnings), which is better for measuring the performance 
of firms. On the other hand, the above role requires shifting the accruals and adjusts 
the recognition of cash flows over time, which means accruals roles require estimates 
of the future cash flows. Moreover, if there are any estimation errors they must be 
corrected in future accruals and earnings. Dechow and Dichev argued that: 
" .... estimation errors and their subsequent corrections are noise that reduces the 
beneficial role of accruals. Therefore, the quality of accruals and earnings is 
decreasing in the magnitude of accrual estimation errors. Our empirical measure 
of accrual quality is the extent to which working capital accruals map into 
operating cash flow realisations, where a poor match signifies low accrual 
quality"( Dechow and Dichev, 2002, p.36). 
That means the magnitude of estimation error in accruals is affecting the accuracy of 
estimation and reducing the quality of accruals and earnings. In addition, the Dechow 
and Dichev model is measuring accrual quality by focusing on working capital 
accruals. The measurement of estimation errors is the residuals from firm-specific 
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regressions of changes in working capital on past, present and future operating cash 
flows (on previous year, present and one-year ahead cash flows from operations). 
These residuals are unrelated to cash flow realisations, and include the estimation 
errors and their reversals. The standard deviation of these residuals is the firm-specific 
measure of quality of accruals and earnings, where a higher standard deviation 
signifies lower quality. However, this model does not try to separate between 
unintentional errors and intentional estimation errors because both are low-quality 
accruals and earnings. 
The model focuses on the observation of adjusting the recognition of cash flows over 
time or accruals shift, on the basis of working capital accruals because cash flow 
realisation is related to working capital generally occur within one year. In other 
words, the model is based on the relationship between accruals and cash flows. The 
model estimates working capital accrual quality by using finn-level time-series 
regression as follows: 
where: 
6WC, = the change in working capital in year (t) (i.e. 6 accounts receivable + 
/). Inventory - /). accounts payable -11 taxes payable + 11 other assets (net)), 
CF01_1 = Cash flows from operations in year t - 1, 
CF01 = Cash flows from operations in year t, 
CFOI+' = Cash flows from operations in year t + 1, and 
c
1 
= an error term that is used to measure the quality of earnings. 
All variables are scaled by average assets. 
The proxies in this model for cash flows related to accruals are cash flow from 
operations. The residuals from the regression reflect the accruals that are unrelated to 
cash flow realisations, and the standard deviation of these residuals is a finn-level 
measure of accrual quality, where higher standard deviation denotes lower quality. 
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McNichols (2002) argues three issues raised by the empirical implementation of the 
Dechow and Dichev model, which are: firstly, the standard deviation of the residual 
as a proxy for earnings quality. Secondly, the difference between reported cash from 
operations and the cash flows related to period (t). Finally, the implications of 
common corporation transactions for the residual term. Moreover, the author provides 
evidence that the power of the model can be enhanced by including the specification 
of the Jones model (incorporate a corporation's changes in revenues and a 
corporation's property, plant and equipment). Therefore, McNichols adapts the model 
by adding the above variables as in the next equation. The author states that the model 
presents estimates of discretionary accruals, which is significantly associated with 
cash flows. 
where: 
Males, = Change in sales deflated by beginning total assets, and 
PPE, = Gross property, plant, and equipment deflated by beginning total 
assets. 
Furthermore, Jones (2008) follows McNichols' (2002) changes in the Dechow and 
Dichev model to estimate the following cross-sectional model: 
~WCi/ = 130 + bICFOi,_1 + f32 CFOi/ + f33 CFOi,+1 + f34ME~, + f3 SPPEi, + sit 
where: 
MEV;, = Change in revenue deflated by beginning total assets. 
From the above discussion regarding earnings management approach and models 
under aggregate accrual approach, this study follows the most common technique that 
is used to detect accruals manipulation in the earnings management literature, which 
uses discretionary accruals as a proxy to measure earnings management (Healy, 1985; 
DeAngelo, 1986; Jones, 1991; Dechow et at, 1995; Becker et aI., 1998; Teoh et ai. 
1998a, b; Guidry et al., 1999; Bartov et al. 2001; Larcker & Richardson, 2004; 
Peasnell et aI., 2005; Kothari et aI., 2005). Under this, techniques total accruals (TA ) 
are divided into discretionary accruals (DA) and nondiscretionary accruals (NDA) 
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components. Discretionary accruals are the difference between actual accruals and 
expected accruals. 
In addition, there are several studies that have compared the ability of earnings 
management models. Dechow et al. (2005) compared the performance of five models 
used to detect earnings management (the Healy, DeAngelo, Jones, Modified Jones 
and Industry models). The authors provide evidence that the Modified Jones model 
was the most powerful in detecting earnings management. Likewise, by regressing 
earnings on non-discretionary accruals and discretionary accruals, Ouay et al. (1996) 
evaluated the earnings management (discretionary accruals) models; these include the 
Healy, DeAngelo, Industry, Jones and Modified Jones models. The authors found that 
the Jones and Modified Jones are stronger than other models, because the Jones and 
Modified Jones models provide discretionary accruals which are compatible with the 
opportunistic accruals and performance measure assumptions. Therefore, this study 
uses the Modified Jones model to measure earnings management in Libyan 
companies. This model was chosen because it is the most common technique used to 
detect earnings management, and the data required for using this model are available 
in the Libyan environment. 
In this study an analysis of secondary data was performed by using the financial 
statements of 87 unlisted Libyan companies; 45 state-owned and 42 private 
companies, for the years between 2007 and 2009. Applying this sample leads to a 
total number of observations of 261 company-years. The data used in this research 
were gathered from different industries and different parts of the country. Moreover, 
due to the fact that there is a lack of database for the records of most state-owned and 
private companies that operated in different industries, the data were collected 
personally by the researcher. Moreover, in some cases there were difficulties in 
obtaining full financial statement data for the period from 2006 to 2009, therefore, the 
data of 23 companies was excluded. In addition, this study used a balance-sheet 
approach instead of a cash flow approach to compute total and currant accruals, 
because some of the Libyan companies did not prepare cash flow statements. 
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3.6.2 Questionnaire Survey 
3.6.2.1 Choosing the Research Tool 
The aims of this study are to detennine the extent of earnings management in the 
Libyan context, to identify the motivations and techniques behind the practice of 
earnings management, and to detennine the procedures that should be taken to 
constrain earnings management in Libyan corporations and improve the quality of 
financial reporting. Using only secondary data analysis would not have achieved the 
above aims. Therefore, a questionnaire survey was designed to directly elicit the 
participants' opinions about the earnings management phenomenon in Libya. 
Collis and Hussey (2003, p.173) define a questionnaire as "a list of carefully 
structured questions, chosen after considerable testing, with a view to eliciting reliable 
responses from a chosen sample". In addition, Sekaran (2003, p.200) defines a 
questionnaire as "a pre-fonnulated written set of questions to which respondents 
record their answers, usually within rather closed alternatives". Moreover, Sekaran 
stated that the questionnaire is an efficient method of data collection when the 
researcher knows exactly what infonnation is required and how to measure the 
variables of interest. According to Blaxter et al. (1998), the questionnaire is one of 
the most widely used methods of research, which can be administered through a 
number of fonnats; for example face-to-face questionnaires, postal questionnaires, 
internet questionnaires and telephone questionnaires. Applying the questionnaire is a 
common method for collecting data because it has many advantages (Sarantakos, 
1998; Oppenheim, 1992; May, 2001; Collis & Hussey, 2003; Sekaran, 2003; 
Walliman, 2006; Bryman & Bell, 2007). The decision to apply a questionnaire is for 
the following reasons: 
• A questionnaire IS a cheaper method to collect data than conducting 
interviews. 
• The responses can be completely anonymous, allowing potentially 
embarrassing questions to be asked with a fair chance of getting a true reply. 
• A questionnaire can be completed at the respondent's convenience, for 
example at work or at home. 
• It can cover a wide geographical area. 
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• A questionnaire has less opportunity for bias or errors caused by the presence 
or attitudes of the interviewer. 
• It does not require as much skill to administer the questionnaires as to conduct 
interviews. 
• Administering questionnaires to a large number of people at the same time is 
less time and money consuming than interviewing. 
• A questionnaire is a good method to collect data from large sample and leads 
to obtaining more different views and a further understanding of the 
phenomenon under consideration. 
Using a questionnaire method is usually the most efficient data collection mechanism 
to measure the variable of interest, especially with a large sample population. It can be 
administered personally or by mailing the questionnaire to respondents. In this study 
the questionnaire was personally administered to the respondents for the following 
reasons: 
• The postal services in Libya are not good enough to send postal questionnaires 
to all respondents in all Libyan cities. 
• To raise the response rate the one disadvantage of the postal questionnaire is 
the low response rate. 
• To allow the researcher to introduce the research topic and the aims of the 
study, and to provide explanations if necessary when the respondent may not 
understand the nature of questions. 
• There is a possibility of checking on responses if they seem odd or incomplete. 
• Personal involvement of the researcher enables more complicated 
questionnaires to be devised. 
Despite the advantages of personally administered questionnaires provided above, this 
type of questionnaire has some limitations, which are: 
• The geographical limitation with regard to the location of the respondents. 
• Personally administered questionnaires are costly when the samples are 
geographically dispersed. 
• Personally administered questionnaires may take more time than postal or mail 
questionnaires. 
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The personally administered questionnaire limitations were taken into account by the 
researcher when considering carefully the design and administration of the 
questionnaire to reduce the effect of limitations. Firstly, to reduce the 
misunderstandings, the questionnaire was tested by a pilot study. Secondly, to allow 
the respondents to explain their answers, all parts in the questionnaire ended with an 
open-ended question and there was one blank page at the end of the questionnaire. 
Thirdly, the researcher made every effort to distribute the questionnaire in different 
cities in Libya. Finally, the questionnaire was supported by semi-structured interviews 
to confirm and supplement the questionnaire's results. 
3.6.2.2 Source of Ideas for Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was designed after reviewing the earnings management literature 
and the question ideas were mainly gained from an extensive review and analysis of 
the existing literature regarding: (a) earnings management motivations and factors 
affecting motivation preferences; (b) earnings management techniques; (c) earnings 
management research designs; and (d) earnings management constraints and the 
factors that affect earnings management practice, which include accounting standards, 
internal corporate governance structure and audit quality. The main idea of the 
questionnaire design was indebted to the work of previous researches, such as 
Nelson el at. (2002); Mulford and Comiskey (2002); Nelson et aI., (2003); Baralexis 
(2004); Pornupatham (2006); Kamel (2006); Noronha and Zeng (2008); and AI-
Khabash and AI-Thuneibat (2009). 
3.6.2.3 Questionnaire Design 
There are a range of factors that affect the structure and content of a questionnaire that 
a researcher should consider at the time of designing a questionnaire (Oppenheim, 
1992; Collis & Hussey, 2003; Sekaran, 2003). These factors are: how questions are 
worded and the level of complexity of the language that is used to write the questions, 
the type and the forms of questions, the sequencing of the questions in the 
questionnaire, and the length of the questionnaire. The following section will discuss 
these factors in addition to two others. 
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(a) The language of the questionnaire 
Marked attentiveness should be paid to design clear and useful questions. The words 
and the way of using them to ask questions may influence the answers obtained from 
the respondents. Janes (1999, p. 322) stated that "people will answer the question you 
will ask them, not necessarily the question you want~d to ask them". This means that 
words that have a common meaning for the researcher may have a different meaning 
for the respondents. Consequently, the researcher should consider what his questions 
might mean to different respondents. 
In addition, Hippler et al. (1987) argue that changes in wording may always be 
considered "substantive" because they change the sense of the question. Moreover, 
they stated that many researches showed that minor changes in the exact wording of a 
question can cause major changes in the achieved responses. Therefore, the researcher 
took these issues into account during the construction process of the questionnaire. 
Firstly, serious attempts were made to ensure that the questions were asked by using 
simple words without making questions sound condescending. As a result, the 
questions were clear, unambiguous and precise. Secondly, the researcher avoided 
using double-barrelled questions that ask more than one question at once which may 
be seen as confusing and ambiguous. Thus, the questionnaire's questions do not ask 
more than one question at once. Thirdly, short questions are less confusing and 
ambiguous; therefore, the researcher had a policy of constructing short questions and 
statements in the questionnaire wherever possible. Finally, questions that utilise 'not' 
were avoided as they may be difficult to understand, particularly when asking 
respondents to specify whether they agree or disagree. 
(b) Type of questions 
There are two types of questions that can be used to construct the questionnaire, 
which are closed-ended and open-ended (Hague, 1993; Ghauri et al., 1995; Ticehurst 
& Veal, 2000; Collis & Hussey, 2003). Closed-ended questions are where respondents 
are asked to circle or tick the appropriate boxes from a range of alternative answers. 
However, open-ended questions give the respondents a line or space to write down the 
answer in herlhis words. 
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Closed-ended questions were adopted in the questionnaire of this study, which offered 
predetennined alternatives in the fonn of a "Likert scale", where the respondent is 
asked to indicate his level of agreement with the statement by ticking a box or circling 
the answer. There are three main advantage of this type of question. Firstly, a number 
of different statements can be presented in a small space. Secondly, it is simple and 
quick for respondents to complete. Finally, it is simple for the researcher to code and 
analyse because the possible responses are already categorised (Collis & Hussey, 
2003, pI84). That means this type of question saves the time of the researcher and 
respondent (Oppenheim, 1992, p 171). As mentioned before, in this study respondents 
were given five choices in the fonn of a "Likert-scale" to indicate the level of 
agreement, the level of frequency or the level of importance. On the other hand, close-
ended questions do not penn it any flexibility by respondents because of the limited 
space which does not allow the respondents to explain their answers. Therefore, to 
overcome these limitations involved in such questions a sufficient space at the end of 
most questions was provided to give the respondents an opportunity to add any more 
infonnation. In addition, one page was included at the end of the questionnaire for the 
respondents to include any additional views and comments they may consider related 
to the topic of the study. 
(c) Sequencing (Order) of questions 
There are two ways to sequence the questions in the questionnaire (Kumar, 1999). 
Firstly, the sequence of the questions could follow a logical progression based on the 
aims of the research. This way is called the funnel approach (Oppenheim, 1992). 
Secondly, questions could be asked in a random order. This approach is useful in 
conditions where a researcher wants respondents to express their agreement or 
disagreement with different aspects. On the other hand, in the funnel approach, 
questions could lead the respondents from questions of a general nature to those that 
are more specific in nature. In other words, the logical approach is better as it 
gradually guides respondents into the topics of research, beginning with simple topics 
and progressing to complex ones. 
In this study the funnel approach was followed to sequence the questions in the 
questionnaire, which were sequenced following the progression of the research aims. 
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The questions started by asking about general information, earnings management 
motivations, earnings management techniques and earnings management constraints. 
(d) Length of the questionnaire 
Short questionnaires risk being superficial, while long questionnaires may discourage 
respondents from completing them. The questionnaire in this study was presented in 
nine pages (A4 paper) printed on single-sides, classified into five sections, and taking 
around 28 minutes to complete. Moreover, a cover letter was attached to the 
questionnaire. This letter includes information about the researcher and the research 
aims, and emphasised the importance of the survey, assured anonymity of the 
respondents, asked for support from respondents and confirmed that all information 
would be treated in the strictest confidence. A copy of the questionnaire is presented 
in appendices one and two. 
(e) Content of the Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was designed and categorised into four sections as follows: 
1. General (Personal) information; 
2. Earnings management motivations; 
3. Earnings management techniques; 
4. Earnings management constraints. 
• Section 1: General information 
In this section, respondents were asked about their background by asking questions 
related to their job position, years of experience in their current position, educational 
qualifications and educational specialisation. The aim of this section was to obtain 
information about the respondents who participated in this study and their 
background. Moreover, these questions were important as they were asked to provide 
the basic data that may be used for testing and analysing relationships between 
variables identified in the study. In addition, it was expected that respondents who are 
highly qualified and experienced in this area would provide reliable and relevant 
responses. 
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• Section 2: Earnings management motivations 
This section attempted to elicit respondents' perceptions on motivations behind 
practicing earnings management, which were provided in prior literature. These 
motivations include capital market motivations, external contract motivations, 
regulatory motivations, management compensation, contract motivation, behavioural 
motivations and communicating information motivations. Moreover, the corporation 
ownership structure, as mentioned in Chapter Three, has an important influence on the 
reported earnings and information value. Therefore, this section's questions asked 
about the motivations in the state-owned and private companies. 
• Section 3: Earnings management techniques 
This section was set to investigate respondents' views about techniques frequently 
used to practice earnings management in the Libyan corporations. They frequently 
ranged from 'never' to 'always'. 
• Section 4: Earnings management constraints 
The objective of this part was to investigate perception on constricting earnings 
management in Libya. 
Part One asked about the influence of adopting more detailed accounting legislation, 
issuing accounting standards that fit with the Libyan environment, issuing standards 
aimed at specific problems and increasing the level of disclosure. 
Part Two investigated the impact of adopting an internal corporate governance 
mechanism on earnings management and the quality of financial reports in Libya. The 
internal corporate governance mechanisms include audit committee, internal audit and 
independent and competent board of directors. 
Part Three elicited respondents' views on the impact of external audit quality on 
earnings management and the quality of financial reports, and the factors may affect 
the external audit quality. 
• Section 5: Other comments 
The objective of this section was to encourage respondents to add any more 
comments and provide recommendations that may be useful to mitigate earnings 
management behaviour, and to improve the quality of financial reports in Libya. 
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(t) Translation of the questionnaire 
The questionnaire employed in this study was originally written in English and then 
translated into Arabic. Serious attention was given to eliminating any difficulties that 
may appear during the translation process. Attempts have been made to review (as 
much as possible) the available questionnaires relating to accounting topics, which 
were originally written in English then translated into Arabic to exploit the relevant 
translations of some accounting expressions that are employed in the questionnaire. 
After completing the Arabic version, it was checked by a language specialist in 
Arabic to check the grammar and meaning. 
3.6.2.4 Pilot Study 
Oppenheim (1992) stated that a questionnaire has to be constructed, tried out to test 
and improve it, and then tried out again, often several times over, to ensure its 
suitability for reaching the research objectives. Moreover, Sekaran (2003) stated that 
it is important to pre-test the questionnaire to certify that the questions are understood 
by the respondents. Therefore, it is essential to pilot the questionnaire before 
distributing it to identifY and clarify any weaknesses, which may arise for many 
reasons, such as the language, unstructured fonnat, ambiguity, and difficulty in 
answering, and also to increase the response rate. According to Collis and Hussey 
(2003), it is useful to test the questionnaire with a small sample of respondents to 
ensure its suitability for reaching the research objectives. 
Consequently, a pilot study of the questionnaire was undertaken to ensure that there 
were no language problems and the questions are understandable by respondents, with 
no ambiguity in the questions. Moreover, it is helpful to rectify any inadequacies 
before administering the questionnaire to respondents. The questionnaire in this study 
went through several developmental stages before distribution of the final version. In 
the first stage, a first draft of the questionnaire was designed based on the literature 
review. The first draft was written in English and discussed with the supervision team. 
After that, the English draft was translated into Arabic with professional help, and 
then the translated draft was discussed with PhD students at the University of 
Gloucestershire who are Arabic native-speakers. As a result, some tenns and phrases 
were rephrased and some unimportant and recurrent questions were removed, and also 
a number of modifications were made on the Arabic draft. 
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In the second stage of the pilot study, five copies of the second draft in English and 
Arabic were passed to academic staff in the Accounting departments at several Libyan 
universities who hold a PhD from the UK to confirm the meaning of the translation. 
Also, one copy of the English and Arabic draft was sent to a specialist translation 
agency in Libya for their opinion and advice. The helpful and useful comments 
suggested by participants in the pilot study were incorporated into the questionnaire. 
Moreover, the Arabic draft was reviewed by a specialist in the Arabic language to 
check the grammar and meaning. 
In the final stage, 18 copies of the new version were piloted. Participants in this stage 
were external auditors, financial managers and senior accountants, internal auditors, 
lenders, tax officers and accounting academics, and every group received three copies. 
Participants provided useful comments and suggestions were offered related to 
wording and options in some questions. The pilot study in Libya took place from 15 
August to 10 September 2009. After that, the questionnaire was administered directly 
to the sample of this study. 
3.6.2.5 Administration of the Questionnaire Survey 
Miles and Huberman (1994, P.27) pointed out that "you cannot study everyone 
everywhere doing everything". After the pilot study was finished the researcher 
distributed 500 copies of the questionnaire to different respondent groups who 
participated in this study, which included external auditors, financial managers and 
senior accountants, internal auditors, lenders, tax officers, and accounting academics. 
Moreover, the researcher distributed the questionnaire in different geographical areas 
in Libya. Most of the copies were distributed and collected personally to increase the 
return rate. In some cases, a snowball sampling strategy was used, where the initial 
respondent was requested to distribute the questionnaires to his colleagues. The 
respondents were under frequent contact (personal follow-ups) by phone or face-to-
face asking them if they had any misunderstanding or any other problems. Also, 
friendly requests were made to return the questionnaire as soon as possible. Figure 3.3 
presents the process of questionnaire construction of this study. 
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Figure (3.3) the process of questionnaire construction. 
Carrying out an 
extensive review of 
earnings 
management 
Second draft of 
questionnaire in 
English and Arabic 
Pilot study with 
academic staff at 
Libyan universities 
and specialist 
translation agency to 
confirm the 
Third draft written in 
light of the previous 
step 
Arabic draft checked 
by specialist in 
Arabic language 
First draft of the 
questionnaire in 
English 
Discussed with 
supervision team 
- Respondents were told that they were 
participating in a pilot study; 
- The questionnaire in the pilot study were 
personally distributed and collected, the 
researcher introduced the research topic and aims 
to encourage participants to give their honest 
answers and comments; 
- Participants were asked to evaluate certain 
aspects of the questionnaire, namely: (a) type of 
questions; (b) wording of questions; (c) the 
sequence of questions; (d) the length of the 
questionnaire;(e) inappropriate and inadequate 
questions; and (1) the scaling of questions; 
Questionnaire delivered personally to the 
respondents in Libya. 
3.6.2.6 tati tical Methods Employed for Data Analysis 
Translated into 
Arabic and 
discussed with 
Arabic PhD 
students 
Eighteen copies in 
pilot study with 
group of the 
sample of this 
study in Libya 
The final draft was 
written in light of 
the previous step 
The aim of this section is to explain the type of statistical test that was used to analyse 
the data, and pro ide a justification for the application of this test. There are two types 
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of statistical tests, which are parametric and nonparametric. Applying the parametric 
test requires four assumptions, which are (Field, 2000; Pall ant, 2001): 
• The scale of measurement should be on an interval or ratio scaling. 
• What is known about the population, where the sample should be randomly 
chosen, and the observations drawn from nonnally distributed population. 
• The variances of variables should be equal or homogenous. 
• Observations should be independent of each other. 
Since the data of this study (which is nominal and ordinal) does not meet with the 
assumptions of the parametric test mentioned above, the nonparametric test was 
applied. This test does not require specific assumptions to be made about the 
population of the study and the nonnality test. 
There are many factors that affect the type of nonparametric statistical tests which can 
be applied to analyse the data, such as the number of groups involved in the study and 
the number of issues in each group. In this study, six groups have responded to the 
questionnaire survey, which were external auditors, financial managers and senior 
accountants, internal auditors, lenders, tax officers and accounting academics. To gain 
a better understanding of the earnings management phenomenon in Libya this 
research applied two statistical tests according to respondents' perceptions, which 
were classified into respondents' types which are the six groups presented above. The 
data were analysed using the software Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(SPSS. 16). 
The non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test allows for comparisons between three or 
more groups and indicates whether there are differences among these groups. 
Therefore, it was employed to test the difference between the perceptions of the six 
groups of respondents or if there was a consensus in the perceptions among these six 
groups. In addition, Non-parametric Mann-Whitney test converts the scores on 
continues variable to ranks, across two groups. It then evaluates whether the ranks for 
the two independent groups differ significantly. Therefore, this test was used to test 
the difference between two of respondents' perceptions. 
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3.6.2.7 Reliability and Validity 
Significant attention was paid by testing the reliability and validity of the data 
collected to detennine whether the characteristics of questions accurately address the 
research's intention and to assess their validity assessment. 
3.6.2.7.1 Reliability 
The reliability analysis is the first step in the quality control of conducting research 
relying on primary data collected by the questionnaires. Reliability could be defined 
as "the extent to which a variable yields the same value on repeated measures" 
(Newman & McNeil, 1998, p.205). The reliability test detennines the relations 
between individual items in the scale and whether the item in the questionnaire are 
related to each other. Thus, it identifies any items that should be excluded from the 
scale. Seale (1999) and Collis and Hussey (2003) identify three fonns to test the 
reliability which are: 
Test-retest reliability is evaluated by having the same set of participants complete a 
survey at two different times to detennine the stability of the responses by calculating 
the correlation coefficients to compare the two sets of responses. Correlation 
coefficients are collectively referred to as the survey instrument's test-retest reliability 
(Litwin, 1995). 
Alternate form method uses different worded items to measure the same point. 
Questions and responses of the questionnaire are rephrased or change their order to 
create two questionnaires that are not identical due to the difference in their wording 
or order. Both of the questionnaires are administered to the same participants at 
different times. If correlation coefficients are high, the questionnaire survey is 
considered to have good alternate-fonn reliability. Alternatively, if the sample is large 
enough the split-halves method could be used, where the sample can be divided in 
half and each fonn of the questionnaire distributed to half the group. Then compare 
the results from the two halves (Litwin, 1995; Cooper & Emory, 1995). 
Internal consistency method is the most popular test for measuring the reliability of 
the questionnaire survey. Internal consistency is an indicator of how well the different 
items measure the same issue. Therefore, this method used two groups of items that 
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are thought to measure different aspects of the same issue. The internal consistency 
among a group of items combined to form a single scale can be measured by using 
coefficient Cronbach's alpha. This coefficient reflects the homogeneity of the scale 
and how well different items complement each other in their measurement of different 
aspects of the same variable. Coefficient cronbach's alpha scores range between zero 
and one and the higher the coefficient alpha the better internal consistency of 
responses and the more reliable the research tool. Generally, the coefficient alpha 
should be at least 0.7 as indicative of good reliability (Litwin, 1995; Cooper & 
Emory, 1995). 
Coefficient cronbach's alpha was applied in this study to measure the reliability of the 
questionnaire due to difficulty contacting the same participants twice and using the 
test-retest. Also, it appears to be less biased and more practicable than other methods 
and produce a more accurate statistical result. The alpha coefficient for all tests was 
0.884, indicating that the data is reliable and suitable for further analysis. Table 3.2 
presents the results of these tests. 
3.6.2.7.2 "alidi~ 
Validity is a measure to make it clear that the questions are measuring what is 
supposed to be measured (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996; Aaker et aI., 
1998). Krippendorff (1996) mentioned it as the extent to which people agree that the 
list of words put in the category have similar meanings or connotations. Validity 
needs consultations with theoretical and empirical researchers, and also reliable and 
valid tools for the collection of data. In this study, the validity of the questionnaire 
was tested through a theoretical review and from different practical professionals and 
researchers who contributed in the pilot study, which showed that the construct 
validity is acceptable. 
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Table (3.2) Reliability analysis Cronbach's Alpa 
Measurement No. of Cronbach's 
Items alpha 
Section 1: earnings management motivations. 22 0.712 
Section 3: earnings management Techniques. 20 0.850 
Section 4: Earnings Management Constraints: 
4.1 Accounting Standards. 5 0.753 
4.2 Greater reliance on internal corporate 
governance mechanisms: 
4.1.1 Corporate governance mechanisms. 3 0.819 
4.1.1 Audit Committee. 20 0.722 
------------------------------------------------------------------ -----------------
--------------._---------
4.1.3 Internal Audit. 5 0.817 
----------------------------------------------------.-------------
-----------------
---.----------------.----4.1.4 Independent and Competent Board of 5 0.754 
Director. 
. __ •.... _·_ ... _H····H ..•............ _ ...... _ ......... _--........ " H·· __ •. __ ._· ••• _·_ ••..•. _____ • _____ •.... H ...•.••• _ •••• _'_,_,_M'_ ...................... _ •.. ••• M •• ............. ...................... , . ............. .................. -........ - • ••••••••• H •••••••••••• __ ..................... . _. 
4.3 External Audit Quality: 
4.3.1The impact of external auditors on 
earnings management. 4 0.749 
----~-----------.------------------------------------------------- ----------------- ------------------------4.3.3 Lengthy tenure. 6 0.801 
----------------------.-----.-----.------------------------------- -----------------
--------- ----------------
4.3.4 Non-auditing services. 6 0.714 
------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------- ------------------------4.3~ 6 Other components. 7 0.715 
All items. 103 0.884 
3.6.3 Semi-Structured Interview 
In this study, to overcome the limitations of the questionnaire, a number of semi-
structured interviews were applied to amplify and supplement the information 
provided by the questionnaire. Moreover, the researcher hoped to achieve a deeper 
understanding of the earnings management practice in Libya by applying semi-
structured interviews used as an exploratory tool with the questionnaire (mixed 
methods research). Using both questionnaire and interview methods to collect data 
helps to answer questions that cannot be answered by one of them alone (Creswell & 
Clark, 2007). 
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An interview survey is a method of collecting data by interviewing respondents to 
obtain information on the issues of interest, which can be structured, semi-structured 
and unstructured interviews (Saunders et al., 2007). Firstly, structured interviews are 
conducted when the researcher knows from the begnning what kind of information 
he/she needs to reach the aims of the study. The researcher has a list of predetermined 
and standardised questions or identical set of questions. The interviewees have to read 
out questions and answer them by recording the response on a standardised schedule, 
usually with pre-coded answers. The questions focus on issues that are relevant to the 
subject of the study. In addition, this kind of interview is usually used to answer 
questions with "what", "how often" and "how many" rather than "why" questions. 
The advantage of this interview is that it allows the researcher to record answers of 
the questions in a standardised format. On the other hand, structured interviews are 
less flexible than other forms since they do not enable the researcher to gain more 
information which may be necessary to achieve research aims. 
Secondly, unstructured interviews or in-depth interviews are informal and the 
researcher does not prepare a planned sequence of questions or predetermined list of 
questions to work through in this situation. However, the researcher needs to have a 
clear idea about the issue that is under investigation. The aim of this type of interview 
is to bring some preliminary issues to the surface so that the researcher can decide 
what variables need more in-depth investigation (Sekaran, 2003). Unstructured 
interviews give opportunity to interviewees to talk freely about the issues and any 
related topic area. This type of interview is useful for exploratory pilot research 
(Oppenheim, 1993, p.51). Nevertheless, it suffers from an inherent limitation because 
sometimes the interview leads to a full discussion until the researcher cannot focus on 
herlhis agenda. In other words, there are problems with recording the questions and 
answers, controlling the range of topics and analysing the data (Collis & Hussey, 
2003). 
Semi-structured interviews are when the researcher prepares a list of matters and 
questions to be covered, and asks interviewees the same sequence of questions and 
gives them considerable latitude in how they answer them. However, additional 
questions may be raised by the researcher or respondents during the interview in 
terms of "why" questions. This type of interview has been generally applied in social 
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research since its aim is to achieve explanation and more understanding of a particular 
phenomenon. In semi-structured interviews, flexibility is important because the 
researcher asks about specific topics in advance and gives the opportunity to 
interviewees to talk and provide as much information as they feel necessary, and the 
researcher to ask about the issues that may be raised during the interview to clarify 
them. 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted in this study because they enable the 
researcher to have control over time, flexibility and sequence of the interview. The 
researcher planned and prepared the interview structure and questions. The questions 
were asked of respondents in a systematic and consistent order. The interview 
schedule was developed and utilised with all interviewees (see appendices three and 
four). The interview questions were similar to those applied in the questionnaire 
survey to clarify and gain a better understanding of the earnings management 
phenomenon and related issues. 
3.6.3.1 Sample Selection and Transcription of Semi-Structured Interviews 
In this study, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 18 individuals who 
belonged to six groups. The steps of the actual interview process were as follows: 
a The researcher contacted participants in person or by phone and asked them if 
they agreed to be interviewed, where in the end of the last page of the 
questionnaire the participants were asked to give their details if they are agree to 
participate in the interview stage. Then, the participants were chosen because of 
their experience and position. Moreover, the researcher confirmed to all 
interviewees that their identities would be known only to him, to encourage them 
to give unguarded answers. 
a The interviews were conducted on a one-to-one basis where the researcher met the 
participants face-to-face. 
a The interview process started with five minutes asking general questions about the 
interviewee's background details, such as their position, years of experience and 
place of work, in order to mitigate any nervousness that interviewees may have 
felt it; in addition to giving participants time to build up confidence and trust, and 
put them in a question-answering mode. 
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o After that, the researcher asked questions related to corporations' financial reports 
in Libya, the earnings management phenomenon, accounting standards in Libya, 
internal corporate governance mechanisms and quality of external aUditing. 
o The last question was asked to give participants an opportunity to add any more 
information or suggestions. 
More information about the actual interview process: 
o In order to reach more understanding of research issues, and because this type of 
interview requires a natural style of conversation, words utilised were specific, 
short and informal. 
o In order to avoid bias which could affect understanding, the researcher utilised the 
same language, voice tone and body language for every interviewee. 
o When addressing well-informed interviewees who were professionals and in 
executive positions, terminology was regularly utilised through the process of the 
interview. 
o Most interviewees refused to be recorded by tape recorder. Therefore, note taking 
was utilised to record all the interviews. Notes that were taken during interviews 
were reviewed with the participants at the end of every interview. 
o Interview data were analysed manually and provided with the questionnaire data 
analysis in Chapter Six. 
3.7 Summary 
This chapter began by providing the main research aims and questions for this study 
in an attempt to provide research evidence on the earnings management phenomenon 
in Libya. After that, the researcher discussed the theoretical approach and the 
philosophical paradigms that were applied to this study, which were realistic 
paradigms that combine positivistic and interpretive paradigms. This research used 
both quantitative and qualitative methods to gain advantage from data triangulation 
and methodological triangulation, and to enhance confidence in the obtained research 
findings. Moreover, the mixed method that was used in this study was justified. The 
chapter also provided a discussion of different approaches that used to examine 
earnings management, which are aggregate accrual, specific accrual, and distribution 
approach. In addition this chapter provided discussion of different models of 
aggregate accrual approach and justification of using the Modified Jones model, 
which was used to analyse the secondary data that was collected from financial 
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reports of 87 Libyan companies over three years. Infonnation was also given about 
the questionnaire survey that was distributed to the six groups. Finally, infonnation 
was given about semi-structured interviews that were conducted with 18 individuals 
who belong to the previous groups. The semi-structured interviews were conducted to 
amplify and supplement the infonnation provided by the questionnaire survey, and to 
achieve more understanding of the earnings management phenomenon. The next 
chapter provides the research findings derived from the secondary data analysis to 
investigate whether Libyan companies are practicing earnings management and to 
overview the direction of earnings management in Libyan companies. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ANAL YSIS OF SECONDARY DATA 
4.1 Introduction 
Measuring discretion over earnings is an essential element of any test for earnings 
management (McNichols, 2000). The accounting literature has provided a number of 
approaches that are used to detect earnings management. The accruals-based approach 
is commonly utilised to detect signals of earnings management activity (Healy, 1985; 
Jones, 1991; Dechow et aI., 1995). Total accruals are separated into two components 
by using regression analysis: discretionary accruals, which represent those accruals 
where managers have some degree to exercise judgment, and non-discretionary 
accruals, which represent those accruals that are largely determined exogenously and 
which therefore play no part in the manipulation of earnings. This chapter in 
particular describes the adoption of an accruals-based approach to investigate whether 
Libyan companies are practicing earnings management and to overview the direction 
of earnings management in Libyan companies. Statistical techniques, such as 
descriptive statistics and multiple regressions, were used to analyse the secondary data 
to achieve the above aims. Four different versions of the Modified Jones model were 
used as an approach to measure earnings management in Libyan companies, which 
were both state-owned and private companies. The sample size was 87 companies 
over three years. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section Two presents the 
earnings management proxies. Section Three presents the measuring of discretionary 
accruals. Section Four presents the existence and direction of earnings management in 
Libyan companies. Section Five presents a summary drawn from the secondary data 
analysis. 
4.2 Earnings Management Proxies 
This study follows the common technique used to detect accruals manipulation as 
described in the earnings management literature and which uses discretionary accruals 
as a proxy to measure earnings management (Healy, 1985; De Angelo, 1986; Jones, 
1991; Dechow et aI., 1995; Becker et aI., 1998; Teoh et al., 1998a and b; Guidry et aI., 
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1999; Bartov et aI., 2001; Larcker & Richardson, 2004; Peasnell et aI., 2005; Kothari 
et aI., 2005). Total accruals (TA) are divided into discretionary accruals (DA) and 
non-discretionary accruals (NDA) components. Discretionary accruals are the 
difference between actual accruals and expected accruals. 
This study applied four different versions of the Modified Jones model to generate 
firm specific coefficients. From the results of the four versions, this study used firm 
specific coefficients that were generated from the version with the highest adjusted 
R2 to estimate the expected nondiscretionary accruals. Moreover, this study follows 
Teoh et al. (1998a and b), who decomposed total accruals (TA) into current and 10ng-
term components, and evaluated them separately because companies have more 
discretion over current accruals (CA), which include adjustments of short-term assets 
and liabilities that support the day-to-day operations, than over long-term accruals 
(LT A), which include adjustments of long-term net assets that can be increased by 
adjusting depreciation, decreasing deferred taxes or realising unusual gains. 
In addition, following Subramanyam, (1996), Teoh et al. (1998a), Bartov et al. 
(2001), Chung et al. (2002), Koh (2003), Balsam et al. (2003), Chen et ai. (2005) and 
Jones et al. (2008) this study used a cross-sectional approach rather than the time-
series approach. This was because of three main reasons. Firstly, the cross-sectional 
model generates a larger sample and a higher number of observations. Secondly, the 
time-series model requires around ten years of data for each company to estimate the 
regression coefficients and therefore introduces misspecification due to non-
stationarity; also, in this study it is difficult to obtain such data. Finally, the time-
series approach may lower the effectiveness of tests (i.e. Type II error) due to 
overlapping estimation and treatment periods. Therefore, this study used cross-
sectional models. Also, this study followed the view of Bartov et a1. (2001) and 
Ronen and Yaari (2007), who consider the standard deviations of the parameters 
much lower in the cross-sectional regression. Moreover, this study used a balance-
sheet approach to compute total and currant accruals because some of the Libyan 
companies do not prepare cash flow statements. 
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The first model employed in this study was similar in form to a cross-sectional 
Modified Jones model; the following cross-sectional regressions were applied: 
where: 
TAli = total accruals of corporation (i ), 
CA" = current accruals, 
MECII = net receivable in years t less net receivables in year t -1, 
MEV" = revenues in year t less revenues in year t -1, 
P P Ell = gross property plant and equipment in year t 
All_I = total assets at (t -1), and 
a o' /31' /32 = firm-specific parameters. 
Dechow et al., (1995) added MECi, to the Jones model, which assumes that 
discretion is not exercised over revenue in either the estimation period or the event 
period. However, the Modified Jones model assumes that all changes in credit sales in 
the event period are due to earnings management. 
Furthermore, Dechow et al. (1995) stated that discretionary accruals are likely to be 
misspecified for companies with extreme levels of performance. Moreover, Dechow 
(1994) stated that cash flow is helpful in determining the expected accruals and it 
should be included in future studies. Also, Larcker and Richardson (2004) added 
operating cash flows to the Modified Jones model to reduce measurement error, 
which is correlated with the discretionary accruals and to control for current operating 
performance. Therefore, the second model employed in this study was a cross-
sectional Modified Jones model including cash flow from operation. The Modified 
Jones model with operating cash flows can be represented as follows: 
TAli / A"_I = al(l! Ait _l ) + 131 (MEV" - MECil / Ail_I) + /32(PPE~ / Ail_I) + 
/3 3 (CFOr / Ail_I) + Bil 
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where CFO is operating cash flows. The majority of Libyan companies do not prepare 
cash flow statements. Therefore, in this study cash flow from operation was calculated 
by subtracting total accruals from income before extraordinary items, due to the fact 
that reported earnings consist of operations cash flow and income before 
extraordinary items (Dechow et aI., 1995; Dechow & Dichev, 2002; Dechow et aI., 
2003). 
CFO" = Income before extraordinary items- T Ait 
The third version of the Modified Jones model that was employed in this study was 
motivated by Kothari et aI. (2005), who included performance matching on return on 
assets in the current year or the prior year (ROA i, or ROA iH). This motivation is to 
address the non-linear relationship between normal accruals and performance. Also, 
the model is designed to present a comparison of the effectiveness of performance 
matching versus including a performance measure in the accruals regression. The 
Modified Jones model with performance matched can be represented as follows: 
TA" I A,,_, =u,(ll A,,_,) + f3,(MEV;t -MECit I Ait-I)+ f32(PPE, I AiH )+ 
P3(ROA,t) + c" 
CAlI I AII _, = u, (1 I Ait _,) + PI (ME"V;t - MEC it I Ait _,) + 
P3 (ROA,,) + cit 
Where ROA, = is income before extraordinary items for year (I) over(Ajf). 
Furthermore, the researcher applied in this study another version of the cross-sectional 
Modified Jones model by including the cash flow from operation (CFO) and 
performance matching on return on assets (ROA) among the regression. The version 
can be shown as follows: 
TA,t I A,t_' = U, (l I Ait _, ) + PI (MEV;t - MEC it I Ait - , ) + P2 (PPE, I AiH ) + 
f33(CFO, I AII _,)+ f33(ROA, I Ait_I)+c" 
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CA,I/Ali_I = a l (1 / All_I) + fJl (llRE"V;1 -llRECil / Ail-I) + fJ2 (CFO, / Ail-I) + 
/33 (ROA, / A,l-I) + Gil 
In this study, an effort was made to generate firm specific coefficients by using year-
by-year regressions for 87 companies, which included 45 state-owned companies and 
42 private companies, using data for the period from 2007 to 2009. Applying this 
sample leads to a total number of observations of 261 company-years. A positive or 
negative relationship between total accruals and the change in revenues was expected 
given that change in revenues can result in income-increasing or income-decreasing. 
On the other hand, a negative relationship between total accruals and the property, 
plant and equipment variable was expected, because it is related to income-decreasing 
accruals. This suggests a positive or negative SIgn for 
the (llREV,1 -llRECII / A,l_I) coefficient /31 and a negative sign for the (PPE, / Ail_I) 
coefficient fJ2. The statistical results of generating firm specific coefficients from the 
four versions models, covering the period 2007-2009 are presented in Tables 4.1, 4.2, 
4.3, and 4.4. 
From Tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4, it can be seen that the fourth version of the cross-
sectional of the Modified Jones model has the highest mean adjustedR2. Also, the F-
values of this version for total accruals and current accruals models are 26.15 and 
18.43, respectively, and were significant at the one percent level, which suggests that 
the regression model was statistically valid. Therefore, the firm specific coefficients 
that were generated from the fourth version (with the highest adjustedR 2 ) were used 
to estimate the expected nondiscretionary accruals and to compute discretionary 
accruals. 
130 
Table (4-1): finn-specific coefficients of the first versions model during the period 
2007-2009 
Version 1: Total accruals 
TA" / A"_I = a l (1/ Ai,_I)+ f31(t1.REV" - t1.REC iI / Ail-I) + f32(PPE iI / AiI_I)+G iI 
Parameter Mean Median Minimum maximum Mean Median 
P-value P-value 
a l 
-0.0159 -0.0157 -0.0600 0.0282 0.5476 0.4443 
f31 0.1489 0.1556 0.0614 0.2296 0.1096 0.1551 
f32 -0.0383 -0.0172 -0.1156 0.0179 0.6155 0.8931 
MeanR2= 13.79% Mean adjusted R2 = 11.74 % 
Version 1: Current accruals 
CA it / All_I = a l (l / A,,_I) + PI (AREV it - AREC it / A it _ l ) + Gil 
Parameter Mean Median Minimum maximum Mean Median 
P-value P-value 
a l -0.0349 -0.0289 -0.0685 -0.0071 0.4062 0.1418 
f31 0.1518 0.1623 0.0636 0.2295 0.0932 0.1083 
MeanR2= 11.10% Mean adjusted R2 =10.05% 
- The composition of total accrual (TAil) used in the table is measured as (t1. current assets -
t1. cash and short term investments) - (current liabilities - t1. maturities of long term debt -
t1. income taxes payable) - depreciation and amortization expense. 
- Current accruals (CA,,) are measured as (t1. current assets - t1. cash and short term 
investments) - (current liabilities - t1. maturities of long term debt - t1. income taxes payable). 
- (MEV;, - MEC,,) is measured as the change in sales minus the change in account 
receivables. 
- The change (ll ) is computed between time t and time t-I. 
- (PPE" ) are measured as net property, plant and equipment. 
- All variables in the model scaled by total assets for year t-I ( Ail-I) to reduce 
heteroscedasticity . 
131 
Table (4-2): firm-specific coefficients of the second versions model during the period 
2007-2009 
Version 2: Total accruals 
TAit / A,t_1 = a l (1/ Ait-I ) + fJI (I1REVit -I1R£Cit / Ait_ l ) + fJ2 (PPE r / Ait _ l ) 
+ fJ 3 ( CFO r / Ait-\ ) + Sit 
Parameter Mean Median Minimum maximum Mean Median 
P-value P-value 
a l 0.0050 0.0053 -0.0187 0.0283 0.7236 0.8363 
/31 0.2721 0.0995 0.0405 0.6763 0.0422 0.0001 
/32 -0.0774 -0.0682 -0.1236 -0.0405 0.3386 0.1186 
/33 0.9087 0.8942 0.4614 1.3705 0.5580 0.5323 
Mean R2 =52.09% Mean adjusted R2 = 50.36% 
Version 2: Current accruals 
CAit / Ait _1 = a l (1/ Ait _l ) + fJI (I1R£Vit -I1RECit / Ait_l ) + fJ2 (CFOit / Ait_l ) + Sit 
Parameter Mean Median Minimum maximum Mean Median 
P-value P-value 
a l 0.0353 0.0278 -0.0005 0.0785 0.4852 0.4347 
/31 -0.0034 0.0177 -0.1374 0.1093 0.2115 0.0735 
/32 0.5501 0.5365 0.4195 0.6942 9.8376 8.8903 
MeanR2= 40.84% Mean adjusted R2 =39.43% 
- The composition of total accrual (TAli) used in the table is measured as (11 current assets ~ 
~ cash and short tenn investments) - (current liabilities - ~ maturities of long tenn debt -
~ income taxes payable) - depreciation and amortization expense. 
- Current accruals (CA" ) are measured as (~current assets - ~ cash and short term investments) 
- (current liabilities - ~ maturities of long tenn debt -~ income taxes payable). 
- (MEV" - MECi,) is measured as the change in sales minus the change in account 
receivables. 
- The change ( ~ ) is computed between time t and time t-l. 
- (PPEII ) are measured as net property, plant and equipment. 
- (CFO,,) are measured as (income before extraordinary items - TAil ). 
- All variables in the model scaled by total assets for year t-l (Ait _l ) to reduce heteroscedasticity 
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Table (4-3): firm-specific coefficients of the third versions model during the period 
2007-2009 
Version 3: Total accruals 
TAli I AII _ I = a l (l I All_I) + PI (~REV;, - ~REC it I Ait_J + P2 (PPE T I Ait - 1) + 
P3(ROA II )+E II 
Parameter Mean Median Minimum maximum Mean Median 
P-value P-value 
a l 
-0.0192 -0.0198 -0.0619 0.0241 0.5716 0.4309 
PI 0.1441 0.1558 0.0575 0.21895 0.1267 0.1843 
P2 -0.0569 -0.0379 -0.1142 -0.0185 0.5957 0.8847 
P3 0.3923 0.2957 0.0810 0.8004 0.4442 0.3492 
MeanR 2= 14.55% Mean adjusted R2 =11.46% 
Version 3: Current accruals 
CA i, I Ai,_1 = al(lIA il _I )+ P I (~REV il - ~REC it I Ail-I) + 
P 2 (ROA it) + E it 
Parameter Mean Median Minimum maximum Mean Median 
P-value P-value 
a l 0.0180 0.0153 0.0145 0.0242 0.5998 0.5812 
PI -0.0487 0.0191 -0.3284 0.1632 0.2082 2.8500 
P2 0.5760 0.3276 0.1540 1.2464 0.2253 0.2732 
Mean R2 =19.18% Mean adjusted R2 =17.26% 
- The composition of total accrual (TAli) used in the table is measured as (~current assets -
~ cash and short term investments) - (current liabilities - ~ maturities of long term debt -
~ income taxes payable) - depreciation and amortization expense. 
- Current accruals (CAli) are measured as (~current assets - ~ cash and short term 
investments) - (current liabilities - ~ maturities oflong term debt -~ income taxes payable). 
- (MEV" - MECu ) is measured as the change in sales minus the change in account 
receivables. 
- The change ( ~ ) is computed between time t and time t-1. 
- ( P P E" ) are measured as net property, plant and equipment. 
- Return on assets (ROA,,) is measured as net income scaled by lagged total assets for year t. 
- All variables in the model scaled by total assets for year t-l (Ait _l ) to reduce heteroscedasticity 
except Return on assets (ROAII )· 
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Table (4-4): finn-specific coefficients of the fourth versions model during the period 
2007-2009 
Version 4: Total accruals 
TAil/Ail-I = a l (1 / Ail-I) + /31 (t!REVil - t!REC it / Ait _ l ) + /32 (PPE T / Ait _ l ) + 
/33 (CFO T / A;I_I) + /34 (ROA it ) + Git 
Parame Mean Median Minimum maximum Mean Median 
ter P-value P-value 
a l 0.0030 0.0034 -0.0172 0.0228 0.76270 0.8650 
/31 0.2696 0.0990 0.0353 0.6743 0.0582 0.00016 
/32 -0.1120 -0.1261 -0.1415 -0.0685 0.2300 0.1045 
/33 0.9289 0.9003 0.4639 1.4226 6.3128 2.1588 
/34 0.5877 0.3828 -0.0356 1.4160 0.2981 0.0385 
MeanR2=53.77% Mean adjusted R2 ==51.52% 
Version 4: Current accruals 
CAlI / A"_I = a l (l / Ail_I) + /31 (I'1REVu -I'1REC iI/Au-I) + /32 (CFO T / AU_I) + 
/33(ROA")+G,, 
Parame Mean Median Minimum maximum Mean Median 
ter P-value P-value 
a l 0.0150 0.0222 -0.0017 0.0246 0.6504 0.5372 
/31 -0.0057 0.0128 -0.1396 0.1097 0.2379 0.0411 
/32 0.5683 0.5877 0.4171 0.7002 0.0000 5.4625 
/33 0.6340 0.3932 0.0317 1.4770 0.3127 0.0919 
Mean R 2 =46.19% Mean adjusted R2 ==44.25% 
- The composition of total accrual (TA" ) used in the table is measured as (1'1 current assets -
1'1 cash and short term investments) - (current liabilities - 1'1 maturities of long term debt -
1'1 income taxes payable) - depreciation and amortization expense. 
- Current accruals (CA,,) are measured as (1'1 current assets - 1'1 cash and short term 
investments) - (current liabilities - 1'1 maturities of long term debt -1'1 income taxes payable). 
- (MEV;, - MEC,,) is measured as the change in sales minus the change in account 
receivables. 
- The change ( 1'1 ) is computed between time t and time t-l. 
- (PPEi/ ) are measured as net property, plant and equipment. 
- (CFO,,) are measured as (income before extraordinary items - TAu ). 
- Return on assets (ROA;I) is measured as net income scaled by lagged total assets for year 
t. 
-
All variables in the model scaled by total assets for year t-l ( Ait _ l ) to reduce 
heteroscedasticity except Return on assets (ROAit ) • 
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4.3 Measuring Discretionary Accruals 
4.3.1 Proxy of Discretionary Accruals 
This study used the following regression model for total accruals (1) to generate finn 
specific coefficients for a p/3p/32,/33'/34 
These coefficients were then used to estimate the level of non-discretionary total 
accruals for each sample finn using the following model (2): 
NDTAit I Ail - t =at(ll Ail _t )+ f3t(MiEVjt -MiEC il I Ail _t )+ f32(PPE, I Ail - t ) + (2 f33(CFO r / Ail - t )+ f34(ROA u ) + Git 
) 
where: NDTA/I is nondiscretionary total accruals in year t for finni. The level of 
discretionary total accruals was then calculated by using the following model (3), 
which was used as a proxy for the extent of earnings management: 
DTA/I = TAil / A,,-I - NDTAII (3) 
where DT A/I is discretionary total accruals in year t for finn i . 
In addition, this study used the following regression model for current accruals (4) to 
generate firm specific coefficients for al' /31' /32' /33' /34 
f3 3 (ROA it ) + E /I 
These coefficients were then used to estimate the level of non-discretionary current 
accruals for each sample firm using the following model (5): 
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where: NDCA" is nondiscretionary current accruals in year t for firmi . The level of 
discretionary current accruals was then calculated by using the following model (6): 
DCA" =CA" / Ail_I -NACDil (6) 
where DCA" is discretionary total accruals in year t for firm i . 
4.3.2 Correlation Analysis 
Correlation analysis shows a correlation demonstrating the power of the relationship 
between two variables. The biggest value of correlation coefficient (r) is (+ 1), which 
indicates that the correlation between the two variables is strong and positive. This 
means that if the value of one variable rises, the value of the other variable also 
increases by the same degree, whereas the lowest value of correlation coefficient is 
( -1), which presents a strong negative linkage between the two variables. This means 
that if the value of one variable rises, the value of the other variable decreases by the 
same degree. However, when the relation is equal to zero, it means that there is no 
association between the two variables. The relationship between two variables is 
weaker as the value of the correlation coefficient becomes near zero (Koutsoyiannis, 
1988). 
Additionally, the analysis of correlation offers the significance of the correlation. This 
study applied the bivariate Person correlation for all the firms. The study uses the 
significant of correlation to ensure that there is no multicollinearity problem between 
the independent variables. As indicated by Berry and Feldman (1985), this problem 
occurs at the value of r > 0.80. The correlation test is subjected to a two-tailed test of 
statistical significance at three different degrees: one percent, five percent and ten 
percent. 
As can be seen from Table 4.5, the results of the correlation analysis show that the 
problem of multicollinearity is not found in relation to all independent variables. The 
value of the correlation coefficient runs from the high of (+0.076) between 
(ROA" ) and (MEV" -!!REel A,,_I) to the low of (-0.358) between 
(!!REV" - AIlEC I A,,_I) and (1/ AU_I)' 
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a e orre a IOn nalysls T bl (4 5) CIt· AI· 
(II A"_I (MEf;, -MEel (PPE iH I (CFql-ll (ROA iI ) 
Ail_I) Ail_I) Ail_I) 
(11 All-I) 
1.00 Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed -
N 261 
(MEV" - MEC" I All-I) 
Pearson Correlation -.358·· 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed 
.000 -
N 261 261 
(PPEr I All_I) 
.046 1.000 Pearson Correlation -.201 •• 
Sig. (2-tailed .458 
.001 -
N 26] 261 261 
(CFOr I A,,_I) 
.008 -.029 -.027 1.000 Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed .893 .647 .659 -
N 261 261 261 261 
(ROAII ) 
Pearson Correlation -.055 .076 -.002 -.034 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed .378 .219 .977 .581 
-
N 261 261 261 261 261 
4.4 Existence and Direction of Earnings Management in the Libyan Companies 
As described in the literature review in Chapter Two (Section 2.1.6), several empirical 
studies have examined motivations that are behind practicing earnings management. 
Their results showed that earnings management might be exercised for several 
motivations, which depend on the aims that want to be reached. These motivations 
lead to practicing earnings management in two directions, which are income-
increasing and income-decreasing. Income-increasing occurs with motivations, such 
as increasing management compensation (Healy, 1985; Watts & Zimmerman, 1986; 
Gaver et aI., 1995; Holthausen et at., 1995; Guidry et aI., 1999), external contract 
requirements (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986; Duke & Hunk, 1990; Defond, 1994; 
Sweeney, 1994; Jaggi & Lee, 2002), job anxiety (Fudenberg & Tirol, 1995; DeFond 
& Park, 1997), capital market motivations (Dechow & Skinner, 2000), reaching 
analysts' consensus forecasts (Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; DeGeorge et at., 1999; 
Payne & Robb, 2000; Burgstahler & Eames, 2006), and initial public offerings (IPOs) 
(Teoh et aI., 1998 b; DuCharme et at., 2004). 
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On the other hand, income-decreasing occurs with the motivations, such as decreasing 
the value of tax payment (Baralexis, 2004; Noronha et aI., 2008), when the debts are 
renegotiated or restructuring takes place because waivers are denied (Jaggi & Lee, 
2002), when the company is targeted by political procedures with unfavourable 
consequences (Cahan, 1997), and during import relief, monopolistic practices, sudden 
product price increases (Jones, 1991; Cahan, 1992; Han & Wang, 1998), bonus 
contracts (Healy, 1985) and during CEO changes (Strong & Meyer, 1987; Elliott & 
Shaw, 1988; Pourciau, 1993; Wells, 2002) 
The motivations presented above can be considered the main causes for exercising 
earnings management. Corporations are working in different environments with 
different variables, which may affect the existence and the direction of earnings 
management. Accordion to Noronha et al. (2008), the issue which should be 
considered is how managers consider the importance of the motivations. As a result, 
managers will have different priorities on motivations. The authors also present two 
factors that influence motivation preference, which are corporation ownership 
structure and corporation size. 
Corporation ownership structure, as stated by Wang (2006), has an important 
influence on reported earnings and information value. The monitoring mechanism that 
a corporation uses is influenced by ownership structure, including monitoring 
earnings management activity (Siregar & Utarna, 2008). Hao (1999) mentioned that 
the non-tradable characteristic of state-owned enterprise shares is the basic reason for 
the low quality of earnings data. Noronha et al. (2008), moreover, state that, because 
managers in state-owned corporations are government officials, corporate earnings 
attainment is one of their promotion criteria. Therefore, managers may have the 
motivation to increase earnings. However, Siregar and Utama (2008), in their 
examination of the relationship between earnings management on the one hand and 
ownership structure and firm size on the other, provided evidence that family 
ownership has an effect on the selection of a particular kind of earnings management. 
With reference to corporation size, Moses (1987) provided evidence that earnings 
management is associated with a corporation's size. Baralexis (2004) in his study of 
Greek corporations found that large corporations in Greece have different motivations 
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to small corporations. Reducing income tax considerations is very important for small 
corporations. However, large corporations managed earnings to demand external 
financing. Zhu and Su (2002) found that Chinese medium- and small-sized 
corporations have motivations to practice earnings management for tax: expense and 
managers' compensation. 
As a result of the above discussion, this particular study investigated the effect of the 
nature of company ownership and company size. 
4.4.1 Existence of Earnings Management 
As mentioned before, the fourth version of the cross-sectional Modified Jones model 
has the highest mean adjusted R2. Therefore, this model was applied to investigate the 
existence and the direction of earnings management in the unlisted companies (state-
owned and private companies) in Libya. 
Table 4.6 shows descriptive statistics results that were obtained from the fourth 
version of cross-sectional Modified Jones model. It can be seen that the total 
discretionary accruals is with negative mean in years one and three and with positive 
mean in year two. Also, it is with negative median in all years. Moreover, it can be 
noticed that approximately 47 percent, 47 percent and 46 percent of the sample 
companies were adopting income-increasing policies in years one, two and three, 
respectively. However, the result of the discretionary currant accruals shows that the 
mean of discretionary current accruals is positive in all years. Also, it is with negative 
median in years one and three and with positive median in year two. Moreover, it can 
be seen that approximately 42 percent, 56 percent and 47 percent of the sample 
companies were adopting income-increasing policies in years one, two and three, 
respectively. 
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Table (4.6): descriptive statistics results for discretionary total accruals and 
d' f tID 11 th . fth 1 Iscre lonary curren accrua s or a e companies 0 esam PJe. 
Accruals level for all the sample Year 1 Year2 Year3 
Panel A: Discretionary total accruals (DTA): 
TA" / A,t-I = a I (J / A"_I) + PI (t1.REV il - I1REC iI/Ail-I) + f3 2 (PPE T / Ail-I) + 
f33(CFO r / A"_I)+ f3 4 (ROA i/)+&iI 
Mean -0.0081 0.0221 -0.0063 
Median -0.0146 -0.0134 -0.0115 
Minimum -1.0842 -1.1032 -0.6554 
Maximum 1.5337 4.2003 0.6604 
% Positive 47% 47% 46% 
Number of observations 87 87 87 
Panel B: Discretionary current accruals (DCA): 
CAli / All_I = a l (1 / Ail-I) + PI (~REVil - ~REC il / Ait _ l ) + P2 (CFO T / A it - 1 ) + 
P3(ROA II ) + G" 
Mean 0.01776 0.1191 0.0067 
Median -0.0245 0.0281 -0.0148 
Minimum -1.0574 -0.7835 -0.6005 
Maximum 1.5073 2.3862 0.6177 
% Positive 42% 56% 47% 
Number of observations 87 87 87 
In order to obtain more explanation of the existence of earnings management in the 
Libyan companies (state-owned and private companies), the entire sample was 
divided into two sub-samples, which are income-increasing and income-decreasing 
samples. Table 4.7 presents descriptive statistics results of total and current accruals 
that were obtained from the fourth version of the cross-sectional of the Modified 
Jones model computed for the two groups of companies. It can be seen that the 
discretionary total accruals in the income-increasing group is with mean 0.206, 00408, 
and 0.132 in years one, two and three, respectively. Also, it can be seen that 
approximately 47 percent, 47 percent, and 46 percent of the sample companies were 
adopting income-increasing policies accruals in years one, two and three, 
respectively. 
However, discretionary total accruals is with mean -0.199, -0.322, and -0.124 in the 
income-decreasing group for years one, two and three, respectively. Also, it can be 
seen that approximately 53 percent, 53 percent and 54 percent from the sample 
companies were adopting income-decreasing policies accruals in years one, two and 
three, respectively. In addition, it can be noticed that discretionary current accruals in 
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the income-increasing group is with mean 0.258, 0.362 and 0.136 in years one, two 
and three, respectively. Also, it can be seen that approximately 42 percent, 56 percent 
and 47 percent from all samples of companies were adopting income-increasing 
policies accruals in years one, two and three, respectively. However, it is with mean _ 
0.153, -0.199, and -0.109 in the income-decreasing groups for years one, two and 
three, respectively. Also, it can be seen that approximately 57 percent, 44 percent and 
53 percent from the sample companies were adopting income-increasing policies 
accruals in years one, two and three, respectively. 
Table (4.7): descriptive statistics results for discretionary total accruals and 
d' . I fl' . . Iscretlon~ current accrua s or mcome-mcreasm~ group. 
Panel A: Accruals level for all income-increasing Year 1 Year2 Year3 
com~anies. 
1- Discretionary total accruals (DT A) 
TA;, I All_I = a 1 (\ I All_I) + PI (I'lREV ;/ - I'lREC iI I All-I) + P 2 (PPE r I Ail_I) + 
P3(CFO r IA,,_I)+P4(ROA il)+E;1 
Mean 0.2069 0.4089 0.1323 
Median 0.1078 0.2180 0.0743 
% Positive from all observations 47% 47% 46% 
Number of observations 41 41 40 
2- Discretionary current accruals (DCA) 
CAlI / A,,_, = a 1(1/ Ail-I) + fi, (~REVil - ~REC iI/Ail-I) + f32 (CFO T / Ait-\) + 
/33(ROA II )+E" 
Mean 0.2588 0.3625 0.1368 
Median 0.,1227 0.1715 0.0863 
% Positive from all observations 42% 56% 47% 
Number of observations 36 49 41 
Panel B: Accruals level for all income-decreasing Year 1 Year2 Year3 
companies. 
1- Discretionary total accruals (DT A): 
TAli I A if _I = a I (I I A it -I ) + P I (I'l REV i/ - A REC it / A it -I ) + P 2 (P PEr I A i/ -I ) + 
P3 (CFO r / A,,_J) + fi4 (ROA il) + Ell 
Mean -0.1997 -0.3227 -0.1243 
Median -0.1045 -0.3227 -0.1036 
% Positive from all observations 53% 53% 54% 
Number of observations 46 46 47 
2- Discretionary current accruals (DCA) 
CA" / A,,_, =a l (1/ A,,_,)+ f31(~REVil -I'l.REC" / A;t-l)+ f32(CFO r / A"_l)+ 
/33 (ROA,,) + E;I 
Mean -0.1534 -0.1994 -0.1092 
Median -0.0792 -0.1281 -0.0757 
% Positive from all observations 57% 44% 53% 
Number of observations 51 38 46 
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4.4.2 Direction of Earnings Management 
In an attempt to obtain more explanation of the direction of earnings management in 
the Libyan companies (state-owned and private companies), the decision was taken to 
divide the whole sample into two sub-samples regarding the nature of company 
ownership, which are state-owned companies and private companies. Then, the 
direction of earnings management was examined by a regression model on the basis 
of company size. 
4.4.1.1 The nature of companies' ownership 
Table 4.8 presents the relationship between the direction of earnings management and 
ownership nature. It can be noticed that 71 percent, 75 percent, and 69 percent of 
state-owned companies were adopting income-increasing policies accruals in years 
one, two and three, respectively. Also, it can be seen that 78 percent, 83 percent, and 
78 percent of the companies that engaged in earnings management by using income-
increasing policies accruals in years one, two and three, respectively, were state-
owned companies. 
Furthermore, it can be seen from Table 4.8 that 79 percent , 83 percent and 70 
percent of private companies were adopting income-decreasing policies accruals in 
years one, two and three, respectively. Moreover, it can be seen that 72 percent, 76 
percent, and 70 percent of the companies that engaged in earnings management by 
using income-decreasing policies accruals in years one, two and three, respectively, 
were private companies. 
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- ----
.-~/- --- ---~.--- .---
direction of 
- - -- - - -- - -
Panel A: Discretionary total accruals (DT A) for state-owned companies 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Income-increasing Income-decreasing Income-increasing Income-decreasing Income-increasing Income-decreasing 
l-(%)of 
state-owned 71% 29% 75% 25% 69% 31% 
companies 
Number of 45 45 45 
observations 
2- (%) of 
the direction 78% 28% 83% 24% 78% 30% 
ofEM* 
Number of 32 13 34 11 31 14 
observations 
Panel B: Discretionary total accruals (DTA) for private companies 
Year I Year 2 Year 3 
Income-increasing Income-decreasing Income-increasing Tncome-decreasing Income-increasing Income-decreasing 
1- (%) of 
private 21% 79% 17% 83% 21% 70% 
companies 
Number of 42 42 42 
observations 
2- (%) of 
the direction 22% 72% 17% 76% 22% 70% 
ofEM* 
Number of 9 33 7 35 9 33 
observations 
- - - -- - -------
* The direction of earnings management is income-increasing or income-decreasmg. 
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4.4.1.2 Company size 
To investigate whether there is a relationship between the direction of earnings 
management and company size. two regression models (one for state-owned 
companies and another for private companies) were applied as follows: 
where: 
DTA" = company total accruals (i). 
A"_l = company total assets at (I -I). and 
Ln( All) = company size as measured by natural logarithm of total assets. 
Table (4.9): the result from regression model to investigate the relationship between 
h d' . f . d' t e IrectlOn 0 earmngs man~ement an company size 
The regression model: DTA" = a + 13 Ln(Ajl) + Gj 
Panel A: state-owned company 
variable Coefficient 13 I-value 
a 0.007 0.374 
Ln(A,,) 0.007 4.412·" 
R Square=7% F= I 9.462 Prop (F statistic) = 0.000 
Panel B: private company 
variable Coefficient f3 I-value 
a 0.006 0.198 
Ln(A,,) -0.009 -3.322 ••• 
R Square=4% F=11.038 Prop (F statistic) = 0.001 
As can be seen from Table 4.9 in panel A (state-owned company). F-value (19.462) 
was significant at the one percent level, which suggests that the regression model was 
statistically valid. The table also shows that company size was positively and 
significantly associated with discretionary total accruals (DTA) (13= 0.007, p<1%). 
This means that as company size increases, the company adopts income-increasing 
policies accruals. 
In addition, Table 4.9 shows in panel B (private company) that F-value (11.038) was 
significant at the one percent level, which indicates that the regression model was 
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statistically valid. The table also shows that company size was negatively and 
significantly linked to discretionary total accruals (DTA) (f3 = -0.009, p<1%). This 
means that as company size increases, the company adopts income-decreasing 
policies accruals. 
To sum up, from the above discussion, one can recognise that there are linkages 
between the direction of earnings management and both ownership nature and 
company Size. 
4.5 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has attempted to investigate the existence and the direction of earnings 
management in the unlisted companies (state-owned and private companies) in Libya 
by using discretionary accruals as a proxy to measure earnings management. Four 
different versions of the Modified Jones model were applied to generate firm specific 
coefficients. From the results of the four versions, this study used firm-specific 
coefficients that were generated from the version with the highest adjusted R2 to 
estimate the expected nondiscretionary accruals. Also, this study used secondary data 
from 87 unlisted companies, which include 45 state-owned and 42 private companies. 
Total and current accruals were computed by using the balance-sheet approach 
because some of the Libyan companies do not prepare cash flow statements, and a 
year-by-year regression (cross-sectional approach) was adopted to generate firm-
specific coefficients. 
The results of this study showed that Libyan companies are engaged in earnings 
management by using both income-increasing and income-decreasing policies 
accruals. In order to investigate the direction of earnings management, the whole 
sample was divided into two sub-samples regarding the nature of ownership (state-
owned and private companies). The results showed that the majority of the companies 
that adopted income-increasing policies accruals were state-owned companies. 
However, the majority of the companies that adopted income-decreasing policies 
accruals were from the private companies group. 
In addition, the results of this chapter indicate that there is a relationship between the 
direction of earnings management and company size, which was measured by using 
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two regression models (one for state-owned companies and another for private 
companies). The results of the regression model of state-owned companies showed 
that company size was positively and significantly associated with discretionary total 
accruals. This means that as company size increases, the company adopts income-
increasing policies accruals. On the other hand, the results of the regression model of 
private companies showed company size was negatively and significantly linked to 
discretionary total accruals. This means that as company size increases, the company 
adopts income-decreasing policies accruals. 
As described in the literature review, Chapter Two (Section 2 .. 1.5), there are several 
methods which can be used to manage earnings. Also, as discussed in Chapter Two 
(Section 2.1.6) and Chapter Four (Section 4.4), there are different motivations that are 
behind practicing earnings management, which depend on the aims to be achieved. 
These motivations lead to practicing earnings management in two directions, which 
are income-increasing and income-decreasing. The next chapter provides the research 
findings derived from the questionnaire and interview data analysis to investigate two 
areas: firstly, it will investigate earnings management motivations in the Libyan 
corporations. Secondly, the most frequent techniques that have been used to practice 
earnings management in the Libyan corporations will be examined. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ANAL YSIS OF QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY AND 
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW FINDINGS RELATED TO EARNINGS 
MANAGEMENT MOTIVATIONS AND TECHENQUES 
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to present the results of both the questionnaire and the semi-
structured interview data that related to the background infonnation about 
respondents, and earnings management motivations and techniques. As mentioned in 
the methodology chapter, a questionnaire and semi-structured interview were utilised 
to collect data concerning the practice of earnings management in Libyan companies. 
For this purpose, six groups were asked to participate in this research through two-
stages; firstly, completing a questionnaire; secondly, participating in a semi-structured 
interview. These six groups consisted of external auditors, financial managers and 
senior accountants, internal auditors, lenders, tax officers and accounting academics. 
The main reason for choosing these groups is that all these groups should have 
expertise and knowledge from their daily work about earnings management and 
accounting manipUlation issues. More specifically, external auditors are a corporate 
safeguard as they monitor financial statements and they traditionally have the 
responsibility of discovering fraud in financial statements. Therefore, their opinions 
may have important implications for earnings management issues. Financial managers 
and internal auditors are expected to be conscious of the motivations and techniques 
behind the practice of earnings management in Libyan companies. Also, lenders and 
tax officers are expected to be aware of earnings management issues and the 
techniques that may be used to manipUlate financial statements because their main 
work is dealing with the infonnation of financial statements. Finally, academic 
respondents, who are specialised in accounting and financial management, are 
presumed to be familiar with the issues of earnings management because of their 
research into accounting issues, Also, some of them work as advisors for some Libyan 
companies and as external auditors. 
Additionally, identifying the perceptions of the six different groups could be useful to 
understand different aspects of earnings management in Libya, and comparisons 
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between these perceptions can be made to highlight any differences between them in 
order to enhance the understanding of the earnings management phenomenon in 
Libya, and as a result, it could be useful to improve the quality of financial statements 
in the Libyan environment. 
The aim of this chapter is to provide the overall findings derived from both the 
questionnaire and semi-structured interviews, which related to the background 
information about respondents and earnings management motivations and techniques. 
The analysis and discussion of the findings are presented on a section-by-section basis 
as appeared in the rationale to the questionnaire. The remainder of this chapter is 
divided into four sections: Section Two presents the descriptive statistics of the 
respondent's background information. Section Three provides detailed survey results 
about motivations behind practicing earnings management in Libyan companies. 
Section Four presents detailed survey results pertaining to earnings management 
techniques. 
5.2 Descriptive Statistics of Respondents and Background Information 
As mentioned above, the questionnaire was distributed to six groups, which included 
external auditors, financial managers and senior accountants, internal auditors, 
lenders, tax officers and accounting academics. A total of 500 copies of the 
questionnaire were distributed to the different respondents groups who participated in 
this study. Of these 500 questionnaires, 318 were returned and 302 of them were 
completed fully and could be used for data collection. Therefore, the analysis of data 
in this study was based on 302 copies, which is a response rate of 60.4 percent as 
shown in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 provides the number of distributed questionnaires and final response rate 
classified into the six groups who participated in this study. It can be seen from this 
table that the highest rate of response was from accounting academics with a response 
rate of 70.2 percent, whereas the response rate from the financial managers and senior 
accountants group and the internal auditors group were lower than other groups at 
52.7 percent and 54.16 percent respectively. 
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Table (5.1): Responses to the questionnaire 
Issued Received and used Response 
Description rate (%) 
No (%) No (%) 
1. External Auditors 102 20.4 65 21.5 63 .10 
2. Financial Managers/ Senior 110 22 58 19.2 52.70 
Accountants 
3. Internal Auditors 96 19.2 52 17.2 54.16 
4. Lenders 58 Il.6 38 12.6 65.50 
5. Tax Officers 50 10 30 10 60 
6. Accounting Academics 84 16.8 59 19.5 70.20 
Total 500 100 302 100 60.40 
Table 5.2 presents respondents' working experience (in years). According to this 
table, it can be seen that 1.3 percent of respondents had working experience less than 
one year, and 98.7 percent of respondents had working experience of at least one year. 
17.2 percent of respondents had working experience between one and five years, 34.1 
percent had experience in their field between six and ten years, 26.2 percent had 
working experience between ten to 15 years, and 21.2 percent of respondents had 
more than 15 years working experience. Consequently, most respondents had working 
experience of more than six years at a rate of 81.5 percent. 
a e espon T bI (52) R d ents expenence 
Description External Financial Internal Lenders Tax Aecountin Total 
Auditor hnagers/ Auditors Officers g 
enior Academics 
Accountants 
No % No % No % No % No % No % No % 
Less than 
One year I 1.5 I 1.7 1 1.9 - - 1 3.3 . - 4 1.3 
1-5 years 
16.7 9 15.3 10 15.4 7 12.1 13 25.0 8 21.1 5 52 17.2 
6-10 year 
18 27.7 27 46.6 16 30.8 13 34.2 13 43.3 16 27.1 103 34.1 
11-15 years 
18 27.7 10 17.2 11 21.2 10 26.3 6 20.0 24 40.7 79 26.2 
Morc than 
IS years 18 27.7 13 22.4 11 21.2 7 18.4 5 16.7 10 16.9 64 21.2 
Table 5.3 shows that 7.6 percent of respondents had a diploma degree, 48.3 percent 
had gained a Bachelor's degree 29.1 percent% had a Master's degree, of which 28.4 
percent were financial managers and senior accountants. 14.9 percent had gained a 
doctoral degree, and more than half of them were from the accounting academics 
group. 
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Table (5.3): Respondents ' educational qualification 
External Financial Internal Lenders Tax Accounting Total 
Auditor Manager Auditors Officers Academics De cription enior 
Accountants 
No % No % No % No % No 0/0 No % No % 
Diploma 
3 4.6 5 8.6 5 9.6 5 13.2 5 16.7 -
- 23 7.6 
Bachelor 
De2ree 39 60.0 28 48.3 34 65.4 20 52.6 18 60.0 7 11.9 146 48.3 
Master 
Degree 18 27.7 25 43.1 13 25.0 13 34.2 5 16.7 14 23.7 88 29.1 
Doctoral 
Degree 5 7.7 - - -
. 
-
. 2 6.7 38 64.4 45 14.9 
Other 
- - - - - - - - -
- - - - -
Table 5.4 shows an analysis of respondents by their educational specialisation. It can 
be seen from this table that 68.2 percent of the respondents possessed an accounting 
background. The remainder had backgrounds in finance (16.9 percent), management 
(12.3 percent) and economics (2.6 percent). 
a e T bi (54) R d espon ent s e d ucattona specl Isa Ion 
Eternal Financial Internal Lenders Ta.x Accountin Total 
Auditors Manager Auditors Officers g 
De criplion enior Academics 
Accountants 
No % No % No % No % No % No % No % 
Accounting 55 84.6 37 63.8 39 75.0 21 55.3 18 60.0 36 61.0 20 68. 
6 2 
Finance 7 10.8 12 20.7 8 15.4 7 18.4 5 16.7 12 20.3 51 16. 
9 
Management 3 4.6 9 15.5 3 5.8 9 23.7 5 16.7 8 13.6 37 12. 
3 
Economics 
- - - -
2 3.8 1 2.6 2 6.7 3 5.1 8 2.6 
Othtr - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
5.3 Earning Management Motivations 
It was mentioned in the previous chapters that financial statements are very important 
to external and internal users to help them make their decisions. According to 
International Accounting Standard 1 (lAS 1), the purpose of accounting is to provide 
information about both the entity's financial performance and the fmancial position of 
the entity in order to assist decision-makers to make economic assessments. As 
described in the literature review, Chapter Two (Section 21.6), several empirical 
studies have examined motivations that are behind earnings management. Their 
results showed that earnings management might be practiced for several motivations, 
which depend on aims that want to be reached, such as increasing management 
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compensation (Healy, 1985; Watts & Zimmerman, 1986; Guidry et aI., 1999; Gaver et 
aI., 1995; Holthausen et aI., 1995), external contract requirements (Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1986; Duke & Hunk, 1990; DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney, 
1994; Jaggi & Lee, 2002), decreasing the value of tax payment (Baralexis, 2004; 
Noronha et aI., 2008) and job anxiety (Fudenberg & Tirol, 1995; DeFond & Park, 
1997). In this section, an attempt is made to discover the reasons underlying earnings 
management in Libyan unlisted companies (state-owned and private). Part two of the 
questionnaire investigated 11 motivations behind managing earnings reports which 
were provided in previous literature. Respondents were asked to indicate their level of 
agreement with each of motivations in the list on a Likert scale of 1 (strongly 
disagree), 2 (disagree), 3 (no view), 4 (agree), 5 (strongly agree). 
Table 5.S presents the results of the responses related to respondents' views on 
earnings management motivations in state-owned companies. It can be seen from the 
table 'to mitigate the threat of displacement (i.e. safeguard job position) and/or 
enhance their reputation' has the highest mean (4.28). Also, a total of is 85.1 percent 
of respondents from all six groups agreed or strongly agreed with this motivation. 
This result shows support to the studies of Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) and DeFond 
and Park (1997) that concerns about job security creates motivations for managers to 
manage earnings. 
Moreover, there was a significant difference in the responses of the six groups. by 
comparing the responses of the six groups a significant difference was appears among 
the respondent groups at the 5% level, with financial managers/senior accountants and 
internal auditors showing much higher level of agreement than other groups. This 
difference may be due to the fact that financial managers/senior accountants and 
internal auditors would be more anxious than other groups about their job anxiety, 
where 93.1 percent of financial managers/senior accountants and 94.2 percent of 
internal auditors (the groups internal to companies) agreed or strongly agreed that 
companies manage their earnings reports for this reason. However, the percentages of 
other groups, who are external to companies, were less than 87.8 percent for agreed or 
strongly agreed with this motivation. 
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Table (5.5): Overall Analysis of Earnings management Motivations in state-owned companies 
Level of agreement Overall Overall Level of 
Mean Rank significant 
Earnings Management Motivations Strongly Disagree No View Agree Strongly Score 
Disaeree Aeree 
No 0/0 No % No % No % No % 
1. To avoid reporting losses 8 2.6 68 22.5 6 2 162 53.6 58 19.2 3.64 5 .020 
2. To avoid reporting a decline 3 1 )0.3 203 67.2 40 13.2 26 8.6 2 0.7 2.22 9 .033 
3. To report profits 3 1 45 14.9 14 4.6 142 47 98 32.5 3.95 2 .000 
4. To sustain last year' s profit 24 7.9 192 63.6 38 12.6 43 14.2 5 1.7 2.38 7 .001 
performance 
5. To increase the value of management - - 67 22.2 8 2.6 133 44 94 31.1 3.84 3 .000 
compensation 
6. To meet regulatory objectives 2 0.7 70 23.2 20 6.6 117 38.7 93 30.8 3.76 4 .343 
7. To enhance the chances of obtaining 32 10.6 219 72.5 23 7.6 26 8.6 2 0.7 2.16 10 .418 
bank loans 
8. To meet predetermined expectations 7 2.3 159 52.6 15 5 94 31.1 27 8.9 2.92 6 .419 
(budgets) 
9. To decrease the amount of taxes 21 7 222 73.5 16 5.3 34 11.3 9 3 2.30 8 .589 
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Table (5.5) continued 
Level of aercement Overall Overall Level of 
Earnings Management Motivations Strongly Disagree No View Agree Strongly Mean Rank significant 
Disae:ree Ae:ree Score 
No % No % No % No 0/0 No % 
10. To mitigate the threat of displacement 
(i.e safeguard job position) and/or - - 32 10.6 13 4.3 95 31.5 162 53 .6 4.28 I .000 
enhance their reputation 
11. To increase information value 86 28.5 180 59.6 22 7.3 14 4.6 - - 1.88 II .289 
Notes: 
- The responses were reported on a 5-point scale ranking from: 1 (Strongly Disagree), 2 (Disagree), 3 (No View), 4 (Agree), 5 (Strongly Agree). 
- A significance Level: P value (probability) <0.05 that means there are significant differences between at least two groups from the six groups 
of respondents. 
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Table 5.5 shows that the second, third and fourth motivations for practicing earnings 
management were 'to report profits', 'to increase the value of management 
compensation', and 'to meet regulatory objectives' with overall mean score (3.95), 
(3.84), and (3.76), respectively. Also, 79.5 percent, 75.1 percent and 69.5 percent, 
respectively, in total from all six groups agreed or strongly agreed with these 
motivations. There was a significant difference in the responses of the six groups for 
the motivation 'to report profits' (at the 5% level). By comparing the responses of the 
six groups, it appears that lenders and tax officers showing much lower levels of 
agreement than other groups, possibly due to their daily work. Firstly, lenders deal 
with the financial statements of companies that attempt to get loans and because state-
owned companies in the Libyan environment are supported by the government, these 
kinds of companies usually do not attempt to get loans from the banks or any external 
financing. Moreover, Table 5.5 shows that the motivation 'to enhance the chances of 
obtaining bank loans' was at the end of the motivations rank and there was no 
significant difference in the responses from the groups of respondents. 
Secondly, companies that manage their earnings reports due to tax motivation 
decrease their income taxes. Therefore, tax officers showed much lower levels of 
agreement than the other groups with the motivation 'to report profits'. Moreover, it 
can be seen from Table 5.5 that the reason 'to decrease the amount of taxes' was in 
rank eight of 11 of earnings management motivations and there was no significant 
difference in the responses from ail six groups of respondents. This result is supported 
by Noronha et al. (2008), who found that state-owned companies had stronger 
motivations than tax decreases to manage their earnings. 
As presented above, the desire to mitigate the threat of displacement (i.e. safeguard 
job position) and/or enhance their reputation was the first ranked motivation, 
reflecting support for prior literature findings (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995; DeFond & 
Park, 1997; Noronha et aI., 2008) that concern about job security creates motivations 
for practicing earnings management. The second ranked motivations for earnings 
management was 'to report profits', and the third motivation was 'To increase the 
value of management compensation', which is consistent with Healy (1985); Gaver et 
al. (1995); Guidry et aI. (1999); and Holthausen et aI. (1995). Meeting regulatory 
objectives was the fourth ranked motivation. The top-four ranked motivations for 
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earnings management are in general linked together, because achieving large profits is 
not the main objective of state-owned companies in Libya in general. Therefore, 
when state-owned companies achieve a small percentage of profits, it shows good 
management performance. This in turns leads to achieving job security, increasing 
management compensation and meeting regulatory objectives. Moreover, avoiding 
reporting losses was ranked fifth, which reflects support for the previous commentary. 
During the interview survey stage of this study, the issue of earnings management 
motivations was raised with respondents. Most of the interviewees showed support for 
the previous results. The financial manager in a company from the state-owned sector 
pointed out that: 
"In my view, many management of state-owned companies practice earnings 
management since they want to safeguard their job position, enhance their 
reputation, and increase the value of their compensation, which can be 
reached by avoiding reporting losses and by reporting profits. Other 
motivations are minor and do not have too much influence on why the state-
owned companies engage in practising earnings management, such as the 
slale-owned companies in general do not use earnings management to 
decrease the amount of taxes since they want to avoid reporting losses and 
they want to reporting profits ". 
Confinning this view, a tax officer made the following remark: 
"In my experience, I can say that state-owned companies usually do not 
attempt tax evasion compared with private companies ". 
Moreover, a bank officer, who is working in the financing department, stated that: 
"In my experience, usually the state-owned companies in the Libyan 
environment do not attempt to get loans from the banks or any external 
financing because they are usually supported by the government". 
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Table 5.6 presents the results of the responses related to respondents' VIews on 
earnings management motivations in private companies. It can be seen from the table 
'to decrease the amount of taxes' has the highest mean (4.44). Also, a total of 92.l 
percent of respondents from all six groups agreed or strongly agreed with this 
motivation. Regarding this motivation there was no significant difference in the 
responses from the six groups of respondents. This result reflecting supports for prior 
literature findings (Beatty, 1995; Baralexis, 2004; Noronha et aI., 2008). 
The second motivation was 'to enhance the chance of obtaining bank loans'. Also, a 
total of 87.1 percent of respondents from all six groups agreed or strongly agreed with 
this motivation. In addition, there was significant difference (at the 5% level) in the 
responses of the six groups of respondents. By comparing the responses of the six 
groups, the result indicates that tax officers showing much lower levels of agreement 
than other groups , where 50 percent of tax officers were agreed or strongly agreed, 
compared to 82.8 percent and above in the other groups (see appendix 5). This is 
possibly due to the fact that they work as tax officers, which limits their experience to 
the situation of companies increasing their earnings. This result supports prior 
literature findings such as Watts and Zimmerman (1986). 
The third and fourth motivations for practicing earnings management were 'to avoid 
reporting losses' and 'to report profits', respectively. A total of 35.7 percent and 32.1 
percent from all six groups agreed or strongly agreed with these motivations, 
respectively. there were significant differences (at the 5% level) among the six groups 
of respondents, In addition, by comparing the responses of the six groups, it appears 
that lenders' opinions differed significantly from other groups and the former 
provided much higher levels of agreement, where 55.3 percent and 71.1 percent 
agreed or strongly agreed, respectively, compared to the responses of other groups (40 
percent and 33 percent) agreed or strongly agreed, respectively (see appendices 5). 
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Table (5.6): Overall Analysis of Earnings management Motivations in private companies 
Level of agreement Overall Overall Level of I 
Mean Rank significant I 
Earnings Management Motivations Strongly Disagree No View Agree Strongly Score 
Disaeree Aeree i 
No 0/0 No % No % No 0/0 No % 
1. To avoid reporting losses 26 9.6 148 49 20 6.6 84 27.8 24 7.9 2.77 4 .030 
2. To avoid reporting a decline 28 9.3 178 58.9 33 10.9 55 18.2 8 2.6 2.46 7 .307 
3. To report profits 17 5.6 152 50.3 36 11.9 67 22.2 30 9.9 2.80 3 .000 
4. To sustain last year's profit 19 6.3 147 48.7 40 13.2 85 28.1 11 3.6 2.74 5 .121 
performance 
5. To increase the value of management 67 22.2 2ll 69.9 11 3.6 12 4 1 OJ 1.9 10 .004 
compensation 
6. To meet regulatory objectives 38 12.6 165 54.6 34 11.3 61 20.2 4 1.3 2.43 8 .224 
7. To enhance the chances of obtaining 1 OJ 34 11.3 4 1.3 94 31.1 169 56 4031 2 .000 
bank loans 
8. To meet predetermined expectations 13 403 207 68.5 15 5 58 19.2 9 3 2.48 6 .159 
(budgets) 
9. To decrease the amount of taxes 1 OJ 20 6.6 3 1 98 32.5 ]80 59.6 4.44 1 .086 
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Table (5.6) continued 
Level of al?:reement Overall Overall Level of 
Earnings Management Motivations Strongly Disagree No View Agree Strongly Mean Rank significant 
Disal?:ree A!!ree Score 
No % No % No % No % No % 
10. To mitigate the threat of displacement 40 13 .2 173 57.3 20 6.6 64 21.2 5 1.7 2.41 9 .015 
(i.e safeguard job position) andlor 
enhance their reputation 
11. To increase infonnation value 81 26.8 186 61.6 23 7.6 12 4 - - 1.89 11 .143 
- ----
Notes: 
- The responses were reported on a 5-point scale ranking from : 1 (Strongly Disagree), 2 (Disagree), 3 (No View), 4 (Agree), 5 (Strongly Agree). 
- A significance Level: P value (probability) <0.05 that means there are significant differences between at least two groups from the six groups 
of respondents. 
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The motivation 'to mitigate the threat of displacement and/or enhance their 
reputation' and 'to increase the value of management compensation', as discussed 
previously in the literature in Chapter Two (Sections 2.1.6.5.2and 2.1.6.4, 
respectively), were ranked ninth and tenth, reflecting weak support for prior literature 
findings (Fudenberg & Tiorle, 1995; DeFond & Park, 1997; Healy, 1985; Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1986; Guidry et aI., 1999; Gaver et aI., 1995). This is possibly due to the 
fact that most Libyan private companies are family owned. The owners of these 
companies might be management. Therefore, these motivations were not ranked as the 
main earnings management motivations in Libyan private companies. 
During the interview, the motivations that are behind practicing earnings management 
in private companies were raised with respondents. The majority of interviewees 
indicated that Libyan private companies commit earnings management since they 
want to decrease the amount of taxes and enhance the chances of obtaining bank 
loans, which means these companies use both income-increasing and income-
decreasing techniques to achieve the aims behind earnings management. Other 
motivations are minor and do not have a great deal of influence on why private 
companies in Libya engage in earnings management. An internal auditor stated that: 
"The aim of using earnings management in private companies in the Libyan 
environment depends on the motivations behind that as some of the private 
companies practice earnings management for tax evasion, which means these 
companies use income-decreasing techniques to manage their earnings 
reports. However, others seek to enhance the chances of obtaining bank loans, 
and therefore, these companies use income-increasing techniques to manage 
their earnings reporting". 
Confinning this view, a bank officer, who is working in the financing department, 
made the following remark: 
"From my experience, one of the main aims that the private companies want 
to achieve by practicing earnings management (income-increasing) is to get 
loans from the banks or any external financing". 
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In addition, an academic stated that: 
"Libya is a country emerging from a conservative and traditional heritage, 
where the Islamic teaching (faith) plays a major role in shaping culture and 
relationships in the society. It is known that loans with interest are forbidden 
in the Islamic religion. Therefore, the majority of private companies do not 
seek bank loans because the majority of banking loans in Libya are with 
interest. However, there are some companies which accept this service with 
interest. As result, in my view, Libyan private companies have more incentive 
to practice earnings management for tax evasion than to use it to enhance the 
chances of obtaining bank loans". 
In addition, a tax officer stated that: 
"Definitely, private companies in Libya commit earnings management 
(income-decreasing) to decrease the amount of taxes as seen by the large 
number of tax evasion cases that we have been faced with in the private 
sector ". 
It was mentioned in Chapter Two (2.1.7) that the extent of earnings management is 
affected by the environment in which a corporation operates and the kind of 
corporation it is. The environment may create conditions for practicing earnings 
management (Goncharov, 2005). Moreover, Noronha et al. (2008) stated that the issue 
which should be considered is how managers consider the importance of the 
motivations. Corporations are working in different environments with different 
variables. As a result, management will have different priorities on motivations. Also, 
they present two factors that influence motivation preferences, which are corporation 
size and the corporation ownership structure. This study was also concerned with one 
of these factors, the effect of ownership in the motivation preference. The above 
results from both state-owned and private companies' motivations reflect strong 
support for Wang (2006) and Noronha et at. (2008). It can be seen from a comparison 
between the motivations of state-owned and private companies that the motivation 
preference of earnings management in the Libyan environment is influenced by the 
ownership structure of the companies. 
160 
The majority of interviewees indicated that the ownership structure of the company 
has an effect on the earnings management motivations. An academic interviewee 
pointed out that: 
"In my view, earnings management motivations are influenced by the 
corporation ownership structure listed/unlisted companies or private/state-
owned companies). Each type of these companies has different conditions that 
lead the company to practise earnings management for different motivations 
and to achieve different goals". 
5.4 Earnings Management Techniques 
As presented in Chapter Two (Section 2.1.5), earnings management might be 
practiced by using several techniques. The accounting literature presents many 
different techniques that may be used to manage earnings, such as business 
combinations, revenue recognition, fixed assets, intangible assets, accounting changes 
and prior period adjustments, transfers of receivables, consolidations and equity/cost 
method and investments and leases (Scott, 1997; Dechow & Skinner, 2000; Mulford 
& Comiskey, 2002; Nelson et aI., 2002; SchitIit, 2002; Nelson et aI., 2003; Ortega & 
Grant, 2003; McKee, 2005; Ronen & Yaari, 2007; Noronha et al., 2008). An attempt 
is made in this section to derive respondents' experiences on the frequency of utilising 
such techniques in the Libyan environment. The questionnaire included a list of 
techniques that might be used to manage the figure of reported earnings. The 
respondents were asked to indicate their experiences of the frequency of using these 
techniques by Libyan companies, on a Likert scale of 1 (never), 2 (seldom), 3 
(sometimes),4 (usually), 5 (always). Table 7.7 presents the frequency of the earnings 
management techniques as perceived by the respondents. 
It can be seen from Table 5.7 that manipulation of the value of inventory was the most 
frequently used technique for practicing earnings management, and there was no 
significant difference among the six groups of respondents. 'Improper assets 
revaluation' and 'incorrect capitalising rather than expensing expenditures' were 
ranked second and third, respectively. For each of these two techniques, there were 
significant differences in the responses from the six groups of respondents. These 
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differences may be because of the level of experience of each group of respondents in 
the practical field. 
'Manipulation of accrual estimation', 'incorrect use of expenses on asset acquisition' 
and 'related-party transactions' were ranked fourth, fifth and sixth, respectively. Also, 
there were no significant differences among the six groups of respondents for 
'manipulation of accrual estimation' and 'related-party transactions' techniques. In 
contrast, there was a significant difference (at the level 5% of significance) in the 
responses from the six groups of respondents with 'incorrect use of expenses on asset 
acquisition' technique. The result revealed that tax officers' opinions differed 
significantly at the 5% level from other groups. Analysis of responses of each group 
shows that more than half of the tax officers (73.3 percent) perceived that this 
technique occurred either 'usually' or 'always', compared to other groups (less than 
48 percent), who classified it either 'usually' or 'always' (see appendices 5). Possibly, 
this difference is due to the experience of the tax officers working with decreasing 
earnings by companies that tried to reduce the value of tax payment. 
'Deferring recognition of expenses' and 'accelerating recognition of income' were 
ranked seventh and eighth, respectively. 'Accelerating recognition of expenses' and 
'deferring recognition of income' were ranked ninth and tenth, respectively. 
Moreover, it can be seen from Table 5.7 that the least frequent techniques for 
practicing earnings management in the Libyan environment were perceived to be 
'manipulation of investment classification between trading and available-for-sales 
investment to present unrealised gain or loss from valuation', 'manipulation of 
depreciation/mortification figures', 'manipulation of deferred tax, and manipulation of 
bad debts provision', respectively. 
During the interview, the earnings management techniques were discussed with 
respondents who participated in the interview. The interviewees mentioned the 
following issues which they had faced in their practical life: 
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Table (5.7): Overall Analysis of Earnings management techniques 
Level of agreement Overall Overall Level of 
Never Seldom Sometimes Usually Always Mean Rank sign ifica nee 
Earnings Management Techniques Score 
No % % No % No % No 0/0 
1. Accelerating recognition of income - - 8 19.9 154 51.2 67 22.3 20 66 3. 16 8 .000 
2. Deferring recognition of income 4 1.3 10 25 .8 152 50.2 59 19.5 9 3 2.97 10 .130 
3. Accelerating recognition of expenses 4 1.3 9 25.2 147 48.7 68 22.5 7 2.3 22.9 9 .757 
4. Deferring recognition of expenses I 3 7 19.2 153 50.7 68 22.5 22 7.3 3.17 7 .000 
5. Incorrect use of expenses on asset I 3 5 19.5 119 39.4 105 34.8 18 6 3.26 5 .003 
acquisition 
6. lncorrect capitalising rather than 4 1.3 3 14.2 114 37.7 97 32.1 44 14.6 3.44 3 .000 
expensing expenditures 
7. Manipulation of bad debts provision 243 80.5 20 15.6 5 1.7 5 1.7 2 0.7 1.26 20 .075 
8. Manipulation of the value of inventory 3 I 1 9.6 ]03 34.1 152 50.3 15 5 3.49 1 .170 
9. Manipulation of impairment of assets 53 17.5 13 41.1 110 36.4 14 4.6 1 0.3 2.29 13 .000 
10.Manipu/ationof depreciation! 213 70.5 18 22.5 13 4.3 7 2.3 ] 0.3 1.39 18 .0]8 
amortisation figures 
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Table (5.7) continued 
Level of agreement Overall Overall Level of 
Earnings Management Techniques Never Seldom Sometimes Usually Always Mean Rank significance 
No % No 0/0 No % No % No 0/0 Score 
11. Manipulation of deferred tax 221 73.2 19 23.8 6 2 3 1 - - 13.1 19 .093 
12. Manipulation of investment 195 64.6 17 26.2 25 8.3 3 I - - 1.46 17 .013 
classification between trading and 
available-for-sales investment to present 
unrealisedgain or loss from valuation 
13. Manipulation of accrual estimation 6 2 4 15.2 102 33.8 139 46 9 3 3.33 4 .931 
14. Manipulation of finance lease contract 71 23.5 14 49.3 65 21.5 13 4.3 4 1.3 2.11 14 .000 
to operating lease contract to avoid 
recording assets and liabilities 
15. Making inadequate provisions 108 35.8 16 53 25 8.3 7 2.3 2 0.7 1.79 16 .053 
16. Improper assets revaluation 5 1.7 2 7.3 125 41.4 128 42.4 22 7.3 3.46 2 .039 
17. Related-party transactions 1 0.3 6 19.9 116 38.4 III 36.8 14 4.6 3.25 6 .948 
18. Sale-and-Iease buy back transactions 7 2.3 11 28.8 147 48.7 36 11.9 25 8.3 2.95 11 .003 
19. Changing accounting policy 8 2.6 12 34.4 128 42.4 50 16.6 12 4 2.85 12 .017 
20. Classification in financial statements 88 29.1 15 59.9 26 8.6 7 2.3 - - 1.84 15 .000 
I 
Notes: 
- The responses were reported on a 5-point scale ranking from: 1 (Never), 2 (Seldom) 3 (Sometimes), 4 (Usually), 5 (Always). 
- A significance Level: P value (probability) <0.05 means there are significant differences between at least two groups from the six groups of 
respondents 
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An external auditor stated that: 
"In my view, earnings management techniques that might be used to manage 
earnings reporting in Libya depend on the motivations behind that. From my 
experience, manipulation of the value of inventory, incorrect capitalising 
recurrent expenditure, early recognition of income, and improper assets 
revaluation are the most frequent techniques utilised for managing earnings 
reporting. These techniques may effectively allow companies to increase their 
earnings reporting. However, other companies that seek to decrease the 
amount of taxes will use the techniques that enable them to decrease their 
earnings, such as delayed recognition of income ". 
Another external auditor remarked that: 
"From my experience, the techniques that are used by Libyan companies to 
manage their earnings include overstating the sales revenue before the end of 
the year, and re-recording these transactions as sales returns in the next year 
disclosing the inventory at the higher figure, and manipulating the work-in-
process and long term contracts especially in construction companies. Also, 
some private companies are using related party transactions to practice 
earnings management because most of them are family companies ". 
Moreover, most of the interviewees agree that Libyan companies rarely used 
techniques, such as manipulation of deferred tax, manipulation of investment 
classification, manipulation of bad debts provision and manipulation of 
depreciation/amortisation figures. Also, an academic interviewee stated that: 
"There are areas of flexibility within accounting standards used in Libya 
because these standards are a mixture of international accounting standards 
and American accounting standards, which are generally accepted by 
accountants in Libya. However, there is no specific law or specific 
professional accounting body that determines such standards. Therefore, 
Libyan companies have more flexibility to manage their earnings reporting". 
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In contrast, a tax officer remarked that: 
"Accounting income in the state-owned companies is measured in the same 
way as tax income. Therefore, the companies are obliged to prepare items of 
financial statements according to the requirements of the law. From my 
experience, the techniques of income-decrease usually used by private 
companies to decrease the amount of taxes include deferring recognition of 
income, accelerating recognition of expenses, and improper assets 
revaluation ". 
5.5 Summary and Conclusions 
The main objective of this chapter has been to investigate respondents' perceptions of 
the motivations behind the practice of earnings management in Libyan corporations, 
the most frequent techniques that are used to practise earnings management in Libyan 
corporations. A questionnaire and semi-structured interviews were used to obtain the 
data at this stage of this study. This chapter and the next chapter are based on 302 
usable responses to a questionnaire survey from 500 copies which were distributed to 
a number of external auditors, financial managers and senior accountants, internal 
auditors, lenders, tax officers and accounting academics. Furthermore, the 
questionnaire survey was combined with semi-structured interviews with 18 
interviewees, all of whom also answered the questionnaire. 
This chapter sought to investigate two issues related to the earnings management 
phenomenon in Libyan corporations. These issues were earnings management 
motivations in Libyan state-owned and private corporations, and the most frequent 
techniques used to practice earnings management. 
With regard to the earnings management motivations in the state-owned corporations, 
the top-four motivations were 'to mitigate the threat of displacement (i.e. safeguard 
job position) and/or enhance their reputation', 'to report profits', 'to increase the value 
of management compensation' and 'to meet regulatory objectives'. However, lower 
levels of agreement were given for the lower four motivations, which were 'to 
increase information value', 'to enhance the chances of obtaining bank loans', 'to 
avoid reporting a decline' and 'to decrease the amount of taxes' . 
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As regards earnings management motivations in private corporations, there was a high 
level of agreement with the statements that the main motivations to practice earnings 
management were 'to decrease the amount of taxes' and 'to enhance the chance of 
obtaining bank loans'. On the other hand, much lower levels of agreement for the 
other motivations were shown by the participants in this study. 
In addition, this study was also concerned about the effect of ownership in the 
motivation preference. The above results from both state-owned and private 
companies' motivations reflect strong support for the prior literature review. It can be 
seen from a comparison between the motivations of state-owned and private 
companies that the motivation preference of earnings management in the Libyan 
environment is influenced by the ownership structure of corporations. 
The most frequent techniques used to practice earnings management were 
'manipulation of the value of inventory', 'improper assets revaluation', 'incorrect 
capitalising rather than expensing expenditures', 'manipulation of accrual estimation', 
'incorrect use of expenses on asset acquisition' and 'and related-party transactions'. 
However, the techniques that were perceived to be the least frequent used were 
'manipulation of bad debts provision', 'manipulation of deferred tax', 'manipulation 
of depreciation/amortisation figures' and 'manipulation of investment classification 
between trading and available-for-sales investment to present unrealised gain or loss 
from valuation'. 
The next chapter provides the research findings derived from the questionnaire and 
interview data analysis to investigate the procedures which should be taken to 
constrain earnings management and improve the quality of financial reporting in 
Libyan corporations, which includes accounting standards, internal corporate 
governance and external audit quality. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
ANAL YSIS OF QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY AND 
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW FINDINGS RELATED TO EARNINGS 
MANAGEMENT CONSTRAINTS 
6.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide the overall findings derived from both the 
questionnaire and semi-structured interviews related to earnings management 
constraints in the Libyan environment. The analysis and discussion of the findings on 
the earnings management phenomenon in the Libyan environment are presented on a 
section-by-section basis as appeared in the rationale to the questionnaire. The 
remainder of this chapter is divided into two sections: Section Two provides detailed 
survey results about earnings management constraints, which include accounting 
standards, internal corporate governance mechanisms and external audit quality. 
Section Three presents a summary of the chapter's contents. 
6.2 Earnings Management Constraints in the Libyan Environment 
The main objective of corporate financial reports is to provide useful information to 
the users groups to enable them to evaluate the performance of the corporation and 
make informed decisions. Therefore, financial reports of low quality provide 
information that may lead to problems in the allocation of resources (Schipper & 
Vincent, 2003). Moreover, according to Leuz et a1. (2003), financial reports with 
extensive earnings management inaccurately reflect corporation performance and thus 
weaken users' ability to assess the corporation performance. Consequently, earnings 
management has a negative relationship with the quality of financial reports, when 
managers use earnings management opportunistically. Therefore, constraining 
earnings management will positively influence the quality of financial reports. 
Baralexis (2004) presents factors that influence the quality of financial reports, such 
as poor management performance, weak corporate governance structure, weak 
accounting profession, limited extent of external auditing and unsophisticated users. 
Levitt (1998) called for an action plan to improve the quality of financial reports by 
constraining earnings management. The action plan includes improving the 
accounting framework, enhancing outside auditing in the financial reporting process, 
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strengthening the audit committee process and pursuing cultural change on the part of 
corporate management. Also, Goncharov (2005) presents additional factors that 
constrict earnings management, such as political forces, culture, corporate 
governance, external auditing and accounting standards. 
In this section, an attempt is made to discover the actions that may be taken to 
constrict practicing earnings management by Libyan companies and improve the 
quality of financial reporting in the Libyan environment. Part four in the questionnaire 
investigated three factors provided by the literature, which might influence practicing 
earnings management and the quality of financial reporting in the Libyan 
environment. These factors were accounting standards, internal corporate governance 
mechanisms and external audit quality. In the next sections an attempt is made to 
derive respondents' experiences about constricting earnings management and 
improving the quality of financial reporting in the Libyan environment. 
6.2.1 Accounting Standards 
Accounting standards give managers different accounting choices, which managers 
can select from to prepare financial reports. As a result, financial reports may provide 
earnings with different quality. Earnings management is expected to be more 
extensive under flexible systems that leave a sufficient gap for making judgments 
(Goncharov, 2005). Several studies in the earnings management literature examine the 
relationship between earnings management and accounting standards, such as Yu 
(2004), Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005), Ball et al. (2003) and Jeanjean and Stolowy 
(2008). Part 4.1 of the questionnaire provided five actions concerning accounting 
standards that might help to reduce the practice of earnings management and improve 
the quality of financial reporting in the Libyan environment. Respondents were asked 
to indicate their level of agreement with each of the actions on the list on a Likert 
scale of 1 (strongly disagree), 2 (disagree), 3 (no view), 4 (agree), 5 (strongly agree). 
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Table (6.1): Overall Analysis of Earnings management Constraints/ Accounting Standards 
Accounting Standards Issues Level of agreement Overall Overall Level of 
Strongly Disagree No view Agree Strongly Mean Rank significant Score 
Disae:ree aeree 
No % No 0/0 No % No % No % 
I. Issuing more detailed accounting 3 I 10 3.3 2 0.7 187 61.9 100 33.1 4.23 I .772 
legislation 
2. Issuing accounting standards which 12 4 65 21.5 18 6 150 49.7 57 18.9 4.16 4 .51 0 
fit with Libyan environment 
3. Issuing standards aimed at specific 2 0.7 12 4 5 1.7 184 60.9 99 32.8 4.21 2 .436 
problems 
1 0.3 38 12.6 30 9.9 162 53.6 71 23.5 4.08 5 .234 
4. Increasing the level of disclosure 
2 0.7 12 4 6 2 186 61.6 96 31.8 4.20 3 .555 
5. Quarterly disclosure 
-
Notes: 
- The responses were reported on a 5-point scale ranking from: 1 (Strongly Disagree), 2 (Disagree), 3 (No View), 4 (Agree), 5 (Strongly Agree). 
- A significance Level: P value (probability) <0.05 that means there are significant differences between at least two groups from the six 
groups of respondents. 
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It can be seen from Table 6.1 that 'issuing more detailed accounting legislation' 
elicited the greatest level of agreement, with a total of 95 percent from all six groups 
of respondents stating that they either agree or strongly agree, with overall mean score 
of 4.23. 'Issuing standards aimed at specific problems', 'quarterly disclosure', and 
'issuing accounting standards which fit with the Libyan environment' were ranked 
second, third and fourth, respectively. A total of 93.7 percent, 93.4 percent and 86.1 
percent of respondents from all six groups agreed or strongly agreed, and with overall 
mean score 4.21, 4.20 and 4.16, respectively. The last action on the rank was 
'increasing the level of disclosure' with the lowest agreement from respondents, with 
an overall mean score 4.08, and 81.8 percent from all six groups agreed or strongly 
disagreed. With all actions there were no significant differences in the responses from 
the six groups of respondents. 
Moreover, it can be seen from Table 6.1 that the lowest mean score for these actions 
was 4.08. This reflected that the participants of this study felt that the right way to 
restrict earnings management in the Libyan environment is by using all identified 
actions in Table 8.1 collectively. This result was supported by comments that were 
given by the interviewees that the accounting standards are not the only solution to 
restrict earnings management and improve the quality of the financial reporting in 
Libya. This result showed support for the findings of Ball et a1. (2003) and Jeanjean 
and Stolowy (2008), who argue the relationship between the quality of financial 
reports and accounting standards. The authors provide results that show it is 
impossible for countries with low quality accounting standards to have high quality 
financial reports. On the other hand, high quality accounting standards do not 
guarantee restriction of earnings management and financial reports with high quality. 
The data obtained from the interview stage regarding this part will be discussed in 
Section 6.5.2.1. 
6.2.2 Internal Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
6.2.2.1 Greater Reliance on Internal Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
As mentioned in Chapter Four (Section 2.2.4), earnings management gives managers 
opportunities to manage a corporation's performance in a way that depends on their 
motivations. Academic researchers have found a positive relationship between 
weaknesses in corporate governance and poor financial reporting quality on the one 
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hand and weaker internal controls, financial statement fraud and earnings 
manipulation on the other (e.g. Beasley, 1996; Dechow et aI., 1996). Corporations 
with good corporate governance mechanisms may restrict the possibility of managing 
earnings reports (Rezaee, 2002). The internal corporate governance structure includes 
an independent and competent board of directors, an effective audit committee, an 
effective internal audit function and legal protection. However, it is widely accepted 
that there are distinct corporate governance differences between countries. The three 
basic differences are orientation, ownership concentration and time horizon of 
economic relationships (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Also, it should be noted that the 
Libyan case is different from developed countries because the ownership structures of 
corporations in Libya are largely determined by unlisted companies, which are state 
and family owned. Therefore, the objective of this section is to introduce some 
elements of internal corporate governance mechanisms to the Libyan environment 
that could help to restrict earnings management and improve the quality of financial 
reporting and facilitate improvements in corporations' performance. A list of these 
internal corporate governance mechanisms was provided in the questionnaire part 4.2. 
Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with each of the actions 
on the list on a Likert scale of 1 (strongly disagree), 2 (disagree), 3 (no view), 4 
(agree), 5 (strongly agree). 
Table 6.2 provides a summary of the overall mean score of the respondents' 
perceptions toward the greater reliance on internal corporate governance actions. As 
can be seen from the table, 'the existence of an effective audit committee' has the 
highest overall mean 4.28, with 98 percent of all groups of respondents agreeing or 
strongly agreeing. 'The existence of an effective internal audit function' was the 
second ranked action with 95.4 percent of all groups of respondents pointing out they 
are either agree or strongly agree, and overall mean score was 4.27. 'The existence of 
an independent and competent of directors' was the last action with overall mean 
score 4.25, with a total of 94.8 percent of all six groups of respondents indicating that 
they either agree or strongly agree. 
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Table (6.2) Greater reliance on internal corporate governance mechanisms 
corporate governance mechanisms Level of agreement Overall Overall Level of 
Strongly Disagree No view Agree Strongly Mean Rank significance 
Disaeree ae:ree 
Score 
No % No 0/0 No % No % No 0/0 
1. The existence of an effective audit - - 2 0 .7 4 13 203 67.2 93 30.8 4.28 I .301 
committee 
2. The existence of an effective internal - - 6 2 8 2.6 186 61.6 102 33.8 4.27 2 . 161 
audit function 
3. The existence of an independent and - - 6 2 10 3.3 188 62.3 98 32.5 4.25 3 .376 
competent board of directors 
--
Notes: 
- The responses were reported on a 5-point scale ranking from: 1 (Strongly Disagree), 2 (Disagree), 3 (No View), 4 (Agree), 5 (Strongly Agree). 
- A significance Level: P value (probability) <0.05 that means there are significant differences between at least two groups from the six 
groups of respondents. 
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There were no significant differences in the responses from all six groups of 
respondents. The participants of this study felt that the right way to restrict earnings 
management in Libya is by using all identified actions in Table 6.2 collectively. This 
result was supported by comments that were given by the interviewees that actions 
presented in Table 6.2 should be taken together to restrict earnings management and 
improve the quality of the financial reporting in Libya. 
During the interview stage, several comments received were from the different types 
of interviewee. Most of them mentioned actions which should be taken together to 
restrict earnings management and improve the quality of the financial reporting in the 
Libyan environment. The suggested actions are as follows: 
- Establishing specific professional accounting body dealing with the accounting 
issues. 
- Establishing an accounting oversight board which should be set as a top priority to 
reorganising of the accounting profession in Libya and enhancing of the 
professionalism of accountants. 
- Establishing and developing accounting legislation to eliminate any difficulties that 
prevent improvement of financial statements quality. 
- Issuing Libyan accounting standards or following international standards in order to 
establish a unified accounting framework that covers all accounting issues. Also, these 
standards should be reviewed regularly in order to include any issues that may occur 
during the practical practice. 
- Increasing the level of disclosure and setting non-financial disclosure requirement in 
law. 
- Creating and using effective internal corporate governance mechanisms collectively 
(in terms of the existence of an effective board of directors, the existence of an 
effective audit committee and the existence of an effective internal audit function). 
_ Guarding the independence and impartiality of all parties of internal corporate 
governance mechanisms. 
_ Establishing a specific mechanism to prosecute any person, such as the board of 
directors or internal auditor, who deliberately manages earnings reports. 
In addition to the previous actions, other points related to external audit will be 
discussed in Section 6.2.3. 
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6.2.2.2 The Existence of an Effective Audit Committee 
6.2.2.2.1 Audit committee functions 
The importance of the audit committee has been highlighted in the recommendations 
of corporate governance guidelines. The main functions regarding the activities that 
should be performed by the audit committee and that were suggested in the literature 
review as provided in Chapter Four (Section 2.2.4.3) are: (1) oversight of financial 
statements; (2) oversight of external auditors; and (3) oversight of the internal control 
systems (e.g. Wolnizer, 1995; Burke & Guy, 2001). The audit committee's 
responsibilities can be classified into four main areas. Firstly, there is oversight ofthe 
financial statement, which includes considering both significant accounting policies 
and any changes to them, and any significant estimates and judgments, assisting 
directors in discharging their statutory responsibilities as regards financial reporting, 
reviewing financial statements with management and the external auditors, and 
disclosure of financial and non-financial tran'sactions and related information 
presented with the financial statements. Secondly, the audit committee should 
evaluate and review the corporation's internal control procedures, and monitor and 
review the effectiveness of the internal audit function to prevent or detect fraudulent 
activities or irregularities, and improve communication between the board and 
external auditors. Thirdly, it should review the qualifications, independence and 
performance of the external auditor, review and discuss with management and the 
external auditor the annual audited financial statements and other financial 
information, to develop and implement policy on the engagement of the external 
auditor to supply non-audit services, and coordinate the work of internal and external 
auditors, and improve communicational between the board and external auditors. 
Finally, the audit committee should report findings to the board of directors and 
strengthen the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors. 
Part 4.2.2.1 of the questionnaire aimed to elicit respondents' perceptions of the audit 
committee functions. A list of 15 possible functions, which could be performed by an 
effective audit committee, was presented in this part of the questionnaire. The aim of 
that was to elicit respondents' views on audit committee functions, which may assist 
in improving the quality of the financial reporting and restrict earnings management 
in the Libyan environment. Respondents were asked to indicate their view of the level 
of importance of each of the functions in the list on a five-point Likert scale of 1 (not 
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important at all), 2 (not important), 3 (little of importance), 4 (important), 5 
(extremely important). 
Table 6.3 presents the analysis of respondents' views about audit committee functions. 
It can be seen from the table that the most important audit committee functions were: 
'reviewing significant changes in accounting policies and practices', 'reviewing the 
internal control system', 'reviewing the independence of the internal audit 
department' and 'overseeing the scope of internal and external audit activities' (with 
overall mean scores of 4.53, 4.33, 4.21, and 3.96, respectively). Also, 94.4 percent, 
83.8 percent, 84.1 percent and 74.5 percent in total, respectively, from all six groups 
of respondents, recorded these functions as important or extremely important. 
As discussed in Chapter Five (Section 5.4), changes in accounting policies and 
practices is one of the techniques that is frequently used to manage the earnings 
reporting in Libyan companies. Additionally, this result suggests that the audit 
committee should pay more attention when reviewing significant changes in 
accounting policies and practices because these may be frequently manipulated by 
companies. 
The second and third important functions were related to internal control system 
(reviewing the internal control system, reviewing the independence of the internal 
audit department). This result reflects how much importance was attached to the 
effectiveness and improvement of the internal audit function in the point of view of 
respondents due to the fact that an effective internal control system may guarantee 
that every function in the system of the company is working properly, which might be 
helpful to restrain the practice of earnings management and improve the quality of 
financial statements as suggested by CCR (1992) and Cohen et al. (2002). Moreover, 
regular review and monitoring of the internal control system by audit committee 
members may give them more understanding of the client's business and operations, 
and more opportunities to discover earnings management (Bishop et aI., 2000). In 
addition, the fourth important function was 'overseeing the scope of internal and 
external audit activities'. This result with the second and third functions (which were 
reviewing the internal control system, reviewing the independence of the internal 
audit department) show support for the results of DeZoort (1997), who investigated 
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the responsibilities of audit committee in issues related to corporate governance, 
auditing and financial reporting. His results showed that the evaluation of the internal 
control system was ranked consistently by committee members as the most important 
function, with financial statement review and the evaluation of internal auditor and 
external auditor considered highly important. 
It can also be seen from Table 6.3 that the two least important functions were review 
of the audited financial statements and the interim reports. In addition, the results 
presented in Table 8.3 showed that there were no significant differences in the 
responses from all six groups of respondents with the first, second and third functions. 
Whereas, there was significant difference between the respondent groups for the 
fourth function, which was possibly due to external auditors' fear of being controlled 
by the audit committee. 
In this particular study, comments were received during the interview stage. Most of 
them expressed the respondents' views on the audit committee function that it was 
responsible for performing the following functions: 
- reviewing the company's internal control system and the independence of the 
internal audit department. Also, oversight of the internal auditor's reports and the 
procedures that were taken to deal with the recommendations made by the internal 
auditor. 
- Reviewing the company's accounting policies and practices and any significant 
changes in them. 
- Overseeing the scope of external audit activities and the independence of the 
external auditor. 
- Discussing the non-audit services fees with external auditor. 
- Reviewing the financial statements before presenting them to the board of directors. 
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-Level of agreement Overall Overall Level of 
Not Important at Not Little of Extremely Mean Rank significance 
Audit Committee Function all Important importance Important Important Score 
No % No 0/0 No % No % No % 
1. Reviewing the corporation's - - 9 3 115 38.1 140 46.4 38 12.6 3.69 8 .844 
accounting policies and practices 
2. Reviewing significant changes - - 2 0.7 15 5 105 34.8 180 59.6 4.53 1 .407 
In accounting policies and 
practices 
3. Reviewing the audited financial - - 96 31.8 28 9.3 150 49.7 28 9.3 3.36 14 .362 
statement 
4. Reviewing the interim reports 39 12.9 180 59.6 47 15.6 25 8.3 11 3.6 2.30 15 .259 
5. Reviewing the corporation' s - - 5 1.7 44 14.6 99 32.8 154 51 4.33 2 .348 
internal control system 
6. Reviewing significant - - 23 7.6 III 36.8 116 38.4 52 17.2 3.65 10 .212 
transactions outside the 
corporation' s normal business 
7. Reviewing related party 1 0.3 19 6.3 73 24.2 157 52 52 17.2 3.79 5 .593 
transactions 
8. Monitoring compliance with - - 14 4.6 119 39.4 124 41.1 45 14.9 3.66 9 .766 
accounting standards 
9. Overseeing the scope of internal - - 8 2.6 69 22.8 152 50.3 73 24.2 3.96 4 .000 
and external audit activities 
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Table (6.3) continued 
Level of agreement Overall Overall Level of 
Mean Rank significance 
Audit Committee Function Not Important at Not Little of Extremely Score 
all Important importance Important Important 
No % No % No % No % No % 
10. Holding frequent meetings - - 20 6.6 90 29.8 150 49.7 42 13.9 3.71 7 .137 
with internal and external auditors 
to discuss any_problems arising 
11. Reviewing the independence - - 19 6.3 29 9.6 125 41.4 192 42.7 4.21 3 .183 
of the internal audit department 
12. Reviewing audit fee - - 65 21.5 43 14.2 130.43 64 64 21.2 3.64 11 .888 
13. Reviewing types and fee of - - 71 23.5 45 14.9 119 39.4 67 22.2 3.60 12 .990 
non-audit services by external 
auditors 
14. Reviewing the independence - - 66 21.9 38 12.6 152 50.3 46 15.2 3.59 13 .939 
and objectivity of the external 
auditor 
IS. Ascertaining whether proper - - 65 21.5 11 3.6 157 52 69 22.8 3.76 6 .726 
action is taken to deal with the 
recommendations made by the 
internal auditor 
Notes: 
- The responses were reported on a 5-point scale ranking from: 1 (Not Important at all), 2 (Not Important), 3 (Little of importance), 4 (Important), 
5 (Extremely Important). 
- A significance Level: P value (probability) <0.05 that means there are significant differences between at least two groups from the six groups of 
respondents. 
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An external auditor emphasised that there are many benefits derived from applying an 
effective audit committee. He stated that: 
"In my personal opinion, there are many benefits which will be derived from 
applying an effictive audit committee, such as monitoring and reviewing the 
internal control system regularly by audit committee members may give more 
opportunities to detect any practice of earnings management. Also, the 
communication between external auditor and the members of the audit 
committee may benefit the company because: firstly, an effective audit 
committee will support external auditors in front of the board of directors. 
Secondly, the committee might help the external auditor to discover new issues 
from their questions during meetings, and identify and solve these issues. 
Thirdly, the members of the audit committee may have in-depth information 
that may help the external auditor to get a better understanding of the 
company's business. However, if the audit committee is not effective (if there 
is no clear framework of audit committee members' duties or it is clearly 
stated but the members of the audit committee may not practice their duties 
appropriately) that may put pressure on the external auditors". 
6.2.2.2.2 Attributes of audit committee members 
As stated in the literature review in Chapter Tow (Section 2.2.4.3), several 
recommendations have been suggested to enhance the effectiveness of the audit 
committee in order to detect earnings management and improve the quality of the 
financial statements. According to CCR (1992), the members of an audit committee 
should be independent from non-executive directors and at least three members of the 
audit committee should be financially literate. Moreover, a significant amount of 
literature suggests that audit committee members should be independent from non-
executive directors and financially literate (DeZoort, 1997; McDaniel et aI., 2002; 
DeZoort et aI., 2002). Also, the international bodies of corporate government, such as 
the BRC Report and Recommendations in the US (1999), and National Association of 
Corporate Directors (2000), provided various recommendations that members of an 
audit committee should have certain types of knowledge, which are an understanding 
of how business activities are presented in financial statements and the ability to 
analyse these statements, and an understanding of the nature and purposes of the 
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financial statement audit. They also stressed that at least one member should have 
accounting or related financial management expertise. 
In this section, this study tried to elicit respondents' views on the attributes of the 
audit committee. A list of four attributes was provided in the questionnaire, (part 
4.2.2.2). Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with each of the 
attributes on the list on a Likert scale of 1 (strongly disagree), 2 (disagree), 3 (no 
view), 4 (agree), 5 (strongly agree). 
Table 6.4 presents an analysis of respondents' views on how far they believe the 
attributes of an audit committee are expected to improve the effectiveness the audit 
committee and help to restrict earnings management. It can be seen from the table that 
the majority of the respondents from all six groups agreed or strongly agreed that 
knowledge and experience of accounting or other related subjects was the most 
important attribute of audit committee members. A total of 97 percent of the 
respondents either agreed or strongly agreed that knowledge and experience of 
accounting helps to increase the communication with external and internal auditors 
(with overall mean score of 4.48). This result showed support to prior literature that 
external auditors and audit committee members should communicate regularly on 
several issues to reduce misstatements between both of them (SET, 1990; leT AA T, 
2000). There was a significant difference in the responses from the six groups of 
respondents in terms of this attribute. The results indicated that external auditors 
opinions differed significantly from other groups (at the 5%level), where external 
auditors showed a lower level of agreement with this statement (see appendix 5). 
Possibly this was due to external auditors observing that it is difficult to put this 
communication into practice. Also, a total of 92.7 percent of the respondents either 
agreed or strongly agreed that knowledge and experience of accounting helps in 
constraining earnings management and improves the quality of financial statements 
(with overall mean score of 4.41). 'Independence from the executive directors' was 
ranked as the second most important attribute as a total of 93 percent of the 
respondents either agreed or strongly agreed (with overall mean score of 4.40). There 
were no significant differences in the responses from all six groups of respondents on 
this attribute. 
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- ---- \. - ----- --- - - - -- -
Attributes Of Audit Committee Level of agreement Overall Overall Levelof 1 
Members Strongly Disagree No view Agree Strongly Mean Rank significance I Score 
Disa2ree aeree 
No % No % No % No % No % 
I. The existence of accounting and .406 
auditing experts in the audit committee 
will: 
A- Help in constraining - - 13 4.2 9 3 120 39.7 160 53 4.41 
earnmgs management and 
improve the quality of 
financial reports I 
-
B- Help In increasing the 1 OJ 8 2.6 - - 129 42.7 164 5403 4.48 .000 
communication with external 
and internal auditors 
2. independence from the executive 1 OJ 15 5 5 1.7 123 40.7 158 5203 4.40 2 .739 
directors will help in reducing the 
opportunity to manipulate financial 
reports 
3. Knowledge about the corporation' s 4 1.3 75 24.8 45 14.9 154 51 24 7.9 3.39 3 .699 
activities 
4. Integrity and sound judgment and 17 5.6 170 56.3 41 13.6 58 19.2 16 5.3 2.62 4 .605 
Personal qualities 
Notes: 
- The responses were reported on a 5-point scale ranking from: 1 (Strongly Disagree), 2 (Disagree), 3 (No View), 4 (Agree), 5 (Strongly Agree). 
- A significance Level: P value (probability) <0.05 that means there are significant differences between at least two groups from the six 
groups of respondents. 
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The aforementioned results appear to highlight the importance of knowledge and 
experience, and of independence from the executive directors, as the most important 
accounting attributes of the audit committee members. Knowledge about the 
corporation's activities, and integrity and sound judgment and personal qualities, were 
ranked fourth and fifth attributes, respectively (with overall mean score of 3.39 and 
2.62, respectively). 
The following is a comment received during the interview stage. An academic 
interviewee remarked that: 
"In my opinion, the most important things to enhance the effectiveness of the 
audit committee are that the members of the audit committee should be 
independent from non-executive directors, have primary knowledge about the 
company's business, able to devote the necessary time, and have financial 
backgrounds that help them to have good communication with external 
auditors ". 
6.2.2.3 The Existence of an Effective Internal Audit Function 
As pointed out in Chapter Two (Section 2.2.4.4), several studies have suggested a 
number of functions that could be performed by the internal auditor. Significant 
empirical studies show that internal auditing plays an important role in external 
financial reporting and restricting earnings management, and it is part of the solution 
to the perceived control, reporting and ethical problems in the corporate sector 
(Coram et aI., 2008). Eigbme and Cashell (2002) mention that internal auditors can 
assist in reducing earnings management by performing two functions, which are (1) 
evaluating the effectiveness of relevant internal controls and risk management 
processes, and (2) supporting the audit committee and management in evaluating 
earnings management risks. Basel Committee (2000) argued that the work of internal 
auditing activities can be categorised into two main streams: first, as an important part 
of internal control; second, internal auditors play an important role in the audit of 
financial statements by providing assistance to external auditors. In addition, the BRC 
on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (1999) pointed out 
that the internal auditor plays a significant role in working with management, the 
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audit committee and the external auditor in ensuring the effectiveness of internal 
controls and in bringing any weaknesses to the attention of the appropriate parties. 
Furthennore, Krislmamoorthy (2002) indicated that external auditors usually check 
and evaluate the internal control structure and the internal audit function. Therefore, 
good communication and coordination of the internal and external auditors could 
improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the auditing process. Edge and Farley 
(1991) mention two major benefits to the external auditor of utilising the work of the 
internal auditor, which are: (I) reducing the time taken for the audit and the cost of the 
external audit; and (2) improving the quality of the external audit function because the 
internal auditor examines in more depth the internal control system and has a better 
knowledge of the client accounting system. Braiotta and Marsh (1992) explain that 
internal auditors are responsible for reviewing, assessing and monitoring the internal 
control structure, policies and procedures. Also, an effective internal auditing function 
will provide the external auditor with the necessary infonnation about the design and 
effectiveness of the entity's internal control policies and procedures and help them to 
assess the control risk and the extent of their substantive procedures. 
Consistent with the above requirements, the questionnaire survey in part 4.2.3 
presented a list of main functions that could be perfonned by internal auditors. 
Respondents were asked to indicate their level of importance with each of the 
functions in the list on a five-point Likert scale of 1 (not important at all), 2 (not 
important), 3 (little of importance), 4 (important), 5 (extremely important). 
Table 6.5 presents an analysis of respondents' perceptions on the importance of 
internal auditor functions. As shown in the table, the most important function that 
should be performed by an effective internal audit is 'evaluating and monitoring the 
effectiveness of the internal control system' (with an overall mean score of 4.69), and 
all respondents from all six groups recording this function as important or extremely 
important. 
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I Internal Auditor Functions Level of agreement Overall Overall Level of 
Not Important at Not Little of Extremely Mean Rank significance 
Important importance Important Important Score 
No % No % No % No % No 0/0 
I. Evaluating the effectiveness of the - - - - - - 93 30.8 209 69.2 4.69 1 .094 
internal control system 
2. Reviewing whether or not - - - - 4 1.3 138 45.7 160 53 4.52 2 .057 
management has consistent treatment 
for similar transactions 
3. Providing assistance to external - - 6 2 82 27.2 162 53 .6 52 17.2 3.86 3 .023 
auditors 
4. Discussing the findings of internal - - 8 2.6 82 27.2 167 55.3 45 14.9 3.82 4 .162 
audits with the audit committee 
members and management 
5. Providing the audit committee - - 9 3 114 37.7 140 46.4 39 12.9 3.69 5 .560 
with an opinion on the credibility of 
information contained In interim 
reports 
Notes: 
- The responses were reported on a 5-point scale ranking from: 1 (Strongly Disagree), 2 (Disagree), 3 (No View), 4 (Agree), 5 (Strongly Agree). 
- A significance Level: P value (probability) <0.05 that means there are significant differences between at least two groups from the six 
groups of respondents. 
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The next function in terms of importance was 'reviewing whether or not management 
has consistent treatment for similar transactions' (with overall mean score of 4.52). A 
total of 98.7 percent of the respondents from all six groups indicated that they 
regarded this function as either important or extremely important. There were no 
significant differences in the responses from all six groups of respondents with this 
function. The third most important function was 'providing assistance to external 
auditors' (with overall mean score of 3.82 and 3.69). A total of 70.8 percent of all 
respondents from all six groups recorded this function as important or extremely 
important, with an overall mean score of 3.86. 
However, a slight difference can be observed between external auditor and other 
groups, where the former showed a higher level of 'extremely important' with regard 
to this function than other groups. Possibly this difference is due to external auditors 
are seeking more cooperation from internal auditors. The last two ranked important 
functions were 'discussing the findings of internal audits with the audit committee 
members and management' and providing the audit committee with an opinion on the 
credibility of information contained in interim reports, respectively. 
A total of 70.2 percent and 59.3 percent, respectively, of all respondents from all 
groups indicated that they regarded these functions as either important or extremely 
important. There were no significant differences in the responses from all six groups 
of respondents with regard to these functions. 
During the interview stage several comments were received from the different types 
of interviewee. An internal auditor highlighted some factors that determine the 
effectiveness of the internal auditors. He remarked that: 
"In my experience, the most important factors that determine the effectiveness 
of the internal auditors are: educational background and qualifications, 
experience and knowledge about the company's operations and aUditing 
techniques, independence from the executive management, the number of staff 
in the internal audit department compared to the scale of to the company's 
activates ". 
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Moreover, an external auditor mentioned other issues which are: 
"In my opinion, the training of internal audit department staff is very 
important to improve the effectiveness of internal audit. Also, in my 
experience, there are some companies which lack audit coverage because of 
shortage of internal auditing staff". 
Another external auditor stated that: 
"My decision to rely on the work of internal auditors depends on their 
independence, competence, and performance. In some companies it is very 
difficult to put full reliance on the internal auditors' work because of the level 
of their reporting and poor competence". 
6.2.2.4 The Existence of a Competent and Independent Board of Directors 
The board of directors is an important element of the internal corporate governance 
mechanism and is charged with monitoring the corporation's management to protect 
its owners' interests. As stated by Pass (2004), the board of directors, which is 
appointed by the general assembly of the company, is responsible for the governance 
of its company and has an important monitoring role to play. Generally, the board of 
directors consists of two types of directors: executive and non-executive. Various 
recommendations have been made by the international bodies of corporate 
governance and a number of recent empirical studies have suggested that some 
characteristics of the board of directors should be achieved, and these characteristics 
are expected to have a great influence on the quality of financial reporting as 
measured by the level of earnings management. 
The board of directors usually includes two kinds of directors, which are inside 
directors who are employed by corporations in an executive or operational capacity, 
and outside directors who should be independent, and have no relationship with the 
corporation other than the relationship of being a member of the board of directors. 
The international bodies of corporate governance, such as the CCR in the UK (1992), 
the Toronto TSE (1994) and the BRC Report and Recommendations in the US (1999), 
have provided various recommendations that having a majority of outside or 
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independent directors can make a positive contribution to the board's monitoring 
responsibilities. Moreover, significant empirical studies have investigated the impact 
of independent board directors on the effectiveness of the board. Beasley (1996) 
indicated that a larger proportion of independent members on the board significantly 
decreases the probability of a company practicing earnings management, because they 
are properly independent from the corporation's management, which makes them able 
to monitor the management effectively. 
Moreover, Xie et al. (2003) stated that the monitoring that outside directors provide 
may improve when they are financially sophisticated, due the fact that a member of 
the board of directors with a financial background might be more familiar with 
earnings management issues and might better understand the implications of earnings 
manipulation. In addition, another important characteristic that may influence the 
effectiveness of the board of directors is the separation between the role of chairman 
and the chief executive officer. The chairman's position and the chief executive 
officer should be separated to ensure an effective monitoring system, since the 
chairman is the head of the board of directors which monitors management, while the 
chief executive officer is mainly responsible for corporate management. 
In part 4.2.4 of the questionnaire a list of statements was presented about the effect of 
a competent and independent board of directors on restricting earnings management 
and improving the quality of financial reporting. Respondents were asked to indicate 
their level of agreement with each statement in the list on a Likert scale of 1 (strongly 
disagree), 2 (disagree), 3 (no view), 4 (agree), 5 (strongly agree). Their responses are 
analysed and presented in table (6.6). 
From Table 6.6 it can be seen that the statement that 'corporations with a greater 
proportion of non-executive directors on the board are less likely to engage in 
earnings management practices than those whose boards are staffed primarily with 
executive directors' has an overall mean score of 4.41. Also, a total of 94 percent of 
respondents from all six groups indicated that they either agreed or strongly agreed 
with this statement. 
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Moreover, it can be seen from Table 6.6 that the statement 'boardroom members with 
a financial background are more likely to detect any activities of earnings 
management' received an overall mean score of 4.13 and 84.4 percent of all six 
groups either agreed or strongly agreed. This result showed support to the prior 
literature review, which indicated through prior studies and the recommendations of 
various committees that there is a positive relationship between the board's 
monitoring effectiveness and the independence and experience of the members of the 
board of directors (CCR, 1992; Beasley, 1996; BRC, 1999; Klein, 2002; Monks & 
Minow, 2001; Xie et aI., 2003; Park & Shin, 2004; Peasnell et aI., 2005; Davidson et 
aI., 2005). Also, there were no significant differences in the responses from all six 
groups of respondents with these statements. 
In addition, Table 6.6 shows the level of agreement of the respondents with the last 
three statements on the table. The results indicate that the statement 'prohibit the CEO 
from acting as chairman of the board of directors' received an overall mean score of 
4.34, and that 95.4 percent of all six groups either agreed or strongly agreed. Also, 
the statement 'prohibit the CEO from being responsible for setting the board's agenda 
and meeting requirements' received an overall score of 3.93. A total of 75.8 percent of 
respondents from all six groups agreed or strongly agreed with this statement. These 
results are therefore compatible with the prior literature review (e.g. Pearce & Zahra, 
1991; CCR, 1992; and Stile & Taylor, 1993). Moreover, the statement 'hold frequent 
seminars and workshops for boardroom members to familiarise them with recent 
developments in accounting issues' with an overall mean score of 3.90 and 82.4 
percent of the respondents from all six groups either agreed or strongly agreed with 
this statement. However, there was a significant difference in the responses from all 
six groups of respondents with the statement 'prohibit the CEO from being 
responsible for setting the board's agenda and meeting requirements', where the 
financial managers and senior accountants showed lower levels of agreement with this 
statement than other groups. Possibly, this was due to the confidence of the financial 
manger and senior accountants in the reliability of the CEO and the management of 
the company in general compared with other groups. 
189 
Table (6.6) the Existence of a Competent and Independent Board of Directors 
Independent and Competent Board of Level of agreement Overall Level of 
Directon Strongly Disagree No view Agree Strongly Mean significance Score 
Disae:ree agree 
No 0/0 No % No % No % No % 
I. Corporations with a greater proportion 2 0.7 15 5 I 0.3 122 40.4 162 53.6 4.41 .626 
of non-executive directors on the board 
are less likely to engage in earnings 
management practices than those whose 
boards are staffed primarily with 
executive directors 
2. Boardroom members with a financial 7 2.3 33 10.9 7 2.3 123 40.7 132 43 .7 4.13 .072 
background are more likely to detect any 
activities of earnings management 
3. In order to improve the effectiveness - - 14 4.6 - - 157 52 131 43.4 4.34 .060 
of the board of directors in preventing 
any fraudulent practices, companies 
sbould: 
A. prohibit the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) from acting as 
Chairman of the Board of 
Directors 
----------------.----.----------------------------
-------- ---- ----
---------
-._----- --------
---------
---------
--------
------- --
------- --
--- --- ------- ---------------B. Prohibit the (CEO) from being 9 3 55 18.2 9 3 104 34.4 125 41.4 3.93 .000 
responsible for setting the board's 
agenda and meeting requirements 
190 
Table (6.6) continued 
Level of agreement Overall Level of 
Independent and Competent Board of Strongly Disagree No view Agree Strongly Mean significance 
Directors Disagree a2ree Score 
No % No 0/0 No % No % No % 
c. holds frequent seminars and I 0.3 16 53 36 11.9 207 68.5 42 13.9 3.90 .248 
workshops for boardroom 
members to familiarize them with 
recent developments in accounting 
issues 
Notes: 
- The responses were reported on a 5-point scale ranking from: 1 (Strongly Disagree), 2 (Disagree), 3 (No View), 4 (Agree), 5 (Strongly Agree). 
- A significance Level: P value (probability) <0.05 that means there are significant differences between at least two groups from the six 
groups of respondents 
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During the interview stage, the interviewees provided a number of characteristics of 
the board of directors that can help to improve the effectiveness of the board of 
directors in the Libyan environment. An external auditor remarked that: 
"In my opinion, selecting and appointing the members of the board of 
directors in the Libyan environment is based on emotion rather than 
qualifications and experiences. Therefore, they are not playing a useful role in 
the supervision of the company's performance ". 
An internal auditor stated that: 
"In my view, increasing the number of non-executive directors would enhance 
the quality of financial statements. However, selecting them should be in the 
appropriate method that will give them full independence to be able to 
perform their job successfully and also, it will help to support the position and 
role of the internal auditors, the audit committee, and the external auditors". 
In addition, the following are comments from an academic interviewee: 
"In my opinion, selecting and appointing the member of the board of directors 
should be based on their professional qualifications (financial background), 
their experience, their business skills, and their reputations. Also, they should 
be independent from the company's management, with a separation between 
the role of chairman and the executive officers, which will give the board more 
independence ". 
6.2.3 External Audit Quality 
6.2.3.1 The Impact of External Auditors on Earnings Management 
Auditing is the accumulation and evaluation of evidence about information to 
detennine and report on the degree of correspondence between the information and 
established criteria. Therefore, external auditing plays an important role in the 
monitoring of financial statements because it reports any observed breaches of 
restrictive covenants to the users of financial statements (DeAngelo, 1981a). The 
objective of an external audit is the expression of an opinion on the fairness of 
192 
financial statements regarding all material respects, financial position, results of 
operations and cash flows in conformity with an applicable financial reporting 
framework (IAASB, 2004a). Moreover, external auditors need to obtain sufficient 
evidence that makes them able to provide that opinion about the fairness of financial 
statements and to issue an appropriate audit report. 
The practice of earnings management might start with small actions or inappropriate 
adjustment of assumptions and changes in judgments by management. Motivations 
and pressures might lead these actions to increase to the extent that they result in 
fraudulent financial reporting. Thus, users of financial reporting seek assurance from 
independent auditors that the information is free from material errors or other 
misstatements. Consequently, external auditors are expected to detect opportunistic 
earnings management, and, in that case, they are considered high-quality auditors. The 
quality of an audit is a function of both auditor competence (which is the auditor's 
ability to detect material omissions or misstatements in the financial statements) and 
auditor independence (which is the auditor's propensity to correct and reveal material 
errors) (DeAngelo, 1981a). 
In part 4.3.1 of the questionnaire a list of statements was presented about the impact 
of external auditors on earnings management. Respondents were asked to indicate 
their level of agreement with each of statements in the list on a Likert scale of 1 
(strongly disagree), 2 (disagree), 3 (no view), 4 (agree), 5 (strongly agree). Their 
responses were analysed and presented in Table 6.7. 
As can be seen from Table 6.7, the statement that 'external auditors would not like to 
lose their reputation because they cannot detect earnings management' received an 
overall mean score of 3.68. A total of 70.6 percent of the respondents from the six 
groups either agreed or strongly agreed with this statement. However, there was a 
significant difference in the responses from all six groups of respondents to this 
statement (at the 5% level of significance). The results revealed that external auditors' 
opinions differed significantly from other groups, where the external auditors showed 
higher levels of agreement than other groups. This result possibly reflects external 
auditors' awareness about their reputation and the negative impact of reputation loss 
in the job market. 
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During the interview stage of this study, an external auditor remarked that: 
"In my view, all external auditors in Libya have a strong motivation to protect 
their reputations, such as losing their place in the job market, and culture". 
Moreover, the result from Table 6.7 indicated that the statements that 'external 
auditors constrain a corporation's management from practicing earnings management' 
and 'external auditors can detect earnings management effectively' received an 
overall mean score of 3.18 and 2.88, respectively. A total of 54 percent, and 42 
percent of the respondents from all six groups either agreed or strongly agreed with 
these statements. In addition, the results revealed that external auditors' opinions 
differed significantly from other groups at the 5% level of significance, where 
external auditors showed higher levels of agreement than other groups with both of 
the statements. Possibly these results reflect external auditors' confidence in their 
ability and experience to detect earnings management. However, the statement 
'external auditors are trained to detect earnings management' received an overall 
mean score of 2.75 and a total of 37.4 percent of the respondents from all six groups 
either agreed or strongly agreed. There was a significant difference in the responses 
from the six groups of respondents with this statement. By comparing the responses of 
the six groups, the results revealed that external auditors' opinions differed 
significantly from other groups (at the 5% level of significance) that external auditors 
showed lower levels of agreement (see appendix 5). Possibly this was due to their 
perception that normal audit training may focus on accounting standards and auditing 
techniques, and it is not aimed at detecting earnings management particularly, which 
means audit training that applies only to accounting standards and auditing techniques 
may not be enough to enable external auditors to detect earnings management 
effectively. 
During the interview stage of this study, an external auditor showed support for the 
results above and drew attention to the fact that: 
.. In my opinion, some earnings management techniques might be difficult to 
discover under normal training. Therefore, external auditors should attend 
special training courses in order to provide good services and help them to 
detect earnings management. Also, regarding to this issue big audit firms 
have greater resources that enable them to provide their staff good training 
courses ". 
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Table (6.7) the Impact of External Auditors on Earnings Management 
The Impact of External Auditors on Level of agreement . Overall Level of 
Earnings Management Strongly Disagree No view Agree Strongly Mean significance 
Disaeree aeree 
Score 
No % No 0/0 No % No % No 0/0 
1. External auditors are trained to detect 37 l2.3 127 42. 1 25 8.3 99 32.8 14 4 .6 2.75 .044 
earnings management 
2. External auditors constrain a 21 7 88 29.1 30 9.9 142 47 21 7 3.1 8 .046 
corporation's management to practise 
earnings management 
3. External auditors can detect earnings 29 9.6 130 43 16 5.3 103 34.1 24 7.9 2.88 .001 
management effectively 
4. External auditors would not like to 10 3.3 58 19.2 21 7 143 47.4 70 23.2 3.68 .013 
lose their reputation because they cannot 
detect earnings management 
--
Notes: 
- The responses were reported on a 5-point scale ranking from: 1 (Strongly Disagree), 2 (Disagree), 3 (No View), 4 (Agree), 5 (Strongly Agree). 
- A significance Level : P value (probability) <0.05 that means there are significant differences between at least two groups from the six groups 
of respondents. 
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6.2.3.2 The Impact of Lengthy Tenure on External Audit Quality 
Hayes el at. (2005) believe that mostly the first year of auditing is perceived as less 
thorough, since it takes some time to identify all potential audit risks for a new client. 
Moreover, since the better identification and understanding of a client's business and 
risk is useful in detecting material misstatements in the financial statements, the 
auditor learning argument suggests that audit quality and the integrity of the auditee's 
accounting reports is lower during the early years of tenure, and improves as audit 
tenure increases. 
On the other hand, Johnson et al. (2002) and Boone et al. (2008) believe that the 
auditor might lose his professional scepticism if the length of tenure is very long, so 
that after a long tenure the auditor may become less sceptical of the client's 
accounting practices and jUdgments based on a "learned confidence" in the client. In 
other words, the audit quality could be enhanced by long length of tenure because it 
provides better identification of client's risk, better understanding of client's business 
and industry and knowledge about the corporation's operations, which are essential 
for an adequate audit to assess the risk of misstatement of the financial statements 
whether due to error or fraud, and to design the nature and extent of further audit 
procedures. However, it may decrease the auditors' independence and objectivity due 
to the closeness of the auditor-client relationship developed over an extended period. 
Consistent with the above, the questionnaire survey in part 4.3.2 aimed to elicit 
respondents' perceptions on the advantages and disadvantages of lengthy tenure with 
audit clients in the Libyan environment. Respondents were asked to indicate their 
level of agreement with each of the statements on the list on a Likert scale of 1 
(strongly disagree), 2 (disagree), 3 (no view), 4 (agree), 5 (strongly agree). Their 
responses were analysed and presented in Table 6.8. 
From Table 6.8 it can be seen that the statement that lengthy tenure gives more 
expertise to external auditor received an overall mean score of 3.72. A total of 81.8 
percent of the respondents from all six groups either agreed or strongly agreed. 
Moreover, statements that important advantages of lengthy tenure are helping external 
auditors to gain, better identification of client's risk and better understanding of 
client's business received overall a mean score of3.76 and 3.77, respectively. A total 
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of 83.4 percent and 83.7 percent from all six groups agreed or strongly agreed with 
these statements, respectively. Also, external auditors showed a higher level of 
agreement with these statements than other groups, where 90.80 percent, 90.70 
percent and 92.30 percent of external auditors either agreed or strongly agreed that 
lengthy tenure with audited clients helped them to achieve more experience, better 
identification of client's risk and a better understanding of client's business, 
respectively. These results support the literature review, which indicates that lengthy 
tenure provides better identification of a client's risk, better understanding of client's 
business and industry and knowledge about the corporation's operations, which are 
essential for an adequate audit to assess the risk of misstatement of the financial 
statements whether due to error or fraud, and to design the nature and extent of further 
audit procedures (Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002; Ghosh & Moon, 2003; Myers et aI., 
2003; Hayes el at., 2005; Chen et aI., 2008; Jackson et aI., 2008; George, 2009 ). 
It can also be seen from Table 6.8 that the statement that lengthy tenure may lead to 
lower external auditors' scepticism received an overall mean of score 3.45, and 68.2 
percent of respondents from all groups agreed or strongly agreed with this statement. 
Moreover, the statement that lengthy tenure might make external auditors less 
innovative received an overall mean score of 3.41 and a total of 65.2 percent of 
respondents either agreed or strongly agreed. Also, the statement that lengthy tenure 
might impair the independence of external auditors received an overall mean score of 
3.62, and 73.2 percent of all respondents agreed or strongly agreed with it. These 
results are consistent with the studies of Deis and Giroux (1992), Johnson et aI., 
(2002), Boone et aI., (2008), Chen et al., (2008) and Dao et aI., (2008). 
There was a significant difference in the responses from all six groups of respondents 
with the statement that the lengthy tenure might impair the independence of external 
auditors. Financial managers, senior accountants and internal auditors groups showed 
higher levels of agreement, where 87.9 percent and 84.6 percent of them agreed or 
strongly agreed with this statement, respectively. 
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Table (6.8) the Impact of Lengthy Tenure on External Audit Quality 
The Results Level of agreement Overall Level of 
Strongly Disagree No view Agree Strongly Mean significance Score 
Disagree a2ree 
No % No % No % No % No % 
I . More expertise 10 3.3 46 15.2 8 2.6 149 64.2 44 14.6 3.76 .002 
2. Better identification of client's risk 10 3J 45 14.9 6 2 188 62.3 53 17.5 3.76 .004 
3. Better understand ing of client's 12 4 40 13.2 9 3 185 61.3 56 18.5 3.77 .000 
business 
4. Less skepticism 17 5.6 64 21.2 15 5 177 58.6 29 9.6 3.45 .442 
5. Less innovation 20 6.6 76 25.2 9 3 154 51 43 14.2 3.41 J09 
6. Less independence 12 4 64 21.2 5 1.7 166 55 55 18.2 3.62 .000 
Notes: 
- The responses were reported on a 5-point scale ranking from: 1 (Strongly Disagree), 2 (Disagree), 3 (No View), 4 (Agree), 5 (Strongly Agree). 
- A significance Level: P value (probability) <0.05 that means there are significant differences between at least two groups from the six 
groups of respondents. 
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Conversely, 43.5 percent of external auditors either disagreed or strongly disagreed 
with the statement that length tenure might lead to lower external auditors' 
independence. These differences are possibly due to economic dependence and 
personal involvement that might compromise external auditors' objectivity, as 
suggested by Church and Schneider (1992) and Brody and Kaplan (1996). However, 
from the external auditors' side, these differences are possibly due to their aim to 
retain their audit clients for a long tenure, and may be to gain a better identification of 
client's risk and better understanding of client's business. 
During the interview stage of this study, an internal auditor remarked that: 
"In my view, external auditors should have experience and industry expertise 
that can help them to provide high quality performance, because it is very 
risky if external auditors do not understand the client's business and they just 
follow auditing standards or the last year's auditing steps ". 
Also, an external auditor remarked that: 
"In my opinion, lengthy tenure has advantages and disadvantages regarding 
audit quality. It could enhance external auditors' experience and help them to 
gain a better understanding of a client's business and operations. On the other 
hand, it may affect external auditors' independence because of the 
relationship that may develop between auditor and client over on extended 
time ". 
Moreover, an academic stated that: 
"In my view, lengthy tenure and the provision of non-auditing services might 
influence audit quality since external auditors might overlook something 
which they think that they already know, which is sometimes very risky". 
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6.2.3.3 The Impact of Non-auditing Services on External Audit Quality 
The joint supply of audit and non-audit services to the same client could be a 
contributor to compromising auditors' independence, due to the fact that audit firms 
might not be willing to criticise the work carried out by their consultancy division, 
and might not wish to lose lucrative consultancy services (Lennox, 1999). Several 
studies have shown that the joint provision of both services can cause a reduction in 
the quality of audit reports and might compromise the independence of auditors 
(Frankel et aI., 2002; Gul et aI, 2006; Basioudis et aI., 2008; Quick & Warming-
Rasmussen, 2009). On the other hand, other studies conclude that non-audit services 
might help auditors to obtain more experience and a better understanding of a client's 
business (Antle et aI., 2006, Lim, 2008; Patel et aI., 2009). 
Consistent with the above, part 4.3.3 of the questionnaire aimed to elicit respondents' 
perceptions on the advantages and disadvantages of non-auditing services in the 
Libyan environment. Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement 
with each of the statements on the list on a Likert scale of 1 (strongly disagree), 2 
(disagree), 3 (no view), 4 (agree), 5 (strongly agree). Their responses were analysed 
and presented in Table 6.9. 
From Table 6.9 it can be seen that the statement that non-auditing services enable 
external auditors to gain more expertise was an important advantage and received an 
overall mean score of 4.30. A total of 97 percent of the respondents from all six 
groups either agreed or strongly agreed. In addition, the statement that non-auditing 
services could help external auditors to gain a better identification of client's risk, and 
better understanding of client's business, received an overall mean score of 4.34 and 
4.33, respectively. Also, the majority of all six groups (97 percent, 97.4 percent in 
total) agreed or strongly agreed with these statements, respectively. There were no 
significant differences in the responses from all six groups of respondents with these 
statements. These results support the literature review, suggesting that non-auditing 
services provide better identification of client's risk, better understanding of client's 
business and industry, and knowledge about the corporation's operations, and 
improve audit quality (Antle et aI., 2006; Lim, 2008; Patel et aI., 2009). 
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Furthennore, it can be seen from Table 6.9 that the statement that non-auditing 
services might reduce external auditors' scepticism received an overall mean score of 
3.74. A total of78.8 percent of all respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with 
this statement. Moreover, the statement that less innovation is a weakness of non-
auditing services received an overall mean score of 3.68, and a total of 75.9 percent of 
all respondents agreed or strongly agreed. There were no significant differences in the 
responses from all six groups of respondents with these statements. In addition, from 
the table it can be seen that non-auditing services might lead to a reduction in the 
independence of external auditors, with an overall score of 3.79. A total of 78.8 
percent of all respondents agreed or strongly agreed. This result was consistent with 
the literature on non-auditing services (Frankel et aI., 2002; Gul et aI., 2006; 
Basioudis et aI., 2008; Quick & Wanning-Rasmussen, 2009). 
There was a difference in the responses at the 5% level of significance. By comparing 
the responses of the six groups, the results indicated that external auditors' opinions 
differed significantly from other groups, with external auditors showing less 
agreement than the other groups (see appendix 5). Possibly because the latter believe 
that economic dependence might impair auditors' independence in order to increase 
their income from non-auditing services. 
During the interview stage of this study, interviewees showed support to the previous 
results related to lengthy tenure and non-auditing services. One of the academics 
made the following comment: 
"In my opinion, non-auditing services could help external auditors to have 
more experience, and better understanding of client's business. However, 
external auditors may not criticise the work provided by their staff". 
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Table (6.9) the Impact of Non-auditing Services on External Audit Quality 
The Results Level of agreement Overall Level of 
Strongly Disagree No view Agree Strongly Mean significance Score 
Disa2ree ae:ree 
No % No % No % No % No % 
I . More expertise gained 1 0.3 6 2 2 0.7 184 60.9 109 36.1 4.30 .861 
2. Better identification of client's risk I 0.3 5 1.7 3 1 174 57.6 119 39.4 4.34 .513 
3. Better understanding of client's I OJ 5 1.7 2 0.7 179 59.3 115 38.1 4.33 .837 
business 
4. Less scepticism 10 3.3 48 45.9 6 2 186 61.6 52 17.2 3.74 .189 
5. Less innovation 8 2.6 59 19.5 6 2 179 5903 50 16.6 3.68 .316 
6. Less independence 11 3.6 43 14.2 10 303 171 56.6 67 22.2 3.79 .000 
Notes: 
- The responses were reported on a 5-point scale ranking from: I (Strongly Disagree), 2 (Disagree), 3 (No View), 4 (Agree), 5 (Strongly Agree). 
- A significance Level: P value (probability) <0.05 that means there are significant differences between at least two groups from the six groups 
of respondents 
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Moreover, an external auditor remarked that: 
"In my experience, non-auditing services are helpful to get more experience 
and understanding of client's operations. Therefore, non-auditing services 
may have a negative effect on auditors' independence because the low audit 
fees in the Libyan environment may make external auditors provide non-
auditing services to increase their income ". 
6.2.3.4 The Impact of other Components on External Audit Quality 
The questionnaire in part 4.3.4 aimed to elicit respondents' perceptions on the impact 
of other components on external audit quality in the Libyan environment, which 
include firm size, audit fees, competition, lawsuits, technology, accounting education 
and accounting and auditing standards. Respondents were asked to indicate their level 
of agreement with each of the statements in the list in a Likert scale of 1 (strongly 
disagree), 2 (disagree), 3 (no view), 4 (agree), 5 (strongly agree). Their responses 
were analysed and presented in Table 6.10. 
The size of an audit firm is considered one of factors that affect audit quality and it 
has been used as a proxy to measure it. Prior studies examine whether larger auditing 
firms provide higher quality audits than smaller auditing firms. These studies assumed 
that large audit firms, due to their greater resources, are more likely to provide more 
precise information and higher quality audit services than small audit firms. 
Moreover, 
large audit firms have a greater motivation to protect their reputation and they are less 
likely to be economically dependent on a few clients. Therefore, it could enhance 
auditors' independence because large firms do not rely on revenue from a single 
client. (DeAngelo, 1981b; Moore & Scott, 1989; Davidson & Neu, 1993; Lys & 
Watts, 1994; DeFond et al., 2002; Chan et aI., 2005; Jong-Hag, 2010). On the other 
hand, there is other evidence to suggest that there is no relationship between audit 
firm size and quality (Jeong & Rho, 2004; Khurana & Raman, 2004; Krishnan, 2005). 
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Table (6.10) the Impact of other Components on External Audit Quality 
Components which may leading to Level of agreement Overall Level of 
higher audit quality Strongly Disagree No view Agree Strongly Mean significance 
Disae:ree ae:ree 
Score 
No % No 0/0 No % No % No 0/0 
I. The large the finn size, the higher 80 26.5 146 48.3 7 23 46 15.2 23 7.6 2.29 .420 
the audit quality 
2. Strong competition helps in 2 0.7 15 5 10 3.3 166 55 109 36.1 4.2 1 .119 
getting high audit quality 
3. More lawsuits result high audit 2 7 25 8.3 9 3 149 49.3 117 38.7 4.17 .067 
quality 
4. High audit fees helps in getting 7 2.3 55 18.2 17 6.6 147 48.7 76 25.2 3.76 .569 
high audit quality 
5. Using more technology helps in 8 2.6 86 28.5 35 11.6 138 45 .7 35 11.6 3.35 .637 
getting high audit quality 
6. Strong accounting education of 3 1 25 8.3 1 I 3.6 162 53.6 101 33.4 4.10 .082 
auditors helps in achieving high audit 
quality 
7. Strong accounting and auditing 1 3 8 2.6 1 3 142 47 150 49.7 4.43 .102 
standards helps in achieving high 
audit quality I 
Notes: 
- The responses were reported on a 5-point scale ranking from: I (Strongly Disagree), 2 (Disagree), 3 (No View), 4 (Agree), 5 (Strongly Agree). 
- A significance Level: P value (probability) <0.05 that means there are significant differences between at least two groups from the six groups of 
respondents. 
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From Table 6.10 it can be seen that the statement that the larger the firm size, the 
higher the audit quality received an overall score of 2.29. A total of 22.8 percent of 
respondents from all six groups either agreed or strongly agreed. There was no 
significant difference in the responses from all six groups of respondents. However, 
the majority of audit offices in Libya are medium and small offices, as revealed in the 
interviews. As a result, the size of audit offices has no affect on audit quality in the 
Libyan environment. 
Consistent with the previous result, during the interview stage of this study, an 
academic stated that: 
"The size of the audit firm does not have influence in the Libyan environment 
because most audit offices in Libya are medium or small size and their quality 
services depend on individual competence, experience, and attitude. 
Moreover, in my opinion, the absence of large audit firms negatively affects 
the audit quality in the Libyan environment due to the fact that the existence of 
these firms will help to improve the audit quality services by transferring their 
experience and knowledge to the Libyan environment". 
Jensen and Payne (2005a) believe that price competition affects audit quality. 
Therefore, audit firms are likely to re-evaluate their positions in the marketplace. 
Also, audit firms with relatively high production costs will provide services if the 
competitive environment allows them to charge fees commensurate with those costs. 
Several empirical studies have addressed the issue of increasing competitiveness in 
the market for audit services and its impact on audit fees and audit quality. Some 
pointed out that high audit quality might result in higher audit fees (Zeithaml, 1988; 
Lichtenstein et aI., 1993). Other studies suggest that audit fees should decrease as the 
level of competitiveness in the audit market increases (Jensen & Payne, 2005b). In 
addition, Pearson and Trompeter (1994) argue that lower levels of competition could 
harm clients through higher fees and lower levels of service. Also, Chaney et a1. 
(2003) argue that greater competition among audit firms results in lower fees and 
improved service quality. However, it may lead to reduced pricing with possibly 
detrimental quality effects. Similarty, Behn (2009) mentions that prior research has 
demonstrated that price competition leads to discounting, which can result in 
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unrealistically low audit fees and poor audit quality. In other words, strong 
competition may lead to higher audit quality services. However, it may lead to lower 
audit fees, which affects audit firms due to the fact that they might accept lower audit 
fees, or exit the market. Also, some audit firms (possibly audit firms with a lack of 
experience) may use fees competition as an opportunity to exploit their competitive 
advantage by using audit fees to gain market share 
It can also be seen from Table 6.10 that the statement that high audit fees help in 
achieving high audit quality had an overall score of 3.76. A total of 73.9 percent of 
respondents from all groups agreed or strongly agreed. Also, the statements that 
strong competition helps in achieving high audit quality received an overall score of 
4.21. A total of 91.1 percent of respondents from all groups agreed or strongly agreed. 
Also, there was no significant difference in the responses from all six groups of 
respondents. These results support prior literature that high audit fees and strong 
competition results in increased audit quality (Copley & Doucet, 1993) and lower 
levels of competition could harm clients through higher fees and lower levels of 
service (Pearson & Trompeter, 1994). Also, audit fees should decrease as the level of 
competitiveness in the audit market increases (Jensen & Payne, 2005b). 
During the interview stage of this study, an external auditor stated that: 
"In my opinion, low audit fees in the Libyan environment may affect external 
auditors' independence and encourage them provide non-auditing services to 
increase their income ". 
Another external auditor remarked that: 
"In my view. in the Libyan environment the supply of audit service is more 
than the demand for this service, which might lead to lower audit fees. 
Moreover, the real competition in the Libyan audit market is restricted to a 
group of audit offices. This issue affects other audit offices due to the fact that 
they might accept lower audit fees in order to enter the market ". 
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Lys and Watts (1994) provide three factors that are necessary for a disclosure lawsuit. 
First, there is existence of cause, which includes practicing earnings management; the 
probability that the auditor did not discover the financial statements were misleading, 
or discovered them and failed to report it; and the existence of a loss by a plaintiff 
Secondly, plaintiffs discover the cause. Finally, plaintiffs may have net benefits from 
the suit. Palmrose (1988) suggests that the increasing frequency of lawsuits against an 
auditing firm is viewed as a negative signal about the quality of auditing services 
provided by the finn and impairs its reputation. 
Table 6.10 presents the results of the responses related to respondent's views on the 
impact of lawsuits on audit quality. It can be seen from the table that the statement 
'more lawsuits result in high audit quality' received an overall score of 4.17. A total 
88 percent of respondents from all six groups agreed or strongly agreed. Also, there 
was no significant difference in the responses from the six groups of respondents. 
This result does not reflect any support from prior literature findings (Palmrose, 
1988). 
During the interview stage of this study, an academic remarked that: 
"In my opinion, there is a positive relationship between lawsuits and quality 
of audit. However, in the Libyan environment, the culture and social relations 
might negatively affect this relationship by decreasing the number of lawsuits 
against external auditors ". 
Audit knowledge that refers to the understanding of the relevance of accounting and 
auditing standards, the audit process, audit technique and client evaluation has an 
influence on audit achievement. Audit knowledge needs a high level of education and 
training in audit and related subjects. According to Navaratnam (1994) a quality audit 
depends on who is carrying out the audit and the location of the auditee. Auditing 
needs knowledge, skills and experience. These should be developed by a formal 
auditor training course, observations of audits, work experience in audits and 
conducting audits. Moreover, Catanach and Walker (1999) mention that audit quality 
is deemed to be a function of performance. Specifically, the auditor's ability, which 
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includes knowledge, experience, technical competence, industry specialisation, 
technological proficiency and professional conduct, affects performance. 
From Table 6.10, it can be seen that the statements that strong accounting and 
auditing standards helps in achieved high audit quality, strong accounting education 
of auditors helps in achieved high audit quality and using more technology helps in 
achieved high audit quality, received an overall score of 4.43, 4.10 and 3.35, 
respectively. Also, a total of 96.7 percent, 87 percent and 57.3 percent of respondents 
from all six groups indicated that they either agreed or strongly agreed with these 
statements. There was no significant difference in the responses from the six groups 
of respondents. These results in general support prior literature (Navaratnam, 1994; 
Catanach & Walker, 1999; Sudsomboon & Ussahawanitchakit, 2009) that 
professional audit competencies have a positive impact on audit quality and audit 
reputation, which affects audit success. Also, audit knowledge refers to the 
understanding of the relevance of accounting and auditing standards, the audit 
process, audit technique and client evaluation, all of which have an influence on audit 
achievement. Audit knowledge needs a high level of education and training in audit 
and related subjects. 
During the interview stage of this study, an academic recommended that: 
" ... reorganising the auditing profession in Libya in order to increase the 
professionalism of the auditors. Also, ensuring the application of the law that 
relates to the minimum qualifications and experience in order to improve the 
audit quality in Libya". 
"In my experience, it is good for an external auditor to have strong skills in 
technology. However, due to the fact that the accounting system in the Libyan 
environment is still basic in the paper accounting system. Therefore, it is 
enough for them to have the basic knowledge in technology that can help them 
10 perform their work efficiently". 
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Consistent with the previous results, an external auditor stated that: 
"In my view, the computerised audit is designed and might be workable in 
developed countries, and it might not work in developing countries, such as 
Libya where is the accounting system is not paperless". 
In addition, another external auditor remarked that: 
"In my opinion, certainly the absence of local standards which take into 
account the local context negatively affects audit quality in Libya, because in 
this case external auditors are applying international standards, which are 
flexible and provide too much scope for local interpretation. Therefore, it does 
not fit with all environments around the world". 
In addition, during the interview stage, several comments were received from the 
different types of interviewee that mentioned other components. Most of them 
mentioned actions that can help to improve the audit service quality in the Libyan 
environment. The suggested actions were as follows: 
- An active professional body must be founded in order to develop audit quality in 
Libya. 
- A guide to professional ethics and conduct is necessary, and it should be in that law. 
-There must be a board of accounting principles. 
- Binding laws must be issued in order to develop the audit profession in Libya. 
- There must be an examination, which must be passed as a condition for exercising 
the profession. 
- There should be conferences in issues of accounting and auditing in Libya. 
- Intensive training courses for practitioners of the profession must be found as a 
strategy to develop the audit quality. 
- A system of quality control must be established in Libya in order to develop the 
audit profession. 
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6.3 Summary and Conclusions 
The main objective of this chapter has been to investigate respondents' perceptions of 
the procedures that should be taken to constrain earnings management and improve 
the quality of financial reporting in Libyan corporations, which include accounting 
standards, internal corporate governance mechanisms and external audit quality. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter a questionnaire and semi-structured interviews 
were used to obtain the data at this stage of this study. The results of this chapter were 
presented as following: 
When considering respondents' perceptions of the actions that should be taken to 
constrain earnings management and improve the quality of financial reporting in 
Libyan corporations, they perceived that accounting standards were not the only 
solution to restrict earnings management and improve the quality of financial 
reporting in Libya. Also, in the view of the respondents, the correct way to restrict 
earnings management and improve the quality of financial reporting in the Libyan 
environment is to combine all the identified actions, which are related to accounting 
standards and internal corporate governance mechanisms that include the existence of 
an effective audit committee, the existence of an effective internal audit function and 
the existence of an independent and competent board of directors. 
As regards respondents' perceptions on the existence of an effective internal audit 
function, they agreed that audit committee members should review the following: 
'significant changes in accounting policies and practices', 'the internal control 
system', 'the independence of the internal audit department', 'the scope of internal 
and external audit activities' and 'related party transactions'. Further, respondents 
agreed that the audit committee members should have knowledge and experience of 
accounting or other related subjects, and they should be independent from the 
executive directors in order to detect earnings management effectively. 
In addition, with regard to the existence of an effective internal audit function, 
respondents agreed that the internal audit should evaluate and monitor the 
effectiveness of the internal control system, reviewing whether or not management 
has consistent treatment for similar transactions, and provide assistance to external 
auditors. Also, the internal audit should have a relevant educational background and 
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qualifications, experience and knowledge about the company's operations and 
auditing techniques, and should be independent from the executive management. 
Furthermore, as regards respondents' perceptions on the existence of an independent 
and competent board of directors, they agreed that a larger proportion of independent 
members on the board significantly reduce the probability of a company practicing 
earnings management. Also, they agreed that there was a positive relationship 
between the boards' monitoring effectiveness and the independence and experience of 
the members of the board of directors. 
With regard to the external audit quality, the results indicated that lengthy tenure and 
the provision of non-audit services give the external auditor more expertise and better 
identification and understanding of a client's risk and his business. On the other hand, 
it may affect external auditors' independence and may lead to external auditors 
becoming less sceptical and less innovative. 
Moreover, respondents' agreed that high audit fees, strong competition, increasing 
numbers of lawsuits, strong accounting and auditing standards and strong accounting 
education all have a positive impact on audit quality and audit reputation. However, it 
was felt that the size of a firm has no effect on audit quality in the Libyan 
environment. Also, 'using more technology' component does not have a significant 
influence in the audit quality due to the fact that the accounting system in Libya is not 
a paperless system. The next chapter provides an overview of the study, summarises 
conclusions drawn from the study findings, and also points out the study's limitations 
and contributions. The chapter concludes by making some suggestions for future 
research 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
7.1 Summary and Review of Findings 
7.1.1 Overview of the Thesis 
This study has focused on the earnings management phenomenon in the Libyan 
environment, which includes the existence and the direction of earnings management 
in Libyan companies, earnings management motivations, the most frequently used 
techniques to practice earnings management, and constraining earnings management 
and improving the quality of financial reporting in Libyan corporations. This study 
consists of seven chapters. Chapter One provided background infonnation related to 
earnings management research, the motivations of carrying out this study, and the 
aims and the questions of the study. 
Chapter Two presented the literature review of earnings management which includes 
definition of earnings management, perspectives of earnings management and patterns 
of earnings management. Also, it critically discussed the techniques and motivations 
of earnings management. . In addition, it provided a review and discussion of the 
literature relevant to earnings management constraints and the factors that affect 
earnings management practice. These factors include political forces, culture, 
accounting standards, internal corporate governance mechanisms and the impact of 
ownership structure on corporate governance, and external audit quality. Chapter 
Three presented details and justifications of the research methodology that was 
adopted in order to achieve the objectives of this research. 
Chapter Foure presented and described the adoption of an accruals-based approach to 
investigate the existence and the direction of earnings management in Libyan 
companies. Also, it provided study findings of the secondary analysis of data by using 
discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management. Chapters Five and Six 
presented the overall findings derived from both the questionnaire and semi-structured 
interviews. Chapter Seven provides a summary and conclusions drawn from the 
study's findings, and points out the study's limitations and contributions; the chapter 
concludes the thesis by making some suggestions for future research. 
212 
7.1.2 Review of Findings 
7.1.2.1 Findings of Secondary Data Analysis 
The conclusions and the main findings of this stage are presented below: 
1- This study applied four different versions of the cross-sectional Modified Jones 
model to generate finn specific coefficients,. which includes: the Modified Jones 
model; the Modified Jones model with operation cash flows as additional variable; the 
Modified Jones model with perfonnance matching on return on assets as additional 
variables; and the Modified Jones model with cash flows from operating and 
perfonnance matching on return on assets as additional variables. The results 
indicated that the fourth version has the highest adjustedR 2 • As a result, the fourth 
version model fitted the Libyan data better than other versions. Therefore, this study 
used firm-specific coefficients that were generated from the fourth version to estimate 
the expected nondiscretionary accruals. 
2- The results indicated that the total discretionary accruals had a negative mean in 
years one and three and with a positive mean in year two. Also, there was a negative 
median in all years. Moreover, approximately 47 percent, 47 percent and 46 percent 
of the sample companies were adopting income-increasing policies in years one, two 
and three, respectively. On the other hand, the mean of current discretionary accruals 
was positive in all years. Also, there was a negative median in years one and three and 
a positive median in year two. Moreover, approximately 42 percent, 56 percent and 47 
percent of the sample companies were adopting income-increasing policies in years 
one, two and three, respectively. 
3- The whole sample was divided into two sub-samples regarding the nature of 
company ownership, which are state-owned companies and private companies. The 
results of the relationship between the direction of earnings management and 
ownership nature showed that 71 percent, 75 percent and 69 percent of state-owned 
companies were adopting income-increasing accruals policies in years one, two and 
three, respectively. Meanwhile, 78 percent, 83 percent and 78 percent of the 
companies that engaged in earnings management by using income-increasing policies 
accruals in years one, two and three, respectively, were state-owned companies. On 
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the other hand, 79 percent, 83 percent and 70 percent of private companies were 
adopting income-decreasing accruals policies in years one, two and three, 
respectively. Moreover, 72 percent, 76 percent and 70 percent of the companies that 
engaged in earnings management by using income-decreasing accruals policies in 
years one, two and three, respectively, were private companies. The above results 
indicated that there are linkages between the direction of earnings management and 
the nature of company ownership. 
4- As regards the relationship between the direction of earnings management and 
company size, the results of the state-owned companies group indicated that company 
size was positively and significantly associated with discretionary total accruals. This 
means that as a company's size increases, the company adopts income-increasing 
accruals policies. On the other hand, the results of the private companies group 
indicated that company size was negatively and significantly linked to discretionary 
total accruals. This means that in the private sector, as company size increases, the 
company adopts income-decreasing accruals policies. The above results indicated that 
there are linkages between the direction of earnings management and company size. 
7.1.2.2 Findings of Questionnaire and Semi-Structured Interview 
The main findings of this stage are summarised and presented below: 
1- The results related to the earnings management motivations in the Libyan state-
owned companies revealed that the top-four motivations were 'to mitigate the threat 
of displacement (i.e. safeguard job position) and/or enhance their reputation', 'to 
report profits', 'to increase the value of management compensation' and 'to meet 
regulatory objectives'. On the other hand, motivations such as 'to increase 
information value', 'to enhance the chances of obtaining bank loans', 'to avoid 
reporting a decline' and 'to decrease the amount of taxes' did not appear to play an 
important role in managing earnings reports in Libyan state-owned companies. In 
addition, the results indicated that the main earnings management motivations in 
private companies are 'to decrease the amount of taxes' and 'to enhance the chance of 
obtaining bank loans'. Moreover, the above results from both state-owned and private 
companies' motivations show that the motivation preference of earnings management 
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in the Libyan environment is influenced by the ownership structure of corporations. 
The above results were confirmed by interviews. 
2- The most frequent techniques used to practice earnings management in Libyan 
companies were 'manipulation of the value of inventory', 'improper assets 
revaluation', 'incorrect capitalising rather than expensing expenditures', 
'manipulation of accrual estimation', 'incorrect use of expenses on asset acquisition' 
and 'and related-party transactions'. These results could be of interest to Libyan 
regulators and external auditors in their efforts to constrain earnings management and 
improve the quality of financial reporting. 
3- When considering respondents' perceptions of the actions that should be taken to 
constrain earnings management and improve the quality of financial reporting in 
Libyan companies, the results from the questionnaire and interviews showed a 
consensus among respondents on the importance of these issues. Also, accounting 
standards cannot be the only solution to restrict earnings management and improve 
the quality of financial reporting in Libya. Therefore, in the view of the respondents, 
the correct way to restrict earnings management and improve the quality of financial 
reporting in the Libyan environment is to combine several actions, which are related 
to accounting standards, internal corporate governance mechanisms, which includes 
the existence of an effective audit committee, the existence of an effective internal 
audit function, and the existence of an independent and competent board of directors, 
and the quality of external audit. 
4- According to respondents' perceptions on the existence of effective audit 
committee functions, they agreed that the audit committee members should review the 
following: 'significant changes in accounting policies and practices', 'the internal 
control system', 'the independence of the internal audit department', 'the scope of 
internal and external audit activities' and 'related party transactions'. Further, 
respondents agreed that knowledge and experience of accounting or other related 
subjects were the most important attributes that help the audit committee members in 
their work and enable them to become more effective monitors. Also, the audit 
committee members should be independent from the executive directors in order to 
detect earnings management effectively. Moreover, having knowledge about the 
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company's activities might help the audit committee members to focus on risk areas 
and become familiar with how company's activities are operated and identify possible 
areas for practicing earnings management. 
5- With regard to the existence of effective internal audit functions, respondents 
agreed that the internal audit should evaluate and monitor the effectiveness of the 
internal control system, reviewing whether or not management has consistent 
treatment for similar transactions, and provide assistance to external auditors. Further, 
the internal audit should have a relevant educational background and qualifications, 
experience and knowledge about the company's operations and auditing techniques, 
and should be independent from the executive management. 
6- According to respondents' perceptions on the existence of an independent and 
competent board of directors,_ they agreed that a larger proportion of independent 
outside members on the board of directors is expected to provide more effective 
monitors and significantly reduce the probability of a company practicing earnings 
management. Further, they agreed that there was a positive relationship between the 
boards' monitoring effectiveness and the level of experience of the members of the 
board of directors. However, during the interview stage of this study, several concerns 
were expressed related to selecting the members of the board of directors. It was 
argued by a number of interviewees that selecting and appointing the members of the 
board of directors should be based on their professional qualifications (financial 
background), their experience, their business skills and their reputations. This will 
help them to be able to perform their job successfully. Also, a separation between the 
role of chairman and the executive officers will give the board more independence, 
which will help them to playa useful role in the supervision of the company's 
performance, and to support the position and role of the internal auditors, the audit 
committee and the external auditors. 
7- With regard to the external audit quality, the results indicated that normal audit 
training may focus on accounting standards and auditing techniques, and it is not 
aimed at detecting earnings management particularly, which means audit training that 
applies only to accounting standards and auditing techniques may not be enough to 
enable external auditors to detect earnings management effectively. Therefore, 
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external auditors should attend special training courses m order to provide good 
services and help them to detect earnings management. 
8- Both lengthy tenure and the provision of non-audit services had positive and 
negative effects on the audit quality. On the one hand they give the external auditor 
more expertise, and better identification and understanding of a client's risk and his 
business. On the other hand, they may affect external auditors' independence because 
of the relationship that may develop between auditor and client over on extended 
time. Further, they may lead to external auditors becoming less sceptical and less 
innovative. 
9- Respondents agreed that high audit fees, strong competition, increasing numbers of 
lawsuits, strong accounting and auditing standards and strong accounting education all 
have a positive impact on audit quality and audit reputation. However, it was felt that 
the size of a firm does not have a significant influence on audit quality in the Libyan 
environment because most audit offices in Libya are medium or small in size, and 
their service quality depends on individual competence, experience and attitude. In 
contrast, the absence of large audit firms negatively affects audit quality in the Libyan 
environment due to the fact that the existence of these firms would help to improve 
the audit service quality by transferring their experience and knowledge to the Libyan 
environment. The results also revealed that the 'using more technology' component 
does not have a significant influence on audit quality due to the fact that the 
accounting system in Libya is not a paperless system. These results might be of 
interest to Libyan regulators and external auditors in their efforts to constrain earnings 
management and improve the quality of financial reporting. 
7.2 Contributions of the Study 
There is a growing body of research that has been examining earnings management in 
developed countries. However, research is still lacking in developing countries 
generally and in Libya specifically, where more studies need to be done. Moreover, 
the results of studies in developed countries are not always applicable to developing 
countries' environment. This is due to the fact that companies located in developing 
countries have received little attention in the literature and have a different 
environment to companies located in developed countries; these differences include 
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poor management performance, a small number of listed companies, weak corporate 
governance structure, unsophisticated users, weak accounting profession and a 
preponderance of family-controlled firms. 
Consequently, this study contributes to the literature of earnings management 
conducted in developing countries in general. Also, this study has investigated the 
current state of the earnings management phenomenon in the Libyan environment, 
which is a different setting to most prior research, where, to the best of the 
researcher's knowledge, this study is the first of its kind in the Libyan context. 
Further, this study is a comprehensive study of the earnings management phenomenon 
because it investigates the existence of earnings management, why earnings 
management takes place, how it is achieved and how it can be constrained. Therefore, 
it is hoped it provides useful insights, policy implications and recommendations for 
policy makers and regulatory bodies, external auditors and accounting professionals in 
Libya in order to enhance the monitoring mechanisms, corporate control and the 
quality of financial statements. Also, this research provides a foundation for future 
research into the earnings management phenomenon in the Libyan environment. 
Further, this study measured earnings management by applying discretionary accruals 
models, which was a cross-sectional of the Modified Jones model with cash flow from 
operating and performance matching on return on assets as additional variables. Also, 
this study established relationships between the direction of earnings management and 
the nature of company ownership and company size. 
Furthermore, this study draws to attention the importance that internal corporate 
governance mechanisms and audit quality have in overseeing the integrity of financial 
statements, which is useful to both regulators and professional bodies in their efforts 
to enhance the quality of financial statements, and the findings of this study could be 
useful for developing and improving the accounting system in Libya. 
7.3 Scope and Limitations of the Study 
This research has certain limitations like any research study. Despite the following 
limitations that are related to analytical methods and data collection, a significant 
effort was made in ensuring that the questions of this study were answered and the 
study objectives were reached. 
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First modelling limitations, the study used discretionary accruals as a statistical proxy 
for earnings management. The literature review documented the statistical limitations 
in respect of earnings management models, particularly relating to separating total 
accruals into non-discretionary and discretionary components. Despite their 
limitations, prior studies have applied these models. To the extent that the criticisms 
of existing earnings management models are applicable, the findings of the earnings 
management analysis provided in this study might be limited. In addition, the mean 
adjusted R2 of the regression model that was used to measure earnings management 
was approximately 52 percent, which suggests that additional explanatory variables 
could be concerned in order to improve the explanation of earnings management. 
Second secondary data sample limitations, this study excluded financial companies 
and banks from the sample of secondary data because these firms' financial 
statements are different from other companies, and they operate under specific 
regulations. Further, this study also excluded listed companies, since there is a small 
number of listed companies because of the fact that the Libyan capital market was 
only established in 2007, and all of the companies listed on the market are banks and 
financial companies, which are excluded from the sample of secondary data. In 
addition, although a significant effort was undertaken to collect the secondary data 
from unlisted companies, which are state-owned and private companies, a lack of 
publicly available data was faced. However, the size of the earnings management 
sample analysed in this study is comparable to that in prior research. The above 
secondary data sample limitations might reduce the generalisability of this study'S 
findings related to the existence of earnings management in Libyan companies. 
Third questionnaire survey limitations, although the administration of the 
questionnaire survey was carefully planned and performed, the response rate was 
approximately 60 percent. Therefore, this study may suffer from response rate 
limitations. On the other hand, this study used semi-structured interviews in order to 
overcome these limitations. 
Despite the above limitations, this study provides evidence of the state of earnings 
management in Libya, and it sheds light on corporate governance and the important 
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role of external auditors in overseeing the integrity of financial statements. Also, this 
study is a starting point for future research related to earnings management in the 
Libyan environment. 
7.4 Future Research 
Although this study answers the specific questions it set out to investigate, it 
stimulates further research to be carried out in this respect. 
1- Future research should measure earnings management by using other approaches, 
such as the specific accrual approach, in order to focus on a set of specific accruals or 
the influence of managers' discretion on specific accrual by focusing on the given 
findings provided in this study. Also, investigating the existence of earnings 
management in Libyan companies by applying the distributional approach, which 
focuses on the statistical properties of earnings to determine behaviour that affects 
earnings and is based on the distribution of earnings after management. 
2- Listed companies should be included in future research in order to gain a 
comprehensive understanding of earnings management in Libya. Further, examining 
earnings management in IPO events in order to found out whether Libyan listed 
companies manage their earnings reports before issuing their shares to the public. 
Also, applying a matched-pair approach, which matches each IPO firm with a non-
IPO firm from the same industry with comparable earnings performance as the IPO 
firm during the issue year. 
3- This study confined itself to accounting standards, the internal corporate 
governance mechanism and audit quality as factors that constrict the practice of 
earnings management in Libya. The future research should include the impact of 
political forces and culture on inhibiting the practice of earnings management, and 
thus to improve the quality of financial reports in Libya. 
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Dear Participant 
APPENDIX(l) 
Questionnaire survey (English) 
I am a student at University of Gloucestershire, Business School investigating the 
earnings management phenomenon in the Libyan environment. This questionnaire 
survey is an important part of the research that the researcher is undertaking for the 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy in accounting. 
This survey seeks infonnation about earnings management motivations and 
techniques, and earnings management constraints, which includes accounting 
standards, internal corporate governance mechanisms, and audit quality. Therefore, I 
would be very grateful to you if you could spare a few minutes to complete this 
questionnaire and include any other comments. Please read the questionnaire carefully 
and answer all the questions, while answering the questions, please be sure to select 
the answers that indicate accurately depicts the present situation in the Libyan 
environment. Your responses to the questionnaire will be completely confidential. 
Thank you in advance for your participation in the completion of this questionnaire. 
Yours faithfully, 
Alhussien Elseraiti 
A Ihosrs@yahoo.com 
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This questionnaire contains 4 sections. Please complete all the questions by circling your 
answer or by placing a tick in the appropriate box. 
Section 1: General Information 
1-1 Job position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
External Financial manger! Internal Lender Tax Officer academic 
auditor Senior accounting Auditor 
1-2 Period of experience in your current position 
1 2 3 4 I 5 
Less than 1 year 1-5 years 6-10 years 11-15 years I More than 15 years 
1-3 Educational qualifications 
1 2 3 4 5 
Diploma Bachelor degree Master degree Doctoral degree Other* 
* Please specify ....................................................................... .. 
1-4 Educational specialisation 
1 2 3 4 5 
Accounting Finance Management Economics Other* 
* Please specdy .......... , ............................................................. . 
Section 2: Earnings Management Motivations 
The accounting literature provides motivations that lie behind the manipulation of earnings in 
financial reports. Please indicate, according to the Libyan environment, the extent to which 
you agree or disagree with the following motivations by circling the appropriate number on 
the following scale of I to 5, where: 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree (D) NoView(NV) Agree (A) Strongly Agree 
Dis3eree (SD) (SA) 
Earnings Management Motivations Ownership SD D NV A SA 
I. To a oid reporting losses. State-owned 1 2 3 4 5 
Private 1 2 3 4 5 
2. To a oid reporting profits decline. State-owned 1 2 3 4 5 
Private 1 2 3 4 5 
3. To report profits. State-owned 1 2 3 4 5 
Private 1 2 3 4 5 
4. To sustain last ear's profit performance. State-owned I 2 3 4 5 
Private 1 2 3 4 5 
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Earnin Man gement Motivation Owner hip SD D NV A SA 
ontinued) 
5. To In r the alue of management State-owned I 2 3 4 5 
mpen ti n. 
Private 1 2 3 4 5 
6. Tom t regulat T}' objecti e . State-owned I 2 3 4 5 
Private I 2 3 4 5 
7. To en han th chance of obtaining bank State-owned 1 2 3 4 5 
I an . Private I 2 3 4 5 
8. T m t pred termined e pectation State-owned 1 2 3 4 5 
(budgets). Private 1 2 3 4 5 
9. Tod re the am unt fta"e . State-owned 1 2 3 4 5 
Private 1 2 3 4 5 
10. Tc mitigat th thr at of di pIa ement (i.e State-owned I 2 3 4 5 
fegu rd j po iti n an or enhance their Private 1 2 3 4 5 
reputation . 
II. To in a inti rmati n alue. State-owned 1 2 3 4 5 
Private 1 2 3 4 5 
12. Other (pI a - if) ....................... . State-owned 1 2 3 4 5 
. .. ....... 
2 
2. 
S. In 
6. In 
7. 
. .. . ~ ............ ................. Private I 2 3 4 5 
lit rature pre nt te hnique that are u ed to manipulate earnings in financial 
t t th c. tent t \\ hich . ou ha e experienced the following forms of 
indi at b cir ling the appropriate number on the following scale from 1 
2 4 5 
Idom ( Usually(U) Always(A) 
N S ST U A 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
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Earning Management Techniques N S ST U A 
( Continued) 
10. Manipulati n of depre iationlamortisation figures. I 2 3 4 5 
II. Manipulation f deferred tax. I 2 3 4 5 
J 2. Manipulation of inve tment clas ification between trading I 2 3 4 5 
and a ailabl -fi r-sale in e tment to pre ent unrealised gain or 
loss from valuation. 
13. Manipulation ofa rual e timation. 1 2 3 4 5 
14. Manipuiati n of finance lea e contract to operating lease I 2 3 4 5 
contract to avoid recording assets and liabilities. 
15. Makin inadequate pro i ion . J 2 3 4 5 
16. Impr per a e r atuation. 1 2 3 4 5 
17. R latcd-party transa tion . 1 2 3 4 5 
18. Sal -and-I a bu back tran Ii' tion . I 2 3 4 5 
19. Ch n ing ace unting polic '. 1 2 3 4 5 
20.CI iti ali n in finnn ia! tatements. ] 2 3 4 5 
21. Oth r (pI a p i1) ............................................ I 2 3 4 5 
.. ... ... ..... . .... .... ... . .... . ..................................................... 
In ur pini n. \vhi h of the fI 110\\ ing procedures might constrain earnings management and 
impr the quality f financial rep rt in Lib a? 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PI indi ate ' ur an wer b ircling the appropriate number on the following scale from I 
1 S. \\h 
t 2 3 4 5 
Str nf!l. Di agr (D) No View(NV) Agree (A) Strongly Agree 
Di'~ree (SD) (SA) 
D D NY A SA 
1 2 3 4 5 
\\hicb fit 2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
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Accounting tandards Issues ( Continued) SD D NY A SA 
4. lncre ing the Ie el of di closure. ] 2 3 4 5 
5. Quart rI di clo ure. 1 2 3 4 5 
on internal corporate governance mechanisms 
The n ,\ ing qu ti n ask about the impact of adopting internal corporate governance 
me hani m in three main e ti ns. 
4.1.1 In . ur ie,. , which of the folio\' ing internal corporate governance procedures might 
n train aming mana ement and impro e the quality of financial reports in Libya? 
corporate governance mechanisms SD D NY A SA 
t. Th exi n e fan fti ti e audit committee. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Th 'i nc of an effecti e internal audit function. I 2 3 4 5 
3. The e. i t n of an ind pendent and competent board of I 2 3 4 5 
directors. 
4. 0lh r (5), pte pe ify ... . .. ..... .. ... ..... ................ ........... 1 2 3 4 5 
-. ~ ... ...... ~ .................... .... .... .. ........ .. ..... ... ........ " .. ............. .. ............................... 
!.4ll udit mmine h e\ eral function a listed in the table below. Please indicate the 
f h of th e fun tion b chao ing the answer from the following scale, 
2 3 4 5 
Little of importance Important 
(Ln 
NIAA NI LI I EI 
and 2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
tatement. 2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
the 2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
mplian 2 3 4 5 
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Audit Committee Function ( Continued) NIAA NI LI I EI 
9. o erseeing the cope of internal and external audit 1 2 3 4 5 
activities. 
10. Holding frequent meeting with internal and external 1 2 3 4 5 
auditors to discuss any problems arising. 
II. Re iev ing the independence of the internal audit 1 2 3 4 5 
department. 
12- R viev ing and appro e audit fee. I 2 3 4 5 
13- Re ie", ing and appro es type and fee of non-audit 1 2 3 4 5 
services by external auditors. 
14- Re iev ing the independence and objectivity of the 1 2 3 4 5 
external auditor. 
15. A ertaining \ hether proper action is taken to deal with I 2 3 4 5 
the recommendations made by the internal auditor. 
16. Other, (plea pe ify) ....................................... I 2 3 4 5 
....................................................................... 
4.2.2.2 The following are attributes of audit committee members' that may affect 
effe ti ene of an audit committee' work, which might constrain earnings management and 
impr e th quality of financial reports. Plea e indicate the extent to which you agree or 
di agr \\ ith the effecti ene of the following attributes by circling the answer on the 
fill I fl 5 h o OWlOg sca e 0 to were 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongl ' Di agree (D) No View (NY) Agree (A) Strongly Agree 
Disa2ree (SD) (SA) 
Attributes Of Audit Committee Members SD D NY A SA 
I. Th i t n fa ounting and auditing e pert in the audit 
c mmitt v ill: 
- H Ip in on training earning management and 
impr \'e the ~uali!y of financial rep.orts. I 2 3 4 5 
------- -- B~ Help -- ln - -i~- iea-i~g--tiie--co~m~nicat-ion---~itii 
eAternal and internal auditors. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Indep ndence fr m the e ecuti e directors v ill help In 
reducing the opportunity to manipulate financial reports. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Kno\\l d e about th corporation' acti ities. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. Int grity and und judgment and Personal qualities. 1 2 3 4 5 
e eral functions to be preformed by internal auditor in 
i t th audit committe in it v ork. Plea e specify the importance of functions by 
n fi llowin scale of 1 to 5 where: 
2 3 4 5 
Little of importance Important 
L 
NlAA NI LI I EI 
of the internal 2 3 4 5 
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Internal Auditor Function ( Continued) NIAA NI LI I EI 
2. R ie\! ing \ hether or not management has consistent 1 2 3 4 5 
treatment for imilar transa tion . 
3. Pr iding as i lance to external auditors. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. Di cu ing the finding of internal audits with the audit I 2 3 4 5 
committee members and management. 
S. Pr \iding the audit committee with an opinion on the I 2 3 4 5 
credibilit) of information contained in interim reports. 
6.0th . (pi pecity) ....................... ...... ....... 1 2 3 4 5 
.......................................................................... 
4.2.4 Independent and Competent Board o[Directors 
Plea indicate the e 'tent to \ hi h ou agree or disagree with the following statements by 
hoo ing the an wer from the folio ing scale, where: 
3 4 5 
o View (NY) Agree (A) Strongly Agree 
SA 
SD D NV A SA 
I. 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
an 
xe uthe ffic r (CEO) from acting 
ard of Oir ctors 2 3 4 5 
a: Pr . h'j'bfith ........ ···f~ · ;,;··b~j~g-~e·p~;;;fbi~· fO·~ " ~tti~g' ... -_. --.................... .. 
th rd' a end and m ting requirement. 1 2 3 4 5 
~ i; 'id . q·u · ~t .. ·~inru:s·aJ;(j~·o~k· hop .. io~ .. ·b .. ard~o·om· ............................. . 
to familiarize them \\ith recent de elopments in 
............................. .................................... 2 3 4 5 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SD D NV A SA 
2 3 4 5 
management to 
2 3 4 5 
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The Impact orE ternat Auditors on Earnings 
SD D NV A SA Mana2ement ( Continued) 
3. External auditors can detect earnings management 
eITe ti\ Iy. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. External auditor would not like to lose their reputation 
because they cannot detect earnings management. I 2 3 4 5 
4.3.2 Lengthy tenure 
Pie indi ate the e (tent to \ hich au agree or disagree with the following statements that 
I ngth t nure rna ha e the follo\ iog results by circling the answer on following scale of I 
t 5. \\here: 
1 3 4 5 
o View (NV) 
The Results of lengthy tenure 
I. More x rti 
2. B n rid ntification of client' rl k. 
3. Ben r und rstanding f client' bu ine 
4. Le "eptici m. 
5. Less inn \ali n. 
6. Le ind pend n 
7. 0th r ,( I a p itY) .................................... 
...................... ... .... ....... .. ............. ................ ...... 
4.3.3 'on-auditing 
Agree (A) 
SD D 
1 2 
1 2 
I 2 
I 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
Strongly Agree 
SA 
NV A SA 
3 4 5 
3 4 5 
3 4 5 
3 4 5 
3 4 5 
3 4 5 
3 4 5 
Pie indi ate th e t nt t whi h au agree or di agree with the following statements that 
n n-auditin rvi rna ha the folio\! ing re ults by circling the answer on following 
alaI t 5 wh r : 
1 2 3 4 5 I-
St r n~ly Di agr (D) No View (NV) Agree (A) Strongly Agree 
Disagree (SD) {SAl 
The Results of non-auditing services SD D NV A SA 
I.M . perti 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Belt rid ntifi ali n f lienl' ri k. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. Belt r und tanding of lient' bu ine 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. L, . k li i,nt. 
1 2 3 4 5 
S. l inn \ Ii n. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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6. Less independence. 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Others, (please specify) .................................... 
•••••• 4 ......................... ...... ....... ..... . ... .. ..... . .. .... ... 1 2 3 4 5 
4.3.4 OIlier (actor. 
Please state the e tent to which you agree or disagree that the following components affect 
audit quality. Please indicate b circling the answer on the following scale from 1 to 5, where: 
factors SD D NV A SA 
I. The large the firm size, the higher the audit quality. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. High audit fees helps in getting high audit quality. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. Strong competition helps in getting high audit quality. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. More la\ uits re ult high audit quality. 
I 2 3 4 5 
5. U ing more technology helps in getting high audit quality. 
I 2 3 4 5 
6. Str ng accounting education of auditors helps in getting 
high audit quaJity. 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Str ng accounting and auditing standards helps m 
getting high audit quality. 1 2 3 4 5 
8. Other, (plea e specify) ..... ...... ....... .................... 
1 2 3 4 5 
...................................... ................................... 
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Section 5: any more comments 
If you have any other comments about the issue of earnings management, please 
provide them here . 
..................... ............................................................................................... . 
........... ........................................................................................................ . 
..................................................................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................... 
.. ' ................................................................................................................. . 
............ ........................................................................................................ . 
............ .................. ...................................................................................... . 
..................................................................................................................... 
............ ........................................................................................................ . 
..................................................................................................................... 
............ .................................................................................................................... . 
............ ........................................................................................................ . 
............ ........................................................................................................ . 
..................................................................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................... 
............ ........................................................................................................ . 
..................................................................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................... 
..... , .............................................................................................................. . 
..................................................................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................... 
............ ..................................................................................................................... . 
.............. ..................................................................................................... . 
........................... ...................................................................................... . 
..................................................................................................................... 
........................................................................................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................... 
Thank you very much for your cooperation. 
If you would like to receive a summary of the final results, please complete the 
following details: 
Name: ............................................................................................ . 
E-mail: ............................................................................................................... . 
Address: ......................................................................................... . 
Please fell the following if you are agree to participate in the interview stage: 
I am agree: 0 Phone number: ............................... . 
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- Interviewer: 
- Date: 
- Starting Time: 
- Position: 
APPENDIX (2) 
Interview Questions (English) 
- Place of interview: 
- Finishing Time: 
- Number of years in this position: 
I-What are your impressions of corporations' financial reports in Libya? 
2- Do you agree that these reports represent the real corporation financial 
performance? 
- If not, Please explain why not? 
3- Do you agree that some Libyan managers manipulate earnings reports to achieve 
certain aims? 
- If yes, what are their motivations? 
- What are the techniques used? 
4- What are the procedures that should be taken to constrain earnings management 
and improve the quality of financial reporting in Libya? 
5 - How can accounting standards be improved to constrain earnings management 
and improve the quality of financial reporting in Libya? 
6- Do you think internal corporate governance mechanisms (Audit Committee, 
Internal Audit, and Board of Directors) can help to constrain earnings management 
and improve the quality of financial reporting in Libya? 
7- What are the factors which affect the quality of external auditing in Libya? 
8- How can we improve the quality of external auditors in Libya to constrain earnings 
management and improve the quality of financial reporting in Libya? 
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NParTests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
EM motivations:11. To 
mitigate the threat of 
displacement (i.e 
safeguard job position) 
and/or enhance their 
I 
reputation. 
APPENDIX (3) 
Mann-Whitney test results 
Ranks 
Job position N 
External Auditor 65 
Financial Manager/Senior 
Accounting 58 
Total 123 
Test Statistic.-
r-
EM 
motivation 
s:11. To 
mitigate 
the threat 
of 
displacem 
ent (i.e 
safeguard 
job 
position) 
and/or 
enhance 
their 
'" 
reputation. 
• Mann-Whitney U 19.500 
Wilcoxon W 2164.500 
.z 
-10.047 
: Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
a. Grouping Variable: Job position 
NParTests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
i ____ ". 
E M motivations: 11 . To 
: mitigate the threat of 
: displacement (i.e 
safeguard job positi 
and/or enhance thei 
on) 
r 
reputation. 
Ranks 
Job position 
Financial Manager/Senior 
Accounting 
lender 
Total 
261 
N 
58 
38 
96 
Mean Sum of 
Rank Ranks 
33.30 2164.50 
94.16 5461.50 
Mean Sum of 
Rank Ranks 
58.97 3420.50 
32.51 1235.50 
Test Statistics" 
EM 
motivation 
s:11 . To 
mitigate 
the threat 
of 
displacem 
ent (i.e 
safeguard 
job 
position) 
andJor 
enhance 
their 
reputation. 
Mann-Whitney U 494.500 
WilcoxonW 1235.500 
Z 
-4.915 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 
.000 
a. Grouping Variable: Job position 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
Job position 
Ranks 
E M motivations: 11 . To Financial Manager/Senior 
mitigate the threat of 
displacement (I.e 
Accounting 
safeguard job position) Tax Officer 
and/or enhance their 
Total reputation, 
Test Statistics" 
EM 
motivation 
s:11 . To 
mitigate 
the threat 
of 
displacem 
ent (i.e 
safeguard 
job 
position) 
andlor 
enhance 
their 
reputation. 
Mann-Whitney U 382.500 
WilcoxonW 847.500 
Z 
-4.622 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 
-
a. Grouping Variable: Job position 
262 
Mean Sum of 
N Rank Ranks 
58 52,91 3068.50 
30 28.25 847 ,50 
88 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
Ranks 
Job position 
E M motivations: 11 . To Financial Manager/Senior 
mitigate the threat of Accounting 
displacement (Le 
safeguard job position) Accounting Academic 
and/or enhance their Total 
reputation. 
Test Statisticsli 
EM 
motivation 
s:11 . To 
mitigate 
the threat 
of 
displacem 
ent (i.e 
safeguard 
job 
position) 
and/or 
enhance 
their 
reputation. 
Mann-Whitney U 84.000 
WilcoxonW 1854.000 
Z -9.166 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
a. Grouping Variable: Job position 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
E M motivations:11 . To 
mitigate the threat of 
displacement (i.e 
safeguard job position) 
and/or enhance their 
reputation. 
Ranks 
Job position 
External Auditor 
Internal Auditor 
Total 
263 
N 
Mean Sum of 
N Rank Ranks 
58 87.05 5049.00 
59 31.42 1854.00 
117 
Mean Sum of 
Rank Ranks 
65 33.47 2175.50 
52 90.91 4727.50 
117 
Test Statistics" 
EM 
motivation 
s:11 . To 
mitigate 
the threat 
of 
displacem 
ent (i.e 
safeguard 
job 
position) 
and/or 
enhance 
their 
reputation. 
Mann-Whitney U 30.500 
WilcoxonW 2175.500 
Z 
-9.718 
Asymp. Si9. (2-tailed) 
.000 
a. Grouping Variable: Job position 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
EM motivations:11 . To 
mitigate the threat of 
displacement (i.e 
safeguard job position) 
and/or enhance their 
reputation. 
Ranks 
Job position 
Internal Auditor 
Lender 
Total 
Mean Sum of 
N Rank Ranks 
52 51 .82 2694.50 
38 36.86 1400.50 
90 
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Test Statistic! 
EM 
motivation 
s:11 . To 
mitigate 
the threat 
of 
displacem 
ent (i.e 
safeguard 
job 
position) 
and/or 
enhance 
their 
reputation . 
Mann-Whitney U 659.500 
WilcoxonW 1400.500 
Z -2.942 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 
.003 
a. Grouping Variable: Job position 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
E M motivations: 11 . To 
mitigate the threat of 
displacement (i.e 
safeguard job position) 
and/or enhance their 
reputation. 
Ranks 
Job position 
Internal Auditor 
Tax Officer 
Total 
Mean Sum of 
N Rank Ranks 
52 47.57 2473.50 
30 30.98 929.50 
82 
265 
Test Statistics'! 
EM 
motivation 
s:11 . To 
mitigate 
the threat 
of 
displacem 
ent (i.e 
safeguard 
job 
position) 
and/or 
enhance 
their 
reputation. 
Mann-Whitney U 464.500 
Wilcoxon W 929.500 
Z -3.260 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 
.001 
a. Grouping Variable: Job position 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
E M motivations: 11 . To 
mitigate the threat of 
displacement (i.e 
safeguard job position) 
and/or enhance their 
reputation. 
Ranks 
Job position 
Internal Auditor 
Accounting Academic 
Total 
266 
Mean Sum of 
N Rank Ranks 
52 82.95 4313.50 
59 32.25 1902.50 
111 
Test Statisticsa 
EM 
motivation 
s:11 . To 
mitigate 
the threat 
of 
displacem 
ent (i.e 
safeguard 
job 
position) 
and/or 
enhance 
their 
reputation. 
Mann-Whitney U 132.500 
WilcoxonW 1902.500 
Z 
-8.565 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 
.000 
a. Grouping Variable: Job position 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
Job position 
Ranks 
E M motivations:3. External Auditor 
To report profits. Lender 
Total 
Test Statisticsa 
EM 
motivatio 
ns:3. To 
report 
profits. 
Mann-Whitney U 881 .000 
WilcoxonW 1622.000 
Z -2.604 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .009 
a. Grouping Variable: Job position 
Mean Sum of 
N Rank Ranks 
65 57.45 3734.00 
38 42 .68 1622.00 
103 
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NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
Ranks 
Job position 
E M motivations:3. 
To report profits. 
Financial Manager/Senior 
Accounting 
Lender l __ _ Total 
Test Statistics' 
Mann-Whitney U 
WilcoxonW 
Z 
Asymp. Sig . (2-tailed) 
EM 
motivallo 
ns3 To 
report 
profits. 
494.500 
1235500 
-4915 
.000 
a. Grouping Variable Job position 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
Ranks 
Job position 
E M mottvations:3--lntemal Audl::-to-r-f--
To report profits Lender 
L _______ Total 
Test Statistics' 
Mann-Whitney U 
WilcoxonW 
Z 
EM 
mollVatio 
ns 3 To 
report 
profits 
659500 
1400500 
-2942 
Asymp Sig (2-taJled) 003 J 
a Grouping Variable: Job position 
268 
Mean Sum of 
N Rank Ranks 
58 58.97 3420.50 
38 32.51 1235.50 
96 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
Job position 
E M motivations:3. Lender 
Ranks 
To report profits. Accounting Academic 
Total 
Test Statistic$' 
EM 
motivatio 
ns:3. To 
report 
profits. 
Mann-Whitney U 797.000 
Wilco)(onW 1538.000 
Z 
-2.594 I Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 
.009 
a. Grouping Variable: Job position 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
Job position 
Ranks 
E M motivations:3. External Auditor 
To report profits. Tax Officer 
Total 
Test Statistics8 
EM 
motivatio 
ns:3. To 
report 
profits. 
Mann-Whitney U 651 .000 
Wilco)(onW 1116.000 
Z -2.762 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 
.006 
a. Grouping Variable: Job position 
Mean Sum of 
N Rank Ranks 
38 40.47 1538.0C 
59 54.49 3215.0G 
97 
Mean Sum of 
N Rank Ranks 
65 52.98 3444.00 
30 37.20 1116.00 
95 
269 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
r Job position 
Ranks 
E M motivations:3 
To report profits 
Financial Manager/Senior 
Accounhng 
Tax Officer 
Total 
Test Statistics' 
Mann-Whitneyu 
WilcoxonW 
Z 
EM 
mohvatlo 
ns3 To 
report 
profits J 
382500 
847500 
-4622 
Asymp. Sig (2-tailed) 000 .J 
a. Grouping Variable: Job position 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
Ranks 
E M mollvatJons~ 3 . 
To report profits. 
Job po ltion 
Internal AudItor 
Ta)( Officer 
Total 
Test Statistic" 
I EM mOlivatro ns:3. To report 
~ profits. I ~~nn-Wh.ltney U - 486 000 
Wilcoxon W 951 000 
Z .3053 
Asymp. Sig (2-IaII_ed .... > ......... _--.;..OO....;.;;;.2...J 
a Groupmg Variable Job posItion 
N 
52 
30 
82 
270 
N 
58 
30 
88 
Me n 
Rank 
47.15 
31 70 
Mean 
Rank 
52.91 
28.25 
Sumo! 
Ranks 
2452.00 
951 .00 
Sum of 
Ranks 
3068.50 
847.50 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
Job position 
E M motivations:3. Tax Officer 
Ranks 
To report profits. Accounting Academic 
I Total 
Test Statisticsa 
EM 
motivatio 
ns:3. To 
report 
profits. 
Mann-Whitney U 587.000 
WilcoxonW 1052.000 
Z -2.765 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 
.006 
a. Grouping Variable: Job position 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
Ranks 
Job position 
EM motivations:B. To External Auditor 
enhance the chances of Tax Officer 
I obtaining bank loans. Total 
Test Statisticsa 
Mann-Whitney U 
WilcoxonW I !..ymp. 519. (2-laiied) 
EM 
motivation 
s:8. To 
enhance 
the 
chances of 
obtaining 
bank 
loans. 
596.000 
1061 .000 
-3.246 
.001 
a. Grouping Variable: Job position 
Mean Sum of 
N Rank Ranks 
30 35.07 1052.00 
59 50.05 2953.0C 
89 
Mean Sum of 
N Rank Ranks 
65 53.83 3499.00 
30 35.37 1061 .00 
95 
271 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
Ranks 
-
Mean Sum of 
Job position N Rank Ranks 
EM motivations·8. To Financial Manager/Senior 
enhance the chances of Accounting 58 
48.78 2829.00 
obtaIning bank loans Tax Officer 30 36.23 1087.00 
Total 88 
'---
Test Statistics' 
EM 
mobvalJon 
s:8 To 
enhance 
the 
chances of 
obtaining 
bank 
loans 
Mann-Whitney U 622000 
WtlcoxonW 1087000 
I ~symp Sig . (2-tailed) -2.312 
.021 
a. Grouping Variable Job position 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
Ranks 
-- M an Sum of 
Job po l\Ion N Rank R nks ~~ M mobvat'ons8 To Intemal Auditor 52 49.32 256450 
enhance the chances of T )( Officer 30 27.95 83850 I obtaining bank loans Total 82 
272 
Test Statisticsll 
EM 
motivation 
s:8. To 
enhance 
the 
chances of 
obtaining 
bank 
loans. 
Mann-Whitney U 373.500 
WilcoxonW 838.500 
Z 
-4.273 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 
.000 
a. Grouping Variable: Job position 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
Ranks 
Job position 
EM motivations:8. To Lender 
enhance the chances of Tax Officer 
obtaining bank loans. Total 
Test Statisticsll 
EM 
motivation 
5:8. To 
enhance 
the 
chances of 
obtaining 
bank 
loans. 
Mann-Whitney U 194.000 
Wilcoxon W 659.000 
Z -5.353 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
a. Grouping Variable: Job position 
Mean Sum of 
N Rank Ranks 
38 44.39 1687.00 
30 21 .97 659.00 
68 
273 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
I E M mot/Vations:8. To 
enhance the chances of 
obtaining bank loans. 
Ranks 
Job position 
Tax Officer 
Accounting Academic 
Total 
Ta t Statistics' 
EM 
motivallon 
5:8 To 
enhance 
the 
chances of 
obtaining 
ban 
loans. 
Mann-Whitney U 
WilcoxonW 
--t-~ 
Z 
Asymp. S19. (2-tailed) 
414500 
879500 
-4509 
.000 
a. Grouping Vanable. Job posillon 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
EM motivations". To 
avoid reporting 10 es. 
T t Statl tics' 
Ranks 
Job po ilion 
EX1 mal Auditor 
Lend r 
Total 
EM 
motivabo 
ns·' . To 
2989.000 
2865 
N 
274 
Mean Sum of 
N Rank Ranks 
30 29.32 879.5C 
59 52.97 312550 
89 
M n Sum of 
R nk R nk 
65 4598 298900 
6229 238700 1 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
Ranks 
Job position 
E M motivations:1. To Financial Manager/Senior 
avoid reporting losses. Accounting 
Lender 
Total 
Test Statistic$' 
EM 
motivatio 
ns:1. To 
avoid 
reporting 
losses. 
Mann-Whitney U 816.000 
WilcoxonW 2527.000 
Z -2.316 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .021 
a. Grouping Variable: Job position 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
Ranks 
Job position 
L 
EM motivations:1. To Internal Auditor 
avoid reporting losses. Lender 
Total 
Test Statistic$' 
Mann-Whitney U 
WilcoxonW 
Z 
I EM 
motivatio 
ns:1. To 
avoid 
reporting 
losses. 
l Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 
751 .000 
2129.000 
-2.068 
.039 
a. Grouping Variable: Job position 
N 
52 
38 
90 
275 
Mean Sum of 
N Rank Ranks 
58 43.57 2527.00 
38 56.03 2129.00 
96 
Mean Sum of 
Rank Ranks 
40.94 2129.00 
51.74 1966.00 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
, E M motivations: 1. To 
avoid reporting losses. 
Ranks 
Job position 
Lender-- -
Tax Officer 
Total 
Test Statisticsa 
I Mann-Whitney t.J 
, WilcoxonW 
Z 
Asym£:..,Sig. (2-tailed) 
EM 
motivatio 
ns:1. To 
avoid 
reporting 
tosses. 
347.500 1 
812.500 
-2.893 I 
.004 
a. Grouping Variable. Job position 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
N 
Ranks 
Job position 
lender ITM motivation. 1 To 
avoid reporting losses Accounhng Academic 
Total 
Test Statistics' 
EM 
motivatlo 
nS:1. To 
avoid 
reporting 
losses 
Mann-Whitney U 850 500 1 
Wilcoxon W 2620.500 
Z -2119 1 Aslmp S'9 (2-talled~ 034 
a Grouping Variable: Job posilion 
276 
38 
30 
68 
N 
Mean 
Rank 
40.36 
27.08 
Sum 01 
Ranks 
1533.50 
812.50 
Mean Sum 01 
Rank Ranks 
38 56.12 2132.50 
59 44.42 2620.5(1 
97 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
Ranks 
Job position 
EM Techniques:5. External Auditor 
Incorrect use of expenses Tax Officer 
on asset acquisition. Total 
Test Statistics4 
EM 
Techniqu 
es:5. 
Incorrect 
use of 
expenses 
on asset 
acquisitio 
n. 
Mann-Whitney U 500.000 
WilcoxonW 2645.000 
Z 
-4.030 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 
.000 
a. Grouping Variable: Job position 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
Job position 
Ranks 
N 
EM Techniques:5. Financial Manager/Senior 
Incorrect use of expenses Accounting 
on asset acquisition. Tax Officer 
Total 
Test Statistics4 
EM 
Techniqu 
es:5. 
. Incorrect 
use of 
expenses 
on asset 
acquisitio 
n. 
Mann-Whitney U 556.500 
WilcoxonW 2267.500 
Z -2.925 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 
.003 
a. Grouping Variable: Job position 
277 
Mean Sum of 
Rank Ranks 
65 40.69 2645.00 
30 63.83 1915.00 
95 
Mean Sum of 
N Rank Ranks 
58 39.09 2267.50 
30 54.95 1648.50 
88 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
EM Techniques:5. 
Incorrect use of expenses 
on assel acquisition. 
Ranks 
Job position 1 
Inlemal Auditor 
Tax Officer 
Total 
Test Statlstlcs' 
EM 
Techniqu 
es.S 
Incorrect 
use of 
expenses 
on asset 
acquisilio 
Wilcoxon W 1834.000 
Z ·3329 
l Asymp. 5 i9· (2-tailed)001 
a Grouping Variable. Job position 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
Ranks 
~ Technique"S. Jobposibon ---
Incorrect use of expenses 
on asset acquISition 
lender 
Tax Officer 
Total 
Test Statistics' 
EM ~ 
Techniqu 
es5 
Incorrect 
use of 
expenses 
on assel 
acqulSillo 
n. 
Mann-Whitney U 366.000 
Wilcoxon W 1107.000 
Z -2.119 
I Asymp SI9 (2 tailed) .007 
--'"-__ --J 
a. Grouping Vanable' Job po Ihon 
N 
278 
N 
38 
30 
68 
52 
30 
82 
Mean 
Rank 
35.27 
52.30 
Mean 
Rank 
29.13 
41 .30 
Sum of 
Ranks 
1834.00 
1569.00 
Sum of 
Ranks 
1107.00 
1239.00 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
EM Techniques:5. 
Ranks 
Job position 
Tax Officer 
Incorrect use of expenses Accounting Academic 
on asset acquisition. Total 
Test Statistic~ 
EM 
Techniqu 
es:5. 
Incorrect 
use of 
expenses 
on asset 
acquisitio 
n. 
Mann-Whitney U 625.000 
WilcoxonW 2395.000 
Z 
-2.617 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 
.009 
a. Grouping Variable: Job position 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
Attributes of A C 
members(C G):1. The 
existence of accounting 
and auditing experts in 
the audit committee 
will :B- Increase the 
communication with 
external and internal 
auditors. 
Ranks 
Job position 
External Auditor 
Financial Manager/Senior 
Accounting 
Total 
279 
Mean Sum of 
N Rank Ranks 
30 53.67 1610.00 
59 40.59 2395.00 
89 
Mean Sum of 
N Rank Ranks 
65 56.75 3689.00 
58 67.88 3937.00 
123 
Test Statistics' 
Mann-Whitney U 
WilcoxonW 
Z 
Asymp. 5;g. (2-tailed) 
Attributes 
ofAC 
members 
(C G):1. 
The 
existence 
of 
accounting 
and 
auditing 
experts in 
the audit 
committee 
will 8-
Increase 
the 
communic 
allon with 
external 
and 
Intemal 
auditors. 
1544.000 
3689000 
-2 487 
007 
a Grouping Variable. Job position 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
Attributes of A C 
members(C G) 1. The 
existence of aCCOunhng 
and auditing experts in 
the audit committee 
will '8- Increase the 
communication with 
external and Internal 
audllors. 
L 
Ranks 
Job posItion 
External Auditor 
Inlemal AudItor 
Total 
M n Sum 01 
N R nk Ranks 
~ -, t-
65 47.11 3062.00 
52 73.87 3841 .00 
117 
280 
Test Statistics" 
Attributes 
ofAC 
members 
(CG):1 . 
The 
existence 
of 
accounting 
and 
auditing 
experts in 
the audit 
committee 
will:B-
Increase 
the 
communic 
ation with 
external 
and 
internal 
auditors. 
Mann-Whitney U 917.000 
WilcoxonW 3062.000 
Z 
-4.847 
Asymp. Sig . (2-tailed) 
.000 
a. Grouping Variable: Job position 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
Attributes of A C 
members(C G):1. The 
existence of accounting 
and auditing experts in 
the audit committee 
will:B- Increase the 
communication with 
external and internal 
auditors. 
Ranks 
Job position 
External Auditor 
Lender 
Total 
Mean Sum of 
N Rank Ranks 
65 46.58 3027.50 
38 61.28 2328.50 
103 
281 
Test Statistics' 
~Mann-Whitney U 
WilcoxonW 
Z 
Asymp. Sig (2-tailed) 
Attributes 
ofAC 
members 
(C G):1. 
The 
existence 
of 
accountmg 
and 
auditing 
experts in 
the audit 
commIttee 
willS-
Increase 
the 
communic 
abon WIth 
external 
and 
internal 
audItors 
882500 
3027.500 
-2784 
005 
oJ 
a Grouping Variable' Job position 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
Attributes of A C 
members(C G) 1 The 
existence of accounting 
and auditing experts in 
the audit committee 
will :B- Increase the 
communication wdh 
external and intemal 
auditors. 
Ranks 
Job posItron 
Extemal AudItor 
Tax Officer 
Total 
N 
65 
30 
95 
282 
M an 
Rank 
44.51 
55.57 
Sum of 
Ranks 
2893.00 
1667.00 
Test Statisticsll 
Attributes 
ofAC 
members 
(C G):1. 
The 
existence 
of 
accounting 
and 
auditing 
experts in 
the audit 
committee 
will:B-
Increase 
the 
communic 
alion with 
external 
and 
internal 
auditors. 
Mann-Whitney U 748.000 
WilcoxonW 2893.000 
Z 
-2.145 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .032 
a. Grouping Variable: Job position 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
Attributes of A C 
members(C G):1. The 
existence of accounting 
and auditing experts in 
the audil committee 
will:B- Increase the 
communication with 
external and internal 
auditors. 
Ranks 
Job position 
External Auditor 
Accounting Academic 
Tolal 
283 
Mean Sum of 
N Rank Ranks 
65 55.08 3580.00 
59 70.68 4170.00 
124 
Test Statistics' 
r 
Attributes --, 
ofAC 
members 
{C G):1. 
The 
existence 
of 
accounting 
and 
audrtlng 
experts in 
the audit 
committee 
WlII.S-
Increase 
the 
communic 
atlon WIth 
external 
and 
Internal 
I Mann-Whitney U 
auditors 
1435000 
WilcoxonW 3580000 
Z 
-2770 
Asymp. Sig. (2-talled) 006 
a Grouping Variable: Job position 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
Ranks 
l __ _ Job position _ 
The impact of external External Auditor 
Auditors on E M(CG)1. 
External auditors are Financial M nager/Senior 
trained to be able to Accounting 
detect earnings 
management. Total 
264 
Mean Sum of \ 
N Rank Ranks 
65 38.63 2511 .0(l 
58 88.19 511500 \ 
123 ~ 
Test Statisticsa 
The impact 
of external 
Auditors on 
E M(CG):1. 
External 
auditors 
are trained 
to be able 
to detect 
earnings 
managem 
ent. 
Mann-Whitney U 366.000 
WilcoxonW 2511.000 
Z 
-8.317 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 
.000 
a. Grouping Variable: Job position 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
Ranks 
Job position 
The impact of external External Auditor 
Auditors on E M(CG):1. 
External auditors are Internal Auditor 
trained to be able to 
detect earnings Total 
management. 
Test Statisticsl 
Mann-Whitney U 
WilcoxonW 
Z 
The impact 
of external 
Auditors on 
E M(CG):1. 
External 
auditors 
are trained 
to be able 
to detect 
eamings 
managem 
ent. 
374.000 
2519.000 
-7.880 
.000 Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) I ~--~~------~ 
a Grouping Variable: Job position 
Mean Sum of 
N Rank Ranks 
65 38.75 2519.00 
52 84.31 4384.00 
117 
285 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
I The Impact of external 
Auditors on E M(CG):1. 
External auditors are 
trained to be able to 
detect eamings 
management. 
Ranks 
Job position 
External Audi 
Lender 
Total 
~ 
Test Statisticsi' 
The impact 
of external 
Auditors on 
E M(CG)·1. 
External 
auditors 
are trained 
to be able 
to detect 
earnings 
managem 
ent. 
260000 
2405.000 
Mann-Whitney U 1 
WilcoxonW 
Z -7.474 
I Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
a Grouping Variable: Job position 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
Ranks 
The impact of external 
Auditors on E M(CG):1 
External auditors are 
trained to be able to 
detect eamings 
management. 
Job position 
External Auditor 
Tax Officer 
Total 
N 
N 
286 
Mean Sum of 
Rank Ranks 
- f-
65 37.00 2405.00 
38 77.66 2951 .00 
103 
Mean Sumo! 
Rank Ranks 
65 37.25 2421.50 
30 71.28 2138.50 
95 
Test Statisticsi' 
The impact 
of external 
Auditors on 
E M(CG):1. 
External 
auditors 
are trained 
to be able 
to detect 
earnings 
managem 
ent. 
Mann-Whitney U 276.500 
WilcoxonW 2421 .500 
Z 
-6.510 
Asymp. Sig . (2-tailed) 
.000 
a. Grouping Variable: Job position 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
Job position 
Ranks 
The impact of external External Auditor 
Auditors on E M(CG):1. 
External auditors are Accounting Academic 
trained to be able to 
detect eamings Total 
management. 
Test Statisticsi' 
The impact 
of external 
Auditors on 
E M(CG):1. 
External 
auditors 
are trained 
to be able 
to detect 
earnings 
managem 
ent. 
Mann-Whitney U 559.500 
WilcoxonW 2704.500 
Z 
-7.466 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 
.000 
a. Grouping Variable: Job position 
287 
Mean Sum of 
N Rank Ranks 
65 41 .61 2704.50 
59 85.52 5045.50 
124 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
Non-auditing 
Ranks 
Job position 
External Auditor 
services(CG):6. Less Financial Manager/Senior 
independence. Accounting 
Total 
Test Statistics" 
Non-auditi 
ng 
services(C 
G):6. Less 
independe 
nce. 
Mann-Whitney U 680.000 
WilcoxonW 2825.000 
Z 
-6.491 
Asymp. Sig . (2-tailed) 
.000 
a. Grouping Variable: Job position 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
Job position 
Ranks 
Non-auditing External Auditor 
services(CG):6. Less Internal Auditor 
independence. Total 
Test Statistics" 
Non-auditi 
ng 
services(C 
G):6. Less 
independe 
nce. 
Mann-Whitney U 413.000 
Wilcoxon W 2558.000 
Z 
-7.437 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 
.000 
a. Grouping Variable: Job position 
N 
65 
52 
117 
288 
Mean Sum of 
N Rank Ranks 
65 43.46 2825.00 
58 82.78 4801 .00 
123 
Mean Sum of 
Rank Ranks 
39.35 2558.00 
83.56 4345.00 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
Ranks 
Job position 
Non-auditing Extemal Auditor 
services(CG):6. Less Lender 
independence. Total 
Test Statistics" 
Non-auditi 
ng 
services(C 
G):6. Less 
independe 
nce. 
Mann-Whitney U 306.500 
WilcoxonW 2451 .500 
Z 
-6.697 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 
.000 
a. Grouping Variable: Job position 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
Non-auditing 
services(CG):6. Less 
independence. 
Ranks 
Job position 
External Auditor 
Tax Officer 
Total 
Test Statistics" 
Non-auditi 
ng 
services(C 
G):6. Less 
independe 
nce. 
Mann-Whitney U 298.500 
WilcoxonW 2443.500 
Z 
-5.837 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 
.000 
a. Grouping Variable: Job position 
Mean Sum of 
N Rank Ranks 
65 37.72 2451 .50 
38 76.43 2904.50 
103 
Mean Sum of 
N Rank Ranks 
65 37.59 2443.50 
30 70.55 2116.50 
95 
289 
NPar Tests 
Mann-Whitney Test 
I 
Ranks 
Job position 
Non-auditing Extemal Auditor 
services(CG):6. Less Accounting Academic I independence. Total 
Test Statisticsl' 
Mann-Whitney U 
WilcoxonW 
Z 
Non-auditi 
ng 
services(C 
G):6. Less 
independe 
nce. 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 
. --~-
344.000 
2489.000 
-8.249 
.000 
a. Grouping Variable: Job position 
Mean Sum of 
N Rank Ranks 
65 38.29 2489.00 
59 89.17 5261 .00 
124 
290 
